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Abstract
Companies must be able to demonstrate that their way of doing business
is compliant with relevant rules and regulations. However, the law often
has open texture; it is generic and needs to be interpreted before it can
be applied in a specific case. Entrepreneurs generally lack the expertise
to engage in the regulatory conversations that make up this interpretation
process. In particular, for the application domain of technological startups,
this leads to legal risks. This research seeks to develop a robust module for
legal interpretation. We apply informal logic to bridge the gap between the
principles of interpretation in legal theory with the legal rules that deter-
mine the compliance of business processes. Accordingly, interpretive argu-
ments characterized by argument schemes are applied to business models
represented by value modeling (VDML). The specific outcome of the argu-
mentation process (if any) is then summarized into a compliance pattern, in
a context-problem-solution format. Two case studies in the application area
of startups shows that the approach is able to express the legal arguments,
but is also understandable for the target audience. The project is presented
in two parts; Part I, the background, contains an introduction, literature
review, motivational case studies, a survey on legal risks, and a modeling of
business and legal aspects. Part II builds on the interdisciplinary facets of
the first part to develop the Compliance Patterns Framework which is then
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Significant gains are being made within legal informatics and tools for legal knowledge
management. As Susskind [2008] predicted, demonstrable results, for instance on time
and cost savings from applying neural networks to legal discovery, have moved the
legal domain quickly from reticence and ambivalence, to gradual adoption of these
new techniques. These so-called deep learning techniques leverage a robust pattern-
matching apparatus. However, they introduce a black box architecture which is not
transparent for regulatory purposes. More work is needed to show how the governing
rules were interpreted and applied for a given technology to be compliant.
This thesis focuses on the application area of regulatory compliance. Companies
need to be able to demonstrate that their business processes conform with relevant
rules and regulations. A module for legal interpretation is a necessary component for
any formal model or algorithm applied to regulatory compliance, see also Boella et al.
[2013b]. This will help both regulators and companies understand what is happening
and what can be done to correct unwanted behaviors. Tools to support legal interpre-
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tation will also have the potential to give those entrepreneurs who are unable to afford
expensive legal consultants the possibility to (a) take their responsibilities in being
compliant, and (b) exploit hitherto unforeseen business opportunities in the law.
We address these questions by proposing a comprehensive approach to compliance,
which should help firms manage their legal risks. The method is expected to help
business owners investigate a business model’s legal risks, select and interpret the rel-
evant laws to understand how to handle those risks, and formulate common patterns
that can be used to check the business model for compliance. The idea is to summarize
knowledge and expertise about compliance of business processes in the form of so called
compliance patterns, compare Kartseva et al. [2010], Elgammal et al. [2016]. Similar to
design patterns Gamma et al. [1994], compliance patterns consist of a context-problem-
solution structure.
1.2 Context
Compliance involves assessing the organization’s business processes to see whether they
conform to the law. However, the law may sometimes be open textured: designed to
fit a number of scenarios [Dworkin, 1977]. That is why lawyers, judges and other legal
officers engage in an interpretive process while applying legal rules which may in turn
require legal argumentation to determine the prevailing interpretation in a particular
instance. Black [2002] calls these regulatory conversations. This may prove problematic
especially for firms which leverage technology to innovate on areas which are yet to be
legislated on, or for whose jurisprudence and case-law may not be as developed.
1.2.1 The ITxLaw misalignment
The ITxLaw misalignment is commonly highlighted by innovation and technology
lawyers, that the law is unable to keep pace with technological innovation. Lawyers may
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lack the technical expertise to assess the impact and flexibility of general legal princi-
ples to fit new business process innovations and solutions. Conversely, while technical
experts may be able to appreciate overarching legal principles e.g. privacy or copyright,
they may not be able to condense them to fit new scenarios.
Most regulatory frameworks are concerned with defining the general legal doctrine
of a particular domain. Where such doctrine is mature, its rules procedures and tests
may be prevalent and therefore directly applicable to the business processes of the firms
in that domain. However, with the continued growth and complexity of the law, this
will increasingly be the exception. Besides, new agile methods from IT have popularized
disruptive innovation and “uberisation”. This results in fast-evolving business models
wherein most domains will require new doctrine to be developed. However, such doc-
trine is not always directly applicable as it may not be particularized enough to apply
directly to a firm’s business processes. It needs to mature through interpretation by
lawyers, regulators, legal scholars and other jurists.
1.3 The problem
A number of developing frameworks in the AI and Law space aim to tackle this mis-
alignment from different perspectives: a) for legal reasoning e.g. Rotolo et al. [2015] b)
the management of legal knowledge e.g. Eunomos Boella et al. [2016] or c) for the ac-
quisition and specification of legal requirements in Requirements Engineering (RE) e.g.
Nomos 3 Ingolfo et al. [2014], Legal-URN Ghanavati et al. [2013] and FBRAM Breaux
[2009]. These developments are crucial towards solving the misalignment. The role of
legal interpretation has however been overlooked. We still need systematic methods
to explore the solution space in terms of the possible interpretations that could result
from applying a given legal provision.
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1.3.1 Legal interpretation
Compliance is defined by certain behavior in public and private law to govern interac-
tions among citizens. For firms, this behavior is characterized in their business processes
[Rozinat and van der Aalst, 2008]. However, the intricacies of matching precise business
processes within the elaborate linguistic patterns and semantics of the legislative and
juridical language found in legal rules are significant. Legislative drafting is a complex
art designed to factor competing considerations including concerns that may only arise
in the future. As a result, some legal provisions are purposefully broad [Boella et al.,
2013b]. This may lead to ambiguities in certain instances that will need to be inter-
preted to fit the circumstances of the case [Boella et al., 2014a]. We therefore need
robust methods of interpreting legal requirements before we can apply them. Unfor-
tunately, the mechanics of legal interpretation do not come defined with the law, they
remain with the legislative drafters, legal theorists, judges, lawyers and other legal
minds. As such, we need elaborate methods detailing legal interpretation methods that
can then be incorporated in the developing frameworks identified in section 1.3.
1.3.2 Scope
While our approach to compliance may be applicable to all firms, in this research project
we restrict ourselves to the application domain of startups. A startup is a company,
partnership, or temporary organization designed to search for a repeatable, scalable
business model that allows for fast growth [Blank and Dorf, 2012]. Startups became
popular with the dot com bubble at the turn of the century. They are revolutionizing
many aspects of life as we know it by disrupting mainstream business models that have
dominated traditional markets for long.
The disruption refers to new, innovative technologies that periodically emerge and
fundamentally transform companies, industries and markets [Christensen, 2013]. They
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do so by leveraging such technologies and the internet to create new markets and offer
products and services across transnational borders at lower costs. However, to do so,
they face formidable challenges to innovate scalability, raise funding, acculturate to
multilingualism and ward off regulatory challenges across transnational and multilevel
jurisdictions. Therefore, unlike most businesses, startups are confronted with the higher
likelihood of failure right from the start of their venture [Menkveld, 2012, Luo and
Mann, 2011, Marcovici, 2013].
In addition, startups and Small to Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) may not af-
ford to maintain compliance, legal or internal audit departments, a typical feature in
mainstream corporations. Governance, Risk and Compliance (GRC) management is
even more complicated for startups as they have short turnaround times of around
three to six months to deliver a prototype or launch a product. Moreover, our survey
in chapter 4 shows that they may not be sensitive to the legal risks that their innova-
tive business models present. Even when the founders are aware, such risks rank low
compared to other demands to monetize their business model. In some instances, the
risk could vitiate the business model. For instance, our first preliminary case of Aereo
in section 3.1, went bankrupt after failing to defend the suit filed against them.
1.4 The objectives
The general objective behind this research therefore, is to make the law more accessible
in specific contexts of usage particularly for non-experts to identify and handle legal
risks. Given the focus on startups, the specific objective is to investigate how to make
the law more accessible for regulatory risk management and compliance for the startup
domain. The goal is to help firms understand how they can achieve compliance. This
is problematic given the traditional view of compliance as a binary split that you are
either compliant or not. Perhaps leaning on the fact that only a judge can make
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such a decision and there is no halfway house in it. Over time, this view has been
challenged with the notion that compliance is the result of a regulatory conversation
Black [2002] occurring between firms and regulators. Here, firms engage in a number
of activities targeted to achieve compliance. However, many regulators will shy away
from adjudging such activities as being compliant.
Discussions with industry players revealed that in the U.S. and the Netherlands, it
is deemed favoritism if a regulator advises a single firm. As such, regulators fall back on
organizing workshops for all industry players on specific developments in the law but
remain unwilling to commit to a specific interpretation. This is understandable, the law
aims to be futuristic and to capture a number of scenarios and thereby explaining why
regulators may want to reserve as much room to flex their regulatory muscle. However,
it is also restrictive and expensive approach that offends the principle of legal certainty,
a key pillar pursued by many legal systems [Sartor et al., 2011, p. 3]. It inhibits firms
especially those relying on their innovative capacities such as startups and other SMEs
and regulators resulting in a regulatory gap in many legal systems in this regard.
The current reality is that we cannot ascertain absolute compliance for firms without
the promulgation of a judge or regulator. This forces us to step down from aiming
for absolute compliance to legal risk management. So the more realistic objective is
to explore the normative space governing a particular technology in order to make
it accessible at the information architecture level where non-experts can identify and
manage legal risks. This will help firms manage the legal risks they encounter while
innovating with new technologies and inspires the research questions below.
1.4.1 Research questions
1. How can legal knowledge engineers use the tools and techniques within legal
informatics to support and minimize legal costs for startups?
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(a) How to effectively establish the legal risks in a startup’s business model
resulting from its disruptive technology?
(b) How to develop business models whose processes achieve their value while
minimizing legal risks?
2. Given the legal uncertainty that startups’ disruptive business models create, how
should provisions in the relevant legal frameworks be interpreted?
(a) How to accurately determine the legal requirements for disruptive technol-
ogy?
(b) How to derive and maintain different interpretations that can be ascribed to
a particular legal requirement?
(c) How to reconcile conflicting interpretations of a given legal requirement?
3. How could legal knowledge engineers apply the final interpretations to manage a
firm’s business risks?
(a) How to effectively map these interpretations onto startups’ business models?
(b) How to iteratively transition business models from high-risk to low-risk mod-
els?
1.5 Methodology
For a comprehensive approach, we will need to model the business and its activities.
The legal rules will then be determined and any legal issues arising interpreted in order
to determine the scope of compliant behavior. Next the interpretations are reconciled
and the resulting prescriptions are formulated into patterns that describe how a business
model can achieve compliance. Accordingly, our approach incorporates the following
elements:
10 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.5.1 Value modeling
The value-based approach as a form of business modeling is a quick and effective way
to model the firm’s core business processes. It also helps frame the research to address
business needs which helps assure of its relevance. Our choice of modeling language,
Value Delivery Modeling Language (VDML), is now an Object Management Group
(OMG) standard. Tools for modelling using value modelling include e3value modelling
language Gordijn [2002] and Value Delivery Metamodel - Business enterprise engineer-
ing (VDMBee). These facilitate the exploration of an innovative e-commerce idea by
incorporating principles from requirements engineering and conceptual modeling to fo-
cus on IT-intensive value propositions. It therefore helps handle the explosion of the
e-commerce design space where many mutually influencing design issues have to be
decided upon, ranging from strategy and marketing to technological issues. This sce-
nario is radically different from traditional IT-intensive projects where the business
environment is more certain.
1.5.2 Eunomos
Our starting point is Eunomos, a Legal Knowledge Management System (LKMS) for
compliance management using legal ontologies Boella et al. [2016]. Eunomos is a state-
of-the-art system with a legal repository and an ontological tool that classifies legal
sources into navigable domains of law. It entrenches a juristic conceptualization of the
law that allows a legal knowledge engineer to enrich legal provisions with multiple inter-
pretations. This facilitates an interpretive process while eliciting the legal requirements
for compliance purposes. This conceptualization also accommodates the fact that there
could be more than one technical solution applied to satisfy a particular legal require-
ment. However, the addition of interpretations is an ad hoc process based on emerging
jurisprudence from the courts and regulators. Our aim is to augment Eunomos with
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a methodical way to determine and reconcile the possible interpretations of the legal
provisions repository in order to determine the legal requirements applicable to a given
business model.
1.5.3 Canons of interpretation
Legal doctrine embodies a number of principles from legal theory that are used in
legal interpretation. Such principles, referred to as canons of interpretation (hereafter
“canons”), may at times be competing, thereby resulting in conflicting interpretations.
In other instances, the interpretations could complement each other. Even then, one
might have a reason to prefer one interpretation over another owing to the weight placed
on one interpretive principle over the other [Rotolo et al., 2015]. It is these canons that
we appropriate to interpret legal rules.
Interpretations can take many thematic forms including a linguistic, systemic, teleo-
logical - evaluative, or trans-categorical perspective [MacCormick and Summers, 1991].
Each of these themes has a number of arguments: the linguistic could either have an
ordinary or a technical meaning; systemic interpretation could argue for contextual har-
monization, precedent, analogy, logical-conceptual, relevant principles or history; the
teleological could argue for purpose or substantive reasons; and the trans-categorical
looks for the intention from among the foregoing. These arguments and their respective
categories rest upon and implement values of special significance in legal order.
1.5.3.1 Legal argumentation
There may be a need to reconcile different interpretations of a legal rule regardless
of whether they complement or conflict with each other. For this, we apply the gen-
eral model for interaction of interpretative arguments proposed in MacCormick and
Summers [1991]. This model exploits the foregoing general distinction of argument
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types into four broad categories of linguistic, systemic, teleological-evaluative and trans-
categorical arguments.
1.5.4 Compliance patterns
We use the final interpretations to develop prescriptions which can be applied to the
value model. The prescriptions are used for formulate patterns of compliance with the
aid of argument schemes from informal logic. We call the result a compliance pattern


















































Figure 1.1: Thesis Research Framework
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1.5.5 Design principles
Our research takes a design-science approach. This type of research should result in a
viable artifact in the form a construct, a model, a method or an instantiation [Hevner
et al., 2004]. Prior legal informatics research and results from reference disciplines
provides foundational theories, frameworks, instruments, constructs, models, methods,
and instantiations used in the develop/build phase of a research study. Rigor will be
pursued by appropriately applying existing foundations and methodologies. We will
draw on the resources and tools described in Figure 1.1 to model the core business of
the startup in order to assess how it will be impacted by the law. We also aim for
relevance by testing the environment needs in a survey and studying several cases in
detail.
1.6 Thesis contributions
We strive for an interdisciplinary effort to combine research efforts from different do-
mains. This will deliver a comprehensive method that delivers scientific relevance to
the new area of Legal Informatics within AI and Law, while having direct application
and benefit for the entrepreneurial efforts of startups in the business domain. The main
contribution is a method for deriving compliance patterns which will help to narrow
the misalignment between IT and Law.
The compliance patterns themselves will facilitate the compliance of business models
in specialised domains which will not only minimise the costs of non-compliance but also
protect governments from the possible loss of taxes. The patterns will also help in the
tracking of the interpretative decisions the firm makes thereby facilitating a regulatory
conversation with regulators. Moreover, the Compliance Patterns Framework (CPF)
adds another method Hevner et al. [2004] to the foundations in the legal informatics
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knowledge base.
The context-problem-solution structure aims to guide entrepreneurs, compliance of-
ficers, and other business executives to solve business problems within the legal so-
lution space. The patterns will be most useful to the innovation process such that
entrepreneurs will be able to consult on how the implementation of their envisioned
systems could be hampered by existing legal frameworks and how to cater for legal
risks while designing their business models. Technical experts could similarly benefit
from these patterns to determine the protocols to be implemented in a system. The
CPF covers the following sub-contributions:
1. A meta-model formalizing concepts of the framework;
2. Implementation of the meta-model to derive compliance patterns;
3. Definition of a methodology for legal risk analysis using value models;
4. Mapping multiple interpretations to business processes; and
5. Extension of the Eunomos ontology with a module for interpretation.
In addition, exploratory case studies illustrated below will help evaluate the utility,
quality and efficacy of the foregoing design artifacts. The first study of two media
technology startup scenarios in the problem environment already demonstrate gaps
in legal knowledge management that our proposed artifacts could make a significant
contribution.
The application of the methodology to Eunomos will ensure that legal experts using
the system arrive at consistent interpretations particularly for new innovations. Even
more importantly, they will be able to track the evolution of particular laws and the
consequent effect on interpretation. This could cut down on the time spent on legal
research hence lowering the legal costs and thereby the costs of compliance for many
firms.
This research also involves a survey that investigates how startups make decisions
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regarding legal risks. It helps us to analyze the gaps in legal risk management in order
to develop appropriate requirements for the CPF in chapter 6.
1.6.1 Publications based on thesis
We are continually growing a number of publications presented below in reverse chrono-
logical order. The following are the papers where the candidate was the main au-
thor:
1. Muthuri R, Boella G, Hulstijn J, Capecchi S, and Humphreys L, (2017), Com-
pliance patterns: harnessing value modeling and legal interpretation to manage
regulatory conversations. In Proceedings of ICAIL ’17, London, United Kingdom,
June 12-16, 2017
2. Muthuri R, Boella G, Hulstijn J, and Humphreys, L (2016), Argumentation-based
legal requirements engineering: The role of legal interpretation in requirements
acquisition 9th Int. Workshop on Requirements Engineering and Law (RELAW).
3. Muthuri R., (2016) Value-based Models for Ontology-driven, Legal Risk Manage-
ment, 10th International Workshop on Value Modeling and Business Ontologies.
4. Muthuri R., (2015) The Place of Legal Ontologies in Regulatory Compliance,
ICAIL Doctoral Consortium.
5. Muthuri R, Boella G, Hulstijn J, (2014) Augmenting Legal Knowledge Manage-
ment Systems with model-based Compliance Patterns, Italian Chapter of AIS.
6. Muthuri, R, Ghanavati S, Rifaut A, Humphreys L, and Boella G, (2014), The Role
of Power in Legal Compliance, 7th Int. Workshop on Requirements Engineering
and Law (RELAW), Karlskrona, Sweden, Extended Abstract.
7. Boella G, Humphreys L, Muthuri R, Rossi P, van der Torre L, Managing Legal
Resources in Open Governance and E-Democracy: Eunomos - An AI and Law
Response, Proceedings of the International Conference for E-Democracy and Open
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Government 2014, Reflection.
The following are papers where the candidate has had a significant contribution in
works related to the thesis.
1. Robaldo L., Humphreys L., Sun X., Cupi L., Santos CT., Muthuri R., (2015) The
ProLeMAS project: representing natural language norms in Input/Output logic.
Ninth International Workshop on Juris-informatics (JURISIN).
2. Bartolini C., Muthuri R., Santos C., 2015, Using Ontologies to Model Data
Protection Requirements in Workflows, Ninth International Workshop on Juris-
informatics (JURISIN).
3. Bartolini C., and Muthuri, R., (2015) An Ontology of the Forthcoming EU
Regulation, Workshop on Language and Semantic Technology for Legal Domain
(LST4LD).
4. Humphreys l., Boella G., Robaldo L., di Caro L., Cupi L., Ghanavati S., Muthuri
R., van der Torre L., (2015) Classifying and Extracting Elements of Norms for
Ontology Population using Semantic Role Labelling, ICAIL Workshop on Au-
tomated Detection, Extraction and Analysis of Semantic Information in Legal
Texts.
5. Boella, G., Humphreys, L., Muthuri, R., Rossi, P., van der Torre, L., A Crit-
ical Analysis of Legal Requirements Engineering from the Perspective of Legal
Practice, Seventh International Workshop on Requirements Engineering and Law
2014.
6. Boella, G., Colombo Tosatto, S. , Ghanavati, S., Hulstijn, J.,Humphreys, L.,
Muthuri, R., Rifaut, A., and van der Torre, L. (2014), Integrating Legal-URN and
Eunomos: Towards a Comprehensive Compliance Management Solution, Proceed-
ings of Artificial Intelligence and the Complexity of Legal Systems (AICOL).
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1.7 Thesis outline
Chapter 2: Literature review considers the state-of-the-art in compliance man-
agement; the traditional approach (legal informatics) and the philosophical approach
(logic). We then explore the different components necessary for an effective interdis-
ciplinary approach; business modeling (value modeling), legal knowledge management
systems (Eunomos), legal theory (interpretation and argumentation), informal logic
(argumentation schemes), and requirements engineering (EARS). We then propose a
comprehensive approach for legal risk management.
Chapter 3: Case studies: motivation presents two preliminary case studies
to further motivate the research. The two are authoritative cases adjudicated at the
Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) and the Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Union (CJEU) respectively. They involve startups with disruptive technology
that were held to be non-compliant. They will therefore help understand how to answer
the first question.
Chapter 4: Survey on legal risks presents the design, development and dissem-
ination of a survey done to help understand how startups manage their legal risks. It
gives us further requirements for the CPF in chapter 6 and thereby sets the groundwork
to answer research question 1(b).
Chapter 5: Modeling interpretive arguments details the preprocessing nec-
essary to apply the framework. Two steps are involved: (a) an example of value mod-
eling, and (b) semi-formalization of 11 canons of interpretation using argumentation
schemes.
Chapter 6: The Compliance Patterns Framework is the main contribution
of the thesis. This chapter details the semi-formalization of the legal risks analysis
process using argumentation schemes. This determines the legal rules applicable to the
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business model at hand. Any issues for interpretation are determined, reconciled and
the resulting prescriptions define the scope of compliant behavior expected. These are
then formulated into system requirements and summarized into compliance patterns
using a context-problem-solution format. It answers research question 2.
Chapter 7: Evaluation The CPF is evaluated with two case studies; BitPesa in
Nairobi, Kenya and Firstlife in Turin, Italy. Firstlife’s technology is applied to plan
and coordinate civic events using open data. This raises data management concerns,
and the risk of copyright infringement while using public sector information. BitPesa
uses Bitcoin to conduct money remittance services and is potentially in breach of Anti-
Money Laundering (AML) and Know Your Customer (KYC) regulations as there is
no regulatory framework in Kenya to handle cryptocurrencies. This helps to answer
research question 3. The studies are to show that the method works, and is useful and
applicable for the target audience.
Chapter 8: Conclusion explores how this work can fit within the existing tools
and techniques within legal informatics and concludes the work by considering the
limitations of the thesis and explores opportunities for future work.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
Figure 2.1: Compliance from a legal informatics perspective
The journey of regulatory compliance could be traced through the following pictorial
depiction in Figure 2.1. This chapter is an attempt to locate each of those efforts in a
bid to harmonize them. The tools work to maintain an intermediate representation of
prescriptions derived from legislation relevant to a particular context. They then map
these prescriptions onto business processes and data with the help of ontologies. The
legal sources on the left are transformed into machine readable artifacts using legislative
XML [Sartor et al., 2011]. From this we derive legal requirements which are then
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classified into different domains where one can elicit usable legal prescriptions as shown
in the middle section [Boella et al., 2011, van Noortwijk and van Noortwijk, 2017]. An
ongoing challenge on the right is how to map the prescriptions onto business processes
that are used to define the system protocols implemented in a system [Boella et al.,
2014a,b]. The overall goal is to convert legislative text into structured computational
artifacts [Gordon and Breaux, 2011, McCarty, 2017]. Other fields include requirements
engineering, logic and other formal techniques [Ashley and van Engers, 2011].
2.1 The state-of-the-art in compliance management
Legal informatics research continues to investigate the misalignment between business
processes and the relevant legal rules that determine their compliance [Sadiq and Gov-
ernatori, 2015, Boella et al., 2013b]. Part of the reason for the fragmentation is the lack
of a clear strategy on which context and domain to initiate the problem-solving. While
the entrepreneur is concerned with the flow of value, the computer scientist is concerned
with information flow and the lawyer with compliance. In addition, responses to our
survey on how startups handle legal risks in chapter 4 reveal that founders struggled
to identify, interpret and incorporate the law into the decision-making process. On the
other hand, lawyers struggled to understand the technology involved. This calls for a
strong interdisciplinary approach.
2.1.1 Soft-law
The notion of soft law aims to simplify legislation by deliverying legal frameworks
that are more accessible to those being governed. This ranges from general framework
directives to soft law instruments such as self and co-regulation [Marsden, 2011] and
ISO standards e.g. ISO 9001:2015 requirements for quality management systems [ISO,
2015]. However, There is currently no method or reconciling such instruments with
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their overriding hard law statutory frameworks. Regulators, advisers and lobby groups
often attempt to fill this gap by giving compliance advice and feedback on how to
comply with new laws or amendments. Even then, such initiatives are usually ad hoc
and those presiding are often unwilling to commit to specific interpretations of the law
and thereby legal uncertainty continues to persist.
2.1.2 The traditional view of law (legal informatics)
It is not surprising that much academic research in compliance, e.g., Lu et al. [2009],
and El Kharbili et al. [2011], have sought to develop a notation to represent norms and
annotate business process models. However, while technically sound, the labellings are
difficult to create and the notation difficult to read for legally trained people [Boella
et al., 2014a]. Moreover, BPMN-type process models are too general for use in legal
settings. There are rule-based approaches currently being pursued to represent and
reason with legal requirements.
The Legal Knowledge Interchange Format (LKIF) is a comprehensive suite devel-
oped within the ESTRELLA project [Klarman et al., 2008]. It incorporates a legal core
ontology and a legal rule language to facilitate comprehensive legal knowledge man-
agement [Gordon, 2008, Gordon et al., 2009]. Apart from representing legal rules and
facilitating legal reasoning, LKIF has the advantage of being open source. LegalRuleML
is an OASIS standard1 based on RuleML. It progresses over LKIF in its expressivity
and its ability to represent temporal aspects which is crucial for the legal domain
[Athan et al., 2013]. However, none of these approaches incorporate a methodology for
identifying the possible interpretations that may be competing or complementing one
another.
There is no system that we know of currently, that handles legal interpretation.
1www.oasis-open.org
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This is a real problem for organizations attempting to apply the law to their area,
particularly where norms are purposefully open and not specific: where for instance
European law has yet to be transposed into national law, or where there have been few
test cases on what the norms mean in practice.
2.1.3 The philosophical view of law (logic)
Formal models offer provable guarantees that the system will comply with the specified
legal requirements. The power of ontological modeling has been applied to represent
legal rules. However, legal ontologies are distinctive in that they are committed by
concepts in legal theory. While a pragmatic rule-based approach has proved shallow,
pure logic-based methods are also detached from the epistemological challenges in legal
theory [Muthuri, 2012]. It is instructive to appreciate that legal modeling transcends
technological advancement and is an intricate blend of AI technology, legal theory, and
knowledge engineering. It may be possible to synthesize these fields to help the law
stand the pace of technological innovation.
2.1.4 An integrated approach for AI and Law
Our design of compliance integrates the analysis of value from the business and legal
domains. Given that value analysis is a complex endeavor more so in interdisciplinary
settings, we look to rigorous ontology-based conceptual modelling, the core of artificial
intelligence. We apply value modeling to avail of the elaborate mechanisms for measur-
ing a startup’s economic value and the value-at-risk. Similarly, our analysis of legal risk
is informed by the ongoing conceptualization of value modeling based on foundational
ontologies [Guarino et al., 2016].
To maximise the degree of fit, we focus on the value ascription relationship between
executives as agents, and compliance, as a value object. Given that perceived value of
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compliance is low among startups, we concentrate on the theoretical value of compli-
ance. However, even with elaborate value modeling tools, it is challenging to estimate
the legal risk. Courts and regulators have the power to escalate fines where they sense
complacency or flagrancy. For instance, Office of Communications (OFCOM) recently
fined vodafone £4.65M for non compliance where previous fines were £250,000 against
H3G and £1M against EE [OFCOM, 2016]. Even then, some cues exist for estimating
the risk e.g. where a defendant subsequently acquires a license after infringing a copy-
right, damages should not exceed double the amount payable under the license before
the first infringement.
Our modeling of the interpretive process is also informed by the developing notion of
relationship reification which considers a relationship as an object that helps the relation
to hold [Guarino et al., 2016]. This helps us specify the consecutive steps for the legal
analysis, from domain specification to argumentation, and their individual qualities.
An effective integration of the legal and business domains demands a closer review of
business modeling, legal risk analysis, informal logic, legal theory, and requirements
engineering RE, which we undertake in the following sections.
2.2 Business modeling
We need to model the business in a manner that will represent the interests of the
stakeholders from business, IT and law. A business-first approach aligns to the juristic
conceptualization of the law where legal analysis begins with the facts of a given case or
transaction. A similar approach has been developed in the privacy and security domain
[Compagna et al., 2007]. See also the EUCases project Boella et al. [2015].
We adopt the notion of economic value as a unifying factor for all the stakeholders.
This will help model the necessary scenarios showing possible trade-offs for the success
of the business model. The point is to model choices at the strategic level of decision
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making, not at an operational level. We expect that the value-based approach is a
quick and effective way to model the firm’s core business processes. It also helps to
frame the research to address business needs, and assure its practical relevance.
Several approaches exist to value modelling. Osterwalder’s Business Model Canvas
is a succesful approach [Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010]. It is easy to apply, but its
results are not precise enough for legal analysis. Gordijn’s e3-value focuses on exchanges
of value objects in a value network [Gordijn et al., 2006]. The e3-value ontology is
suitable in principle, but currently, e3-value lacks tools support. Now it is only a
graphical notation; the ontology cannot be used for automated reasoning. Therefore,
we have adopted VDML an official representation language supported by OMG [2014].
VDML has elaborate notations for analysis and design of the operation of an enterprise
and it has tool support through the VDMBee value management platform.2
2.2.1 The startup environment
Startups provide this research with a rich application area. The online startup environ-
ment is empowering many young and vibrant innovators to become entrepreneurs with
much leaner resources compared to traditional brick and mortar stores [Blank, 2013].
However, startups rely on angel investors and venture capitalists to fund their ventures
through to a successful IPO, merger or buyout. Indeed, resources in this domain are
constrained and there are barely any compliance officers or an internal audit depart-
ment as such. Nevertheless, they are confronted by hyper-regulation just like any other
mainstream business entity.
We study two cases whose disruptive technology was litigated in the highest courts
in their jurisdictions to inform further research on how to elicit legal requirements for
startups. The first case is the recent US Supreme Court case, American Broadcast-
2www.vdmbee.com
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ing Companies v. Aereo.3 Subsequently, the ITV vs TVCatchup case4 strengthens





Figure 2.2: VDML Concepts
Value-based modelling is closely related to modelling the strategic goals of a firm.
Indeed, the e3-value is compatible with I* Yu [1997] a goal-modelling approach, so the
two could be used interchangeably for mutual benefit. I* which stands for distributed
intentionality, is founded on the philosophy that actors relate to each other from an
intentional perspective as opposed to simple actions and information flows. While each
actor has strategic goals to pursue, these are achieved via a network of intentional de-
pendencies. This enables a shared understanding vital to the online environment where
a number of enterprises have to collaborate to deliver the e-Service. Moreover, there is
3573 U.S. (2014)
42015 EWCA Civ 204
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usually no centralised authority so this approach helps to manage the complex decision
making involved. Accordingly, we model different actors, the flow of the services and
the attendant dependencies in order to identify synergies and vulnerabilities.
The work of Osterwalder and Pigneur [2002] is also instructive in this regard. Once
the business goal is determined, it will be matched against the goals in the envisioned
system to identify the corresponding compliance pattern(s). This helps determines
the applicable regulations and the compliance behavior to be implemented. Figure 2.2
shows the value modeling concepts from VDML. An organization may have a particular
competency that its roles apply in activities to create value. A competency is an ability
the business has and applies in order to perform the work as represented by an activity.
As seen in the Figure 2.2, a competency could either be a capability, method, or resource
within an organizational unit.
A capability is the ability to perform a type of work e.g. fleet management or pas-
senger seating. A method is a collaboration specification that defines the activities,
deliverable flows, business items, capability requirements and roles that deliver a ca-
pability and associated value contributions. A resource is a thing used by an activity
to produce an outcome e.g. a patent, a system, or a class of human resource with a
certain skill.
As seen in Figure 2.2, a capability could be resource-driven or method-driven. Both
resources and methods are potential sources of legal risks for an organization. However,
we will concentrate on resources given that disruptive technology qualifies as a resource
not a method. We therefore model the application of the technology as a resource with
regard to the capabilities it enables and the consequent activities that create value
within the organization.
Figure 2.3 shows the methodology by VDMBee, a value management platform im-
plementing VDML. We concentrate on competency design as this is where resources are
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modeled. VDMBee advice not to list all the competencies but to focus on those directly
related to the strategies i.e. in the strategy map. The naming convention given is that
a) the competence should reflect the relationship and b) it should be a combination of






























Figure 2.3: VDMBee Methodology for continuous business model planning
business provides through a capability offer. The question for us is, what capability
offers does a business offer through its technological resource and what is the legality
of such an offer.
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2.3 Legal risk analysis
This second part elaborates on the interpretive process. It begins by identifying the
relevant legal domain and the applicable rules, followed by an analysis of the identified
business competencies and activities against such rules.
2.3.1 Eunomos
To identify the legal rules, we first classify the identified activities within the govern-
ing domain of law. A LKMS could be incorporated at this stage. Boella et al. [2016]
discuss Eunomos, a specific legal knowledge management system, that could act as a
plug-in of a Business Process Management system, to handle multiple interpretations
of norms. In Eunomos, the European Legal Taxonomy Syllabus ontology framework
[Ajani et al., 2017] has been extended to include prescriptive norms, as opposed to
the terminological definitions found in constitutive norms, that are covered by most
existing systems. Humphreys [2016] and Humphreys et al. [2015] seek to address the
resource bottleneck of populating ontologies by semi-automated extraction of consti-
tutive norms (terminology) and prescriptive norms (legislative prescriptions) from the
text of legislation, using Semantic Role Labeling (SRL).
2.3.2 Informal logic (argumentation schemes)
We adopt argument schemes from informal logic to model the steps of the legal risk
analysis. This area of logic has been used to demonstrate how legal terms are defined
by a sequence of argumentation moves, in which a given rule is refined by taking new
exceptions and precedents into account. This approach is more intuitive and closer
to legal reasoning and is therefore more likely to be appreciated by stakeholders from
the legal fraternity. Mylopoulos et al. [1992] also use argumentation methods to re-
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fine goals. In a similar vein, we apply the abstract argumentation schemes developed
by Walton et al. [2008] to generate and characterize the rule patterns that typify a
particular legal domain. The resulting templates are then instantiated with the partic-
ulars of a given business model. A model for legal argumentation is then deployed to
determine the overall winning interpretation. It is this final interpretation that is used
to derive a common pattern summarizing the context, the legal problem, i.e. risk of
non-compliance, and the proposed solution. We refer to this triple of context-problem-
solution as a compliance pattern. It specifies compliant behavior for the business model
and subsequent models based on that pattern.
Our aim with compliance patterns is close to that of Walton et al. [2008] in model-
ing argumentation schemes to develop tools which can help people to construct a wide
variety of arguments, improving their ability to protect their interests in dialogues, es-
pecially in the legal domain. They distinguish between two functions of argumentation
schemes: as argument patterns useful for reconstructing arguments from natural lan-
guage texts, and as methods for generating arguments from argument sources, such as
legislation or precedent cases. In many fields, such as the law, solving problems requires
several forms of reasoning. We apply the schemes in the latter sense to generate and
represent different interpretive arguments that help to interpret the legal provisions.
The schemes are also used as templates that capture the patterns of compliant behavior
in a particular domain of law. The argument schemes help to generate and characterize
the rule patterns that typify a particular legal domain. The resulting templates are
then instantiated with the particulars of a given business model.
Patterns have been used before to address compliance: Kartseva [2008], Kartseva
et al. [2010] uses patterns to prescibe controls in business models, while Elgammal et al.
[2016] use patterns to specify compliance constraints on business processes. However,
our work is novel, because it applies argumentation theory to capture the outcome of
legal interpretation, tailored to a particular business model. The utility is in identifying
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and reusing existing patterns for analyzing compliance and even more importantly, for
tracking regulatory changes.
2.4 Legal theory
We now take a look at the different canons of interpretation introduced in chapter 1.
Interpretations can take many thematic forms. Compare with Araszkiewicz [2013] that
concentrates arguments from reason in civil law jurisdictions. We apply the four themes
and their accompanying eleven canons (types of arguments) identified by MacCormick
and Summers [1991]. Albeit ambitious, this study by leading legal theorists representing
their individual countries, was conducted for over a decade in an effort to demystify
and reconcile the cross-jurisdictional differences on interpretation. They offer sufficient
arguments for our purposes to identify, and a classification to map the nature of legal
reasoning as follows:
a Linguistic arguments: argument from ordinary meaning, argument from tech-
nical meaning;
b Systemic arguments: argument from contextual harmonization, argument from
precedent, argument from analogy, argument from a legal concept, argument from
general principles, argument from history;
c Teleological-evaluative arguments: argument from purpose, argument from
substantive reason; and
d Trans-categorical-arguments: argument from intention.
2.4.1 Linguistic interpretation
Here the aim is to preserve the clarity and accuracy in legislative language and a
principle of justice that forbids retrospective judicial rewriting of a legislature’s chosen
words [MacCormick and Summers, 1991]. The arguments therefore appeal essentially
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to an ordinary meaning or ordinary words, or to a technical meaning of ordinary or
technical words, whether legal or non-legal.
Argument from ordinary meaning: This is an argument from a standard ordinary
meaning of ordinary words used in the specific section of the statutory text being
interpreted. Where there is more than one standard ordinary meaning of an ordinary
word used in the text, as is often the case, the general context of use in the section of
the statute involved can usually be taken to indicate which meaning is linguistically
appropriate.
The argument from technical meaning: These are arguments from a standard
technical meaning of ordinary words, legal or non-legal. Whether an ordinary word or
phrase is used with a standard technical meaning can frequently be readily determined
from the general context of use in the section of the statute involved, from relevant
history of the use of such words previously in the law or from other evidence. Tech-
nical terms here include technical legal terms, as well as the technical terms of other
specialized activities..
All of the remaining types of arguments numbered below may:
1. Confirm a standard ordinary meaning of ordinary words or a standard technical
meaning of ordinary or technical words;
2. Support a contrary special meaning in place of a standard meaning of ordinary
words or a standard technical meaning of ordinary or technical words; or
3. Clarify and thus determine the statutory meaning where there is no determi-
native ordinary or technical meaning because of syntactic ambiguity, vagueness,
evaluative openness or the like.
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2.4.2 Systemic interpretation
This subset emphasizes the principle of rationality grounded in the value of coherence
and integrity in a legal system [MacCormick and Summers, 1991].
Argument from contextual harmonization: This argument arises not only from
the part of the statutory section in which the words in issue appear, but from usage in
other parts of that section, in related sections of the same statute, and in sections of
closely related statutes. It is noted that contextual harmonization arguments are fre-
quently available although they may be limited when the relevant elements of statutory
context conflict. For instance, one section of the statute may suggest a given meaning
while still another indicates a contrary meaning. Poor drafting of a particular part or
the whole statute may also limit this type of argument.
Argument from precedent: These arguments invoke precedents already interpreting
the statute at hand. MacCormick and Summers [1991] note that this argument is widely
influential in code systems, just as it is in the USA and in the UK, where it is sometimes
said that a binding prior interpretation even becomes ‘part of the statute’.
The argument from analogy: This is where a statutory provision is significantly
analogous with similar provisions of other statutes, or a code, or another part of the code
in which it appears, then even if this involves a significant extension of or departure
from ordinary meaning, it may properly be interpreted so as to secure similarity of
sense with the analogous provision either considered in themselves or considered in the
light of prior judicial interpretations of them. MacCormick and Summers [1991] observe
that the argument from analogy appears to be stronger on the second hypothesis, where
it incorporates a version of the argument from precedent. In general, this argument
cannot be used to: 1. extend a criminal prohibition 2. extend a statute imposing a tax
or 3. expand an explicit statutory exception.
Logical-conceptual arguments: The governing idea here is that, if any recognized
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and doctrinally elaborated general legal concept is used in the formulation of a statutory
provision, it ought to be interpreted so as to maintain a consistent use of the concept
throughout the system as a whole, or a relevant branch or branches of it [MacCormick
and Summers, 1991]. Examples given of such concepts are terms such as contract or
corporation. The crucial point is for legal concepts to receive the same treatment unless
there is good reason not to do so.
The argument from relevant principles of law: These refers to those legal prin-
ciples potentially or actually operative within the field in which the interpretational
issue arises. MacCormick and Summers [1991] observe that this argument is influential
in all countries. They distinguish three senses of ‘principles of law’:
1. Substantive moral norms: previously invoked by judges when interpreting statutes
or otherwise, independently or as presumptions of legislative intention: for exam-
ple, no person shall profit from his own wrong (equity).
2. General propositions of substantive law widely applicable within a particular branch
of law : for example, in some systems the principles of ‘first in time’, ‘first in right’
in personal property and security law, nulla poena sine lege in criminal law, ‘no
liability without fault’ in tort law and ‘good faith’ in contract law.
3. General propositions of law, substantive and procedural widely applied throughout
the legal system: Examples of general procedural principles are those requiring
fair notice and a fair hearing before an official may take adverse action against a
citizen. Examples of such substantive principles are those protecting the rights
to freedom of association and speech, freedom from discrimination on racial or
religious grounds, and the right to free movement.
Historical argumentation: This argument refers to the special history of the recep-
tion and evolution of the statute [MacCormick and Summers, 1991]. Such arguments
presuppose that the statute has come to stand for something rather different from
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what it was originally designed for hence the need for an evolved understanding on the
purpose of the statute or the conception of rightness it embodies. It is noted that in
common law systems, this argument may not be very wide-ranging yet quite important
when it becomes operative. Conversely, it has a wide effect in civil law systems with
regard to the evolved understanding of the codes, or major parts of them.
2.4.3 Teleological-evaluative interpretation
This level of argumentation emphasizes the need for practical reasoning in terms of the
values or principles underlying the legal system.
The argument from purpose: The governing factor is that, if a particular purpose
can be identified when applying a statutory provision or statute in a concrete case,
the interpretation given ought to be in a manner compatible with such purpose. Mac-
Cormick and Summers [1991] note that the purposes identified are evaluational at least
in the sense that they provide a ground for evaluating one interpretation as better than
another. They also note that the force of this type of argument derives mostly from the
fact that the argument conceives of the legislature as an instrumentalist body seeking
to serve ends through apt means.
The argument from substantive reasons: These arguments seek to invoke the
moral, political, economic, or other social considerations. MacCormick and Summers
[1991] note that their weight or force is not essentially dependent on any authorita-
tiveness that the reasons may also have. They give the following scenarios where such
argumentation is most frequent:
1. The other types of argument, especially linguistic arguments are not available (or
only limitedly available) because of ambiguity, vagueness or the like;
2. General clauses or other evaluative phrases must be filled out; or
3. Conflicts between arguments must be resolved.
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Two varieties of substantive reasons might be distinguished:
1. Particular ones informing the content of, or relevant to the immediate interpre-
tation of, a statute; and
2. General ones stating the rationales for institutions and processes such as demo-
cratic values, fair process and the rule of law.
2.4.4 Trans-categorical interpretation
The argument from intention: These arguments pursue the effect that the legisla-
ture intended that the words in issue have a given meaning:
1. In accordance with some appropriate sense of intention; and
2. In respect of some element which serves as the object of intention i.e., any core
element of any of the 11 argument types such as an ordinary meaning, general
principle or purpose.
MacCormick and Summers [1991] note that the higher courts of all countries in-
voke certain ‘presumptions’ as to legislative intention. Among such presumptions are
that:
1. the legislature knows the national language and uses ordinary words or technical
words accordingly;
2. the legislature intends its enactments to be constitutionally valid;
3. the legislature does not intend absurd or manifestly unjust outcomes;
4. the legislature does not intend a statute to have retroactive effect;
5. every penal (non-regulatory) statute requires ‘mens rea’; and
6. treaties are not to be infringed.
In the UK and the USA, most such presumptions are rebutted only by very clear
contrary language.
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2.4.5 Gap-filling
Sometimes, more may be demanded as the interpretive process is not always sufficient.
MacCormick and Summers [1991] differentiate interpretation from gap-filling, which is
necessary to remedy intrinsic and extrinsic gaps in legislation resulting from new forms
of legal life for instance, in economic and technological regulations. Our first case study
in section 7.2 presented a case for gap-filling. The study is of a Nairobi startup BitPesa,
which is using Bitcoin to conduct money remittance services. There is no regulatory
framework in Kenya to handle cryptocurrencies. The framework may thus be limited
to generating the arguments from intention that the legislature or judicial doctrine may
have used to fill the resulting gaps.
2.4.6 Legal argumentation
To reconcile the resulting interpretations, we apply a simple but economical model for
the interaction of interpretive arguments subsequently identified in MacCormick and
Summers [1991]. The model’s hierarchical order, the arguments, and their respective
categories rest upon and implement values of special significance in the legal order as
follows:
1. Consider arguments in the following order: 1. linguistic arguments, 2. systemic
arguments, 3. teleological-evaluative arguments.
2. Accept as prima facie an interpretation at one level before proceeding to the
next. At level (3), only accept the argument supported by the whole range of
arguments.
3. Take account of arguments from intention and other trans-categorical arguments
as grounds, which may be relevant for departing from the prima facie ordering.
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2.4.7 Requirements engineering (EARS framework)
A recent systematic literature review Ghanavati et al. [2011] shows that RE techniques,
especially Goal-Oriented Requirements Engineering (GORE) methods have been used
to extract and model legal requirements or build business process compliance frame-
works. Most of these approaches apply i* -based or Tropos-based notations such as
i* itself Rifaut and Dubois [2008], No`mos Siena et al. [2009], SecureTropos Ishikawa
et al. [2009], Secure i* Krausova et al. [2009], Goal-Based Requirements Analysis
Method (GBRAM) Breaux and Anto´n [2005] or the Goal-oriented Requirement Lan-
guage (GRL) Ghanavati et al. [2007], Ghanavati et al. [2009], Shamsaei et al. [2011].
These approaches mainly work on achieving similar behavior for legal requirements as
with other types of requirements such as system, business or technical requirements.
They try to bind the concepts of legal goals and intentions with stakeholders’ goals and
intentions. As such there is no in depth handling of legal interpretation.
Research in RE is more concerned with tackling ambiguities in elicited requirements
[Massey et al., 2014, Christel and Kang, 1992]. Work by Ghanavati and Hulstijn [2015]
shows how a closer collaboration of these developing domains could help manage and
handle the intricacies of the resulting interpretations. Such collaboration sets the stage
for better definition of constraints for compliance as a non-functional requirement and
thereby, more compliant software systems. However, we still need systematic methods
to explore the solution space in terms of the possible interpretations that could result
from applying a given legal provision.
Even then, we find the Easy Approach to Requirements Engineering (EARS) from
RE quite useful in order to express the final compliance patterns in clear succinct ex-
pressions that are more user-friendly to engineers as opposed to legal jargon [Mavin
et al., 2009]. The general syntax is: 〈optional preconditions〉〈optional trigger〉 the 〈sys-
tem name〉 shall 〈system response〉. It is expounded into six patterns as follows:
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1. Ubiquitous requirements: such a requirement has no preconditions or trigger.
It is not invoked by an event detected at the system boundary or in response to
a defined system state, but is always active.
2. Event-driven requirements: initiated only when a triggering event is detected
at the system boundary.
3. Unwanted behavior: failures, disturbances, deviations, defined using a syntax
derived from event-driven requirements designated by keywords ‘If’ and ‘Then’.
4. State-driven requirements: active while the system is in a defined state. They
are denoted by the keyword ‘While’.
5. Optional features: designated with the keyword ‘Where’.
Mavin et al. [2009] instruct that requirements with complex conditional clauses can be
achieved by combinations of the keywords When, While and Where to specify richer
system behaviors. They can also be used within If-Then statements.
2.5 Compliance patterns
The foregoing review is broad and shows that more is needed to understand how legal
interpretations and conceptualizations are formed; what understandings are shared and
by whom, which are contested and between whom, and the strategies used in developing
or contesting those understandings. Such understanding will enable us to (1) assess how
existing laws are likely to impact new innovations (2) construct a characterization of the
regulatory process as a whole and (3) enable the stakeholders involved to make sense of
that process. Understanding such a process requires understanding the detailed level
of its operation, the perceptions of its participants, and how those ‘internal’ processes
interact with a broader context [Black, 2002]. We aim to bridge this gap with an
approach that extends the current methods for compliance management as applied to
regulatory compliance.
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The final requirement is to manage the related legal risk using a context-problem-
solution structure. The context is summarized by the technological competence and
consequent activity driving the value model. The problem is identified as a legal risk
arising from a certain activity or competence of the model, and the solution is given
by listing the final requirement.
2.5.1 The context
We will use value models and tools to answer the first research question of modeling
the business in order to understand how the technology developed is applied and the
competencies it enables. Such competencies are the inputs of the legal analysis.
2.5.2 The problem
The analysis process will help us understand the legal risk the startup faces. Eunomos
or any other suitable LKMS can act as a source of legal rules. The rules will be analyzed
to determine the requisite compliance behavior expected. We characterize this process
using argument schemes. The interpretive arguments used in this process will also be
represented using argument schemes. The final interpretations will be recast onto the
original rules to form prescriptions applicable to the value model. Such prescriptions
will also be translated into systems requirements for easier mapping onto business
processes in the value model.
2.5.3 The solution
For the final solution to be adopted in the business, it needs to be applied to the value
model in a form that the business can appreciate i.e. via a value management platform
e.g. VDMBee.
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2.6 Conclusion
The foregoing literature review presents us with adequate tools with which to design a
robust compliance pattern framework. Argument schemes from informal logic can be
used to bridge the gap between the principles of interpretation in legal theory with the
legal rules they interpret. Dialectical approaches, also from informal logic can be used to
trace the interpretive steps used in legal reasoning in judicial proceedings and similar
forums. A model for legal argumentation can be deployed to determine the overall
winning interpretations. It is this final interpretation that is used to derive a pattern
summarizing the context, the legal problem, i.e. legal risk, and the proposed solution.
We refer to this as a compliance pattern Muthuri [2016], which specifies compliant
behavior for the business model and subsequent models based on that pattern. This is
a novel application of argumentation theory to capture patterns of compliant behavior
tailored to a particular business model. The utility is in reusing these patterns while
analyzing compliance and even more importantly, while tracking regulatory changes
which alongside the costs of compliance continue to rise steadily over the decade.5
5See for instance, Thomson Reuters, Cost of Compliance Reports 2012-2016.
Chapter 3
Case Studies: Motivation
This chapter will consider the startup application domain and two cases litigated at
the highest courts in their jurisdictions in order to answer research questions 2(a,c) and
3(a).
3.1 The Aereo case
The facts of this study are presented in the case of American Broadcasting Companies
v. Aereo.1 Aereo is a media technology startup based in New York City that enabled
subscribers to view live and time-shifted streams of over-the-air television on Internet-
connected devices. Subscribers paid $8 to $12 a month to rent a coin-sized TV antenna
stored in Aereo’s warehouse. Users could then stream near-live television and record
programs from major broadcasters by selecting the relevant broadcast signal. Aereo’s
system would pick up the relevant broadcast signal, translate its audio and video com-
ponents into digital data, store the data in a user-specific file, and transmit that file’s
contents to the subscriber’s laptop, tablet, or other device displays just as an ordinary
television would. The Supreme Court rejected the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
1573 U.S. (2014)
41
42 CHAPTER 3. CASE STUDIES: MOTIVATION
decision 6-3, to hold that Aereo had violated copyright laws by capturing broadcast
signals on tiny antennas stored in warehouses and transmitting them to paying sub-
scribers. Given the decision, the company was forced into bankruptcy in November
2014.2
3.1.1 Legal requirements for Aereo’s technology
How did the Supreme Court determine the legal requirements that Aereo’s technology
ought to have complied with? The Court gives its judgment in a number of steps
that highlight the legal reasoning. It begins with a four page summary of the case then
proceeds to give its opinion over 18 pages. This followed by the dissenting opinion which
is delivered over 13 pages. We now look at the summary part to answer this question.
The Court begins the judgment by stating two prescriptive rules as follows:
‘The Copyright Act of 1976 gives a copyright owner the “exclusive righ[t]”
to “perform the copyrighted work publicly.” 17 U. S. C. §106(4). The
Act’s Transmit Clause defines that exclusive right to include the right to
“transmit or otherwise communicate a performance . . . of the [copyrighted]
work . . . to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the
members of the public capable of receiving the performance . . . receive it
in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different
times.” §101.’
The second rule extends the first rule and may help to make it more comprehensible
to non-lawyers as they can associate a more familiar term transmit, to the technical
legal phrase perform the copyrighted work publicly. The court then summarized the
technology involved as follows:
2Other media startups hailed Aereo’s two year battle with the broadcasters association which high-
lights Aereo’s unique position in affording the legal resources in the first place. Indeed, many other
media startups are trying to disrupt the $167 billion American Television Market.
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‘Respondent Aereo, Inc., sells a service that allows its subscribers to watch
television programs over the Internet at about the same time as the pro-
grams are broadcast over the air. When a subscriber wants to watch a
show that is currently airing, he selects the show from a menu on Aereo’s
website. Aereo’s system, which consists of thousands of small antennas and
other equipment housed in a centralized warehouse, responds roughly as
follows: A server tunes an antenna, which is dedicated to the use of one
subscriber alone, to the broadcast carrying the selected show. A transcoder
translates the signals received by the antenna into data that can be trans-
mitted over the Internet. A server saves the data in a subscriber-specific
folder on Aereo’s hard drive and begins streaming the show to the sub-
scriber’s screen once several seconds of programming have been saved. The
streaming continues, a few seconds behind the over-the-air broadcast, until
the subscriber has received the entire show.’
It is evident that the court is not concerned with the technicalities of Aereo’s tech-
nology, rather it tries to describe the resulting capabilities and activities that such
technology makes possible. The Court then proceeds to note the legal action in ques-
tion by stating that the Petitioners, who are television producers, marketers, distrib-
utors and broadcasters that own the copyright in many of the programs that Aereo
streamed, sued Aereo for copyright infringement by seeking a preliminary injunction
against Aereo.
Consequently, the Court notes the legal claim that the Petitioners make i.e. that
Aereo was infringing their right to ‘perform’ their copyrighted works ‘publicly’. The
quoted words are instructive as the court is already pointing the reader to the terms
on which the Petitioners’ case either succeeds or fails. It is important to note that
since this is an appeal, the Court does not frame the issue to be decided. However,
at the initial stage of litigation, a lower court may have to frame the issues to be
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determined.
The Court then concludes by giving its holding in two parts. The first is that Aereo
performs the Petitioners’ works within the meaning of the transmit clause. This means
that the Court bases its decision on the second rule which is more specific and closer to
Aereo’s activities. The Court supports this holding with three limbs a) that in the past,
congress had purposefully changed the law to overturn two Supreme Court holdings
that ruled in favor of firms analogous to Aereo. b) Congress had made three changes
to bring the activities of cable system activities within the Copyright act i) specifically
amended the Copyright Act to clarify the term ‘perform’, ii) enacted the transmit
clause, and iii) enacted a complex licensing scheme which sets out the conditions,
including compulsory fees under which cable system may retransmit broadcasts to the
public. c) The Court determined that Aereo’s activities were substantially similar to
those of CATV companies which it has previously held to perform.
The Court’s second holding was that Aereo performed the Petitioners works ‘pub-
licly’. It supported its decision by abstracting away from Aereo’s technology arguing
that the totality of Aereo’s recipients fit the definition of public under the transmit
clause, even if Aereo claimed that its technology only enabled private transmissions to
its subscribers. The Court concluded its holding by claiming that this was a limited
ruling that would not affect the emergence of other different kinds of technologies. The
court then proceeds onto the full opinion.
The full opinion begins with a synopsis that summarizes the legal rules, the tech-
nology, the legal action and legal claims being made against Aereo, and the Court’s
ruling. The Court then proceeds to expound on each of these limbs in the rest of the
judgment. This is followed by the dissenting opinion as the Court’s decision was not
unanimous.
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3.1.2 Reconciling conflicting interpretations in Aereo
A good example of how the Court reconciles conflicting arguments is seen in the second
limb of the case i.e. whether Aereo’s performance was public. This was part of the Pe-
titioners’ claim and it had to be proved independently for the whole infringement claim
to succeed. Aereo relied on its technological capabilities to show that its transmissions
did not fall under the statutory provisions thus: Aereo claims that because it transmits
from user-specific copies, using individually-assigned antennas, and because each trans-
mission is available to only one subscriber, it does not transmit a performance “to the
public”.
The Court solved the conflict by first making reference to the objectives of Congress
when it enacted the transmit clause. This allowed it to abstract from the technology in
question to capture Aereo’s activities under the clause. The rationale that allows the
court to make this abstraction is a canon from legislative intention. As in this case,
courts will not usually make explicit reference to the canons being applied while writing
opinions. This is because the judge(s) audience when writing opinions is made up of
lawyers and other legal minds, not the general public. They understand as between
themselves the canons at at play.
3.1.3 Applying interpretations in Aereo
The Court used the legal action and legal claims made against Aereo, to determine
the legal rules at play. They subsequently analyzed Aereo’s activities to assess whether
they fell under the defined rules. In doing so, the Court applies a number of canons such
as analogies to fill the gaps between the text of the law and Aereo’s activities.
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3.2 The TVCatchup case
The facts of this study are presented in the case of ITV and others v. TVCatchup. 3 TV
Catchup Ltd (TVC) runs a website which allows ordinary viewers to watch live UK
television including broadcasts by a number of free-to-air broadcasters on their own
computers, smart phones and game consoles. This case is analogous to the Aereo case
but even more complex as it involves multi-level jurisdictions between the European
Union and a Member State. It also presents an uncommon opportunity for legal in-
terpretation as it involved two references to the CJEU for interpretation, first by the
English High Court and later by the Court of Appeal. This presents us with significant
argumentation which makes it highly relevant for our purposes.
3.2.1 Legal requirements for TVC’s technology
The first judge, Lord Justice Kitchin begins with a short introduction, the background,
and an outline of the issues on appeal. No holding is given yet. He proceeds to set
out the legislative framework followed by the legislative history. He then sets out the
second reference to CJEU, considers TVC’s appeal from the High Court that is unlikely
to be affected by the judgment of the CJEU, then concludes his case. His judgment
covers 32 pages. The other two judges agree with the first judge in principle but differ
in rationale. They give shorter judgments of two and five pages respectively on the
issues differed.
The introduction presents each party’s appeal from the High Court ruling and then
sets out the background of the case. TVC operates an internet-based, live-stream
service of broadcasts and films in which the broadcasters own the copyright. The
broadcasters alleged TVC had infringed the copyright in their films and broadcasts by
communicating these works to the public contrary to s.20(1)(b) and s.20(1)(c) of the
3[2015] EWCA Civ 204
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Copyright, Design and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA).
3.2.1.1 High Court ruling
On the issue of communication to the public and the scope of s.20 of the CDPA, the
judge said it was not clear whether there was a communication to the public where
an organization (herein TVC), acting for its own profit, intervened and retransmitted
a broadcast on the internet to members of the public who were in fact already able
to access the original signal in their own homes using their own television sets. He
therefore referred the issue (together with various other issues which have no bearing
on this appeal) to the CJEU for guidance.
3.2.1.2 The High Court’s reference to the CJEU
The CJEU held4 that the concept of communication to the public within the mean-
ing of the Information Society Directive5 (the Directive) covered the unauthorized re-
transmission of a broadcast by way of internet streaming, even when subscribers to the
internet streaming service were within the area of reception of the original broadcast and
could therefore, lawfully receive the original broadcast on their television sets.
Despite the CJEU’s guidance, the High Court in England found that TVC’s stream-
ing service over fixed-line internet had not infringed the broadcasters’ copyright in their
broadcasts. This was because in the High Court’s view, TVC had a defense under sec-
tion 73 of the CDPA. Section 73 provides that copyright in a wireless broadcast by
the UK free-to-air broadcasters, made from a place in the UK, is not infringed to the
extent that the broadcast is received and immediately retransmitted by ‘cable’ to the
same area that the terrestrial broadcast was transmitted (the ‘reception area’ defense).
In the High Court’s view, streaming over fixed-line internet connection fell within the
4Case C-607/11
5Directive 2001/29
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definition of ‘cable’ for the purposes of section 73. However, the High Court held that
the meaning of the term ‘cable’ in section 73 did not extend to streaming services to
mobile devices over mobile networks. Consequently, it found TVC’s mobile services to
have infringed the broadcasters’ copyright.
3.2.1.3 The appeal
Both parties appealed the High Court decision to the English Court of Appeal. The
Broadcasters argued that TVC’s defense to infringement did not extend to streaming
over the internet. TVC argued that its defense to infringement extended to mobile
devices in addition to the internet.
3.2.1.4 The Broadcasters’ appeal
The broadcasters appeal challenged the High Court’s decision that the section 73 de-
fense applied to TVC’s internet streaming services. They claimed that the term ‘cable’
has a uniform and precise meaning in EU law of a dedicated cable system operated by
traditional cable operators. This is an argument from legal-concept discussed in subsec-
tion 2.4.2 which meant that the High Court was wrong to extend the term to internet
streaming over fixed communications. They argued that the section 73 defense pro-
vided under English law could only be permitted under EU law if it fell within Article
9 of the Directive. Article 9 qualifies the exclusive right of communication to the public
by making it clear that it is without prejudice to provisions concerning, among other
things, access to cable of broadcasting services, which would continue to apply following
the implementation of the Directive.
The broadcasters argued that the phrase access to cable of broadcasting services in
Article 9 of the Directive did not extend to and, therefore, did not permit an exception
of the breadth of section 73 reception area defense given to it by the High Court.
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Consequently in interpreting national legislation in line with the Marleasing principle,
which requires national legislation, where possible, to be construed in conformity with
EU law, the scope of section 73 should be limited to the retransmission of broadcasts
on traditional cable systems operated by cable programme providers. One aspect of the
broadcasters’ appeal led to discussion of whether the reception area defense was covered
by Article 9 at all. The broadcasters argued that Article 9 was limited to cable access
to retransmit broadcasts to geographical areas which had poor broadcast reception -
another exception to copyright provided for in section 73 of the CDPA and referred to
as the must carry exception.
The outcome of an interpretation of Article 9 therefore had a potential conclusion
that the reception area defense did not comply with EU law on any interpretation.
The Court of Appeal came to the conclusion that the meaning of Article 9 was not
clear. Consequently a further reference to the CJEU was made regarding whether it
covers both reception area and must carry exceptions. It also asked for the scope of
the meaning of the term ‘cable’ to be clarified. We highlight the questions focused on
the meaning of the term:
1. Does the quoted phrase (This directive shall be without prejudice in particular
to...access to cable of broadcasting services) permit the continued application of
a provision of national law with the scope of ‘cable’ as defined by national law,
or is the scope of this part of Article 9 determined by a meaning of ‘cable’ that
is defined by EU law?
2. If ‘cable’ in Article 9 is defined by EU law, what is the meaning? In particular:
(a) Does it have a technologically specific meaning, restricted to traditional cable
networks operated by conventional cable service providers?
(b) Alternatively, does it have a technologically neutral meaning which includes
functionally similar services transmitted via the internet?
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(c) In either case, does it include transmission of microwave energy between
fixed points?
The main inquiry is whether the meaning of the term cable extends to streaming over
the internet by fixed-line communications.
3.2.1.5 TVC’s appeal
TVC appealed the High Court’s finding that section 73 did not extend to live streaming
to mobile devices via mobile networks. TVC sought to draw a distinction between their
transmission to the mobile mast, which was wholly via ‘cable’, and what they termed
as a private communication between the mobile network and the consumer at the point
between the mobile mast and the consumer’s mobile device. Alternatively, they argued
that section 73 should apply as the retransmission was ‘substantially’ by cable. The
Court of Appeal rejected both of these arguments and upheld the High Court’s decision
on this point.
3.2.2 Reconciling conflicting interpretations in TVC
A number of terms were heavily debated key of which were a) cable and b) access to
cable of broadcasting services. On the meaning of cable, it is instructive to note the
Court highlight that since there is no definition of the term cable for purposes of the
reception area defense, the word can bear an ambulatory or movable meaning. ITV on
the other hand argued that there was no reason why the cabling system inherent in the
internet should not be regarded as cable for purposes of the defense. This is a linguistic
argument from ordinary meaning of a term. They supported this with the contention
that the CDPA had been amended severally to make its provisions technology neutral,
which meant it redefined broadcasts to encompass all services relating to transmission
by electronic means whether wired or wireless. This is a systemic argument from
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principle.
The principle of technology neutrality is an EU law principle in European electronics
communications which states that the same regulatory principles should apply regardless
of the technology used. This tries to prevent regulators from using the regulatory
framework to push the market towards a desired optimal structure thereby allowing
companies freedom to adopt whatever technology is most appropriate to achieve the
result. The expectation was that after implementation of the Directive across the EU,
the term cable in UK law would have the same meaning as that of EU law. However,
it seems that the UK has a wider meaning than that of the EU and unfortunately, the
Court could not ascertain the meaning ascribed by the EU hence the reference to the
CJEU for clarification. Depending on the interpretation the CJEU gave, TVC would
either maintain or lose its defense to infringement.
A number of canons are brought into play to try reconcile the different arguments.
As with Aereo, most of these arguments are not explicitly stated except for the Mar-
leasing principle possibly to guarantee stability of the underlying legal system i.e. that
EU law takes precedence over a Member State’s law, and thereby the soundness of any
subsequent interpretations. Relatedly, the broadcasters citing two directives,6 insist
that the term cable has a settled and autonomous meaning throughout the European
Union acquis, which is to identify a particular means for conveying transmissions en-
compassed in the term ‘wire’ but of a more limited scope. This is a systemic argument,
specifically the logical-conceptual argument. They seem to draw this interpretation
from a wider argument from legislative intention that EU law clearly distinguishes
between broadcast transmission services from information society services.
The Information Society Directive provided for an exemption that allowed Member
States to retain some existing provisions. They use this to support their main con-
tention that the EU legislature could not have intended to exempt national provisions
6Directives 92/100/EEC and Directive 9398/EEC
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concerning internet retransmissions, an activity they sought to harmonize under that
Directive. That is why they deem access to cable of broadcasting services to refer only
to the traditional form of cable and thereby maintaining the distinction between the
older broadcast transmission services outside the Directive, from the newer informa-
tion society services. This is teleological argument from purpose. All these arguments
support the broadcasters’ use of a linguistic argument from the technical meaning to
interpret the term cable.
The third Judge, Lady Justice Arden supports this view by noting that Article 9
does not mention copyright at all. Additionally, the recital behind Article 9, recital 60,
does not make reference to copyright as such. She is using a teleological argument from
purpose, which looks at other sources (recital 60) to clarify the legislature’s purpose
when enacting a particular provision. The import is that Article 9 may not have any-
thing to do with defenses to copyright infringement. If this is the case, it would support
a conclusion that the legislature was more concerned with access to infrastructure in the
Member States. Access to cable of broadcasting services would therefore mean, access
to infrastructure. She supports this interpretation by arguing that Member States have
different levels of capability and therefore different legislation about how they use their
cable networks. This is a systemic argument from principle i.e. the proportionality
principle that divides subject matter jurisdiction between the Union and its Member
States. This helps her to conclude that if access refers to physical infrastructure, it
does not include internet transmission using fiber-optic wires but a reference to the
CJEU would be necessary to apply a conforming interpretation if it is possible to do
so.
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3.2.3 Applying interpretations to TVC
On the 1st of March 2017, the CJEU ruled that Article 9 must be interpreted as
not covering, and not permitting, national legislation which provides that copyright
is not infringed.7 This is interesting given the provisional view given at the English
Court of Appeal by the second judge Lord Justice Underhill that if the EU Directive
legitimizes internet retransmissions, but only those of traditional cable, it would be
possible to read the language of the UK law conformably. However, this would mean
that the same words would have a different meaning before and after domestication of
the Directive in the UK. However, if the defense is not accommodated within EU law,
the Justice opined that it would not be possible to simply strike it down as it represents
a clear legislative choice on a primary policy issue. Unfortunately, we will not see how
this plays out as the UK has recently decided to repeal the section 73 exception after a
public consultation that determined that there was no longer a need to retain it.
3.3 Conclusion
There are a number of takeaways from the above exposition. To begin with, it is
not always clear what the law is and even for a single term, it may take a significant
evaluation with several appeals delving into the legislative history and purposes of the
legal framework to ascertain the correct meaning. Aereo may have believed from the
start that terrestrial or free-to-air broadcasts were part of the public domain. TVC
seems to have held the same belief in regard to retransmitting such broadcasts on the
internet. This is further complicated where a number of jurisdictions are involved. In
the lower court cases, Aereo won in some states and lost in others. The part winnings
of TVC in the UK courts were eventually lost at the CJEU. It may be that startups,
particularly those without resources to seek legal counsel, may base their business
7Case C-275/15
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models on decent but erroneous presumptions from the legal perspective.
Secondly, there are many underlying considerations incorporated while each pro-
vision is being drafted and sometimes this could inadvertently lead to conflicts where
different considerations were not balanced for instance in TVC where subsequent EU
law may annul legitimate rights of a Member State’s entity unintentionally. It is there-
fore imperative to have a method that will begin to help legal knowledge engineers
(a) understand the different arguments at play and (b) apply the different interpretive
arguments to legal provisions that they are working with to promote a more accurate
reading and application of the law in order to gauge their impact on a firm’s business
model.
Another interesting observation from the TVC case is that over the long-running
course of this litigation, the broadcasters have developed their own live streaming ser-
vices to fill the void. This may defeat the competing business models of subscription
live streaming services after all. The role of technology here, brings out the stack con-
trast between law and economics. The law has to think about posterity and preserve
certain ways of thinking which gets complicated when technology gets involved. On
the other hand, economists think about efficiency, and technology is currently driving
that efficiency.
Finally, judicial interpretation is one of the few clear ways to achieve legal certainty
on a matter. However, even the highest courts can shy away from giving a succinct
criteria which stakeholders can follow. This may be from their lack of sufficient capacity
to interpret the complexity of the technology involved. Even then, we have seen that
courts will concentrate on the functionality of the technology enabling a given business
model. It will then proceed to determine the appropriate legal rules and evaluate the
consequent legal claims. This will then invoke an interpretive process to determine
which party’s arguments will prevail. In doing so, it implicitly, and sometimes explic-
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itly deploys canons of interpretation in analyzing these arguments in order to balance
competing interests.
This calls for resources for a) legislators to understand and legislate sufficiently
for emerging technologies and b) for lawyers to decode the resulting regulatory frame-
works in a manner specific enough to help startups managing the attendant legal risks.
Following these preliminary studies using case law, we sought to delve into more re-
search to investigate our empirical claim that startups are unable to manage their legal
risks.
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Chapter 4
Survey on Legal Risks
4.1 Introduction
In addition to the foregoing exploratory studies using case law, it was necessary to
conduct a survey of startups in the application domain to get user requirements for the
thesis. A template of the survey is attached in Appendix A.
4.1.1 Purpose of study
Our objective in conducting this survey was necessitated by the research questions to
understand how startups manage legal risks i.e. how they make compliance decisions
and how they interpret the law in that process. This will help develop precise require-
ments with the understanding of where best to focus the conceptual framework. The
survey will help us understand different perceptions as follows:
• How do founders make compliance decisions? This may provide empirical ground-
ing for other theory-backed efforts to improve that decision making process.
• Understanding the issues that founders have in decision making – both by ex-
plicitly asking what aspects participants perceive to be most critical during their
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decision making process and investigating the characteristics of that process, we
can have a more empirically grounded list of local points for research and practical
efforts to address.
• Understanding what to compare their experience with for instance against SMEs
or other more established firms.
Our research objective is to study these aspects and in doing so, elicit data that gives
insights into the general operations of a startup as well. We will do so by performing
qualitative work with a diverse amount of participants active as startup founders or
executives.
4.1.2 Brief description of study
The study was conducted by the author by approaching startup founders in Lux-
embourg, Kenya and Italy from October 2015 to October 2016. Majority of those
startups were housed in technology incubators and accelerators where they benefit
from economies of scale from shared administrative, marketing and other similar re-
sources, most important of which include facilitating easier visibility to potential in-
vestors.
4.2 Study methods and design
We chose a survey conducted through an online questionnaire in order to make it as
convenient as possible particularly given that our main target, founders, are usually
very busy and inaccessible. Participants were offered no reward except a copy of the
research results, when available.
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4.2.1 Sampling method
We specifically targeted founders or members of the top leadership as they were more
likely to have had direct experience in decision making. Owing to the exploratory
nature of the research, time and financial constraints, the sampling was opportunistic
and emergent as we gained more insight into the domain. We approached startups
located in the different locations determined by the author’s mobility track which for
the duration of the study were Luxembourg and Italy. The sampling was also emergent
as we gained more knowledge of the startup domain. For instance, having observed
that some startups, especially those in developing countries were able to thrive from the
lack of legislation, we also approached startups located in the author’s home country
i.e. Nairobi, Kenya which also has the advantage of being one of Africa’s thriving
technology hubs alongside Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa. This may have an effect
of stratifying the sample.
4.2.2 Data collection method
The questionnaire was made up of three main parts, a) building a professional profile
of the participant, b) understanding the difficulties they face in compliance decision-
making, and c) testing how they feel about certain aspects of the decision-making
process.
4.2.2.1 Business profile
The profile of the participants was build based upon the following questions:
1. What is the name of your startup?
2. What is your position in the firm?
3. Where is your startup based?
4. In what sector do you categorize your startup?
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5. How many years has your startup been in operation?
6. Is there a designated legal officer within the company, or an external legal expert
you consult?
4.2.2.2 Business model
The second part dealt with the business model. These were more specific and mostly
open questions about the difficulties participants face in identifying, interpreting and
applying the law while modeling decisions in the decision-making process . Finally, we
Question Type 
1. How does your company (intend to) make money? Have you finalized decisions about this 
business model, or is it still open? Open 
2. Have you identified the laws or regulations that may affect this business model? Closed 
Yes 2.1. What are the difficulties associated with such laws or regulations? Open  
No 2.2. What are the difficulties in identifying such laws and regulations? Open  
3. What are the main legal risks with regard to your startup's business model? (We're 
focusing on the legal risks related to the business model as opposed to others e.g. of 
setting up a business etc. which are common to all) 
open 
4. Do you consider these risks when you are designing/changing your business model? Closed 
Yes 4.1. Were you able to determine the possible ways your business model could have been affected? Open 
No 4.2. Could you give some reasons why it was difficult to consider such risks? Open 
5. Were you able to propose appropriate modifications of the business model to solve this? Open 
6. Did you work with any internal or external legal expert or lawyer in this process? Open 
7. What makes legal compliance challenging for you? Open 
8. What are the most important (or critical) aspects of making sure that your business model 
is legally compliant (hereafter "compliance decision")? Open 
 
asked participants to judge to what extent they agreed with a number of statements
on a 5-point Likert scale (ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). These
were created to give insight into how participants feel about decision making aspects
detailed below. To what extent do you agree with the following statements when applied
to compliance decisions at the early-stage entrepreneurship?
1. The law is clear as regards our business model.
2. It is easy to determine which legislation is applicable.
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3. We have taken a crucial decision about the business model without knowing
exactly what the law is.
4. Compliance related decisions are often refined at a later stage.
5. When we make a compliance decision, it is final.
6. Time constraints do not allow us to consider all decision alternatives.
7. We prefer discussions with lawyers or (other stakeholders) to base our compliance
decisions.
8. It is easy to interpret what rules the legislation provides and how they affect our
business model.
9. We prefer to base compliance decisions on other business-related data.
10. Compliance decisions often have to be reconsidered, which also affects other de-
cisions.
We also asked participants whether we could get back in touch with them in regard
to testing the legal knowledge management system developed with the help of the
questionnaire. If they agreed, we asked for their email.
4.2.3 Data analysis method
The results will be classified based on themes developed from the research questions.
The objective is to explore aspects regarding the ITxLaw Misalignment discussed
in subsection 1.2.1. The following hierarchical code was used in identifying different
aspects of the theme.
1. How accessible is the law to the startup domain?
(a) Access to legal services: affordability, value-legal certainty.
(b) Complexity: identifying legal provisions, interpreting and reconciling multi-
ple interpretations, applying legal interpretations to business models.
2. Role of technology in aggravating access to the law by startups:
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(a) Place of compliance in business model formulation
(b) Prioritization of legal advice: time and other constraints, adaptation of busi-
ness model to avoid legal risks.
This coding will be used to build an overview of the general trend for the answers. After
doing so, we will go through the answers again to find answers that specifically conflict
with this trend, and use them to discuss the attitudes of the participants towards the
questionnaire. To estimate the general tendency for each answer in the Likert, we
will calculate the median of each question’s answers (given the ordinal nature), which
we use to determine whether the majority of participants had a polarized (i.e., strong
agreement or disagreement) or neutral attitude towards them.
Figure 4.1: Nielsen’s graph of diminishing returns curve for user testing
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4.3 Results
We received 20 responses, 17 of which were full responses and 4 partial responses. This
was sufficient given that Nielsen’s curve of diminishing returns in Figure 4.1 shows that
about 11 users is sufficient for qualitative data. The partial respondents still completed
the business profile section and we will therefore include them in the analysis of that
part as their insights were relevant.
4.3.1 Presentation
This part reviews the participants profiles and those of their businesses as a foundation
to the main subject of study presented thereafter.
4.3.1.1 Participants profile
We were able to reach the target audience as 13 of the respondents gave their position
as either founder or CEO. Two identified themselves as director or managing director.
Two others had more unconventional designations such as growth hacker. One gave
their position as business development, marketing, sales, finance. This goes to show
that startups have a limited labor force and the few available have to be resourceful
enough to juggle a number of roles. The respondents experience in the application area
ranged from 0 to 11 years although almost half had less than 3 years experience and 80%
had less than 5 years experience in the domain as shown in Figure 4.2. This shows that
founders are usually quite young and inexperienced in the domain. A further question
for future investigation could be whether this factors into the quality of compliance
decisions that startups make.
On location, 12 of the startups were based in Kenya, 4 in Luxembourg, 2 in France,
1 in Brussels and Luxembourg, and 1 in Italy. On classification, 13 startups categorized
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Figure 4.2: Participants experience
themselves in a technology-related field while others classified themselves according to
subject matter i.e. real estate, marine, agriproduce, socialization etc. Figure 4.3 shows
the participants’ startups had been in operation for a period varying from 1 month to
6 years with 8 being a year old or younger. This also shows that startups are young
vulnerable ventures run by youthful entrants into the domain.
14 participants had a designated legal officer while 6 did not. Of the 14 positive,
7 specifically mentioned consulting external counsel while 1 had both in-house and
external counsel. Another reported having employed a legal intern but she proved too
expensive to maintain.
4.3.1.2 Business profile
On the second part on the business model, participants described their business models
using short formulaic descriptions that could almost fit an x per y description. For
instance, either profit, margin, percentage, or commission per subscription, transaction













Figure 4.3: Startups by age
models while 11 hadn’t. Nevertheless, 13 against 4 participants were able to factor legal
risks that they had identified in the process of designing or changing their business
model. From the Likert scale we selected the statements with strong responses (either
positive and negative), and emphasized those with a low response variation in their
responses (indicating consensus among participants). These statements are not used as
statistically generalizable findings, but as verification for the analysis of the qualitative
data, and to ensure they both corroborate each other.
4.3.2 Interpretation
In this section we give an outline of ITxLaw misalignment as perceived by founders,
describing the dominant views held by participants for the different aspects we studied
on access to the law. We will try as much as possible to let the participants speak for
themselves, showing their actual responses.
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Question Polarity 
1. The law is clear as regards our business model. Negative  
2. It is easy to determine which legislation is applicable. Negative  
3. We have taken a crucial decision about the business model without 
knowing exactly what the law is. 
Positive  
4. Compliance related decisions are often refined at a later stage.  Positive 
5. When we make a compliance decision, it is final.  Negative 
6. Time constraints do not allow us to consider all decision alternatives.  Positive 
7. We prefer discussions with lawyers or (other stakeholders) to base our 
compliance decisions 
Positive 
8. It is easy to interpret what rules the legislation provides and how they 
affect our business model. 
Negative 
9. We prefer to base compliance decisions on other business related data.  Positive  
10. Compliance decisions often have to be reconsidered, which also affects 
other decisions.  
Positive 
 
4.3.2.1 Accessibility of the law to startups
Affordability of legal services
As expected, the responses intimated that legal services are expensive for startups.
More importantly, this may be explained by a misalignment where lawyers apply tra-
ditional business models such as retainers and hourly billing to startups which are not
yet financially sound for such models. In fact, recognition is occasionally given to law
firms that develop tailored offerings for startups showing this is not the norm.
Relatedly, responses show that there isn’t enough training on legal resources for
founders to understand the nature of legal advice they should be seeking. When they
do seek that advice, it is hard to apply. One participant summed up the issue well when
asked what made compliance challenging to them: “Finance, it is expensive as a startup
to get a lawyer to advice as well as to comply with and implement the law as interpreted
and recommended by the lawyer.” Some incubators have tried to solve this problem
by employing in-house counsel to advice their startups. However, it was noted that
such lawyers may not be proactive thus: “Identifying where to start in the first place.
Hence why we have lawyers to consult. But the lawyers are not forthcoming until you
actually ask.” It would seem that this participant expected more of their incubator’s
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counsel towards understanding the law’s implications on their business model. Such
expectations were not met possibly because such lawyers are more concerned with
management concerns of streamlining other legal issues which were foremost in the
failure of startups in the dot-com bubble such as incorporation, shareholding, taxation,
and intellectual property. Where engagement with the lawyer was successful, other
issues arose such as “Trust with the expert. Blurry responses. Need to have someone
skilled enough in new business model variations to be a proposal force.”
Value of legal services
If startups are not able to afford legal services, and those that do have minimal resources
and training on how to apply the advice given in meaningful ways, it may be that even
where lawyers offer sound legal advice, startups are not able to find much value in it.
This may be seen in the fact that while many of the participants were able to identify
the subject matter of legal risks their business model faced, 11 out of 20 were not able
to identify the main laws and regulations affecting them. Some even stating “I have no
idea on what laws bind me usually until I get sued or get served for it.” This may lead
them to seek alternative sources as in this response: “We read and modify the contracts
ourselves. The returns cannot yet bring in a lawyer. We seek advice from other startups
and companies in the same industry. Also friends and family help out”.
4.3.2.2 Complexity of access
Identification of legal provisions
The complexity the participants experienced in accessing the law centered on obscurity
and vagueness of legal provisions. Almost half of the respondents (9 out of 20) reported
that they were able to identify the laws and regulations that affect their business model.
However, when asked about the difficulties they faced in this endeavor, they suggested
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that the legal frameworks were not adequate: “There are not always specifications for
our exact type of business”, and “lack of examples”. Of the 11 participants that had not
identified the laws and regulations affecting them, it was for lack of information. This
is partly a function of the cost of information which leads them to rely on other sources
of information for instance, “. . . information is under ownership of lawyers, especially
in European markets, on others some interesting resources are available on Quora or
Stack Exchange.” The larger issue here is the lack of knowledge and training on legal
resources: “Without any legal background it is hard to personally identify the laws,
we therefore result to consulting.” However, we have also seen that consulting is not
yielding much actionable advice. This calls for more resources for customizing the law
to existing business models.
Interpreting legal provisions
Another way we wanted to understand complexity is on how difficult it was for those
participants that had identified some legal risks to factor them into the business model
formulation process. 13 against 4 participants were able to consider legal risks when
designing/changing their business model. This should tell us that there is some form
of interpretation going on albeit limited. Remember this is subject matter of the
legal risk generally as many were not able to identify the specific legal provisions that
affected them. The main hurdle reported was that legal provisions were also difficult to
understand and interpret. However, there was an outlier that identified no difficulties.
On closer scrutiny, this participant dealt in banking software with a 3-year-old startup
and they personally had 5 years experience. This would be expected i.e. the complexity
of dealing with the law eases over time as the technology matures and the entrepreneurs
gain more experience.
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Applying interpretations to business models
Of the 13 participants that considered legal risks while designing or changing their
business model, 9 against 4 were able to determine possible ways in which the models
could have been affected for instance, “We have had to change the technology used
to open source licenses” and “yes e.g. changing the software structure to accommo-
date licensing requirements without loosing the competitive advantage and know how”.
However, the alternatives were not always so practical e.g. “The business model could
carry too much friction to be fully functional with the market needs.” The complexity
of application also arises from the intrinsic set-up of many startups to leverage tech-
nology to scale to online markets as their main market as opposed to mainstream firms
which use the internet to expand their existing markets. The problem is “Operating in
different countries makes it difficult to handle different regulations.” Responses showed
that participants struggle to implement different variations of a business model in or-
der to be compliant in each jurisdiction. This will also have a multiplier effect on the
legal spend necessary to be compliant in a cross-jurisdictional or multi-jurisdictional
setting. We tested again the involvement of lawyers at this more granular level and of
those that maintained a designated legal officer either internally or externally, they had
some form of consultation while considering possible modifications to their business
model. Nevertheless, when these particular participants were then asked whether they
were able to propose appropriate modifications of the business model to solve the risks,
only 6 against 6 had a positive response. Of the negative responses, uncertainty was
expressed on whether the issue was solvable.
4.3.2.3 Role of technology in aggravating access
With the above information, it is important to try understand the role of technology in
the ITxLaw misalignment in terms of the two limbs considered above i.e. affordability
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and complexity of access. In terms of affordability, it may well be that lawyers may
charge higher fees given the complexity of the technology involved. However, other
SMEs also struggle to afford legal services so affordability is not necessarily unique to
the startup domain. On the other hand, the complexity of identifying, interpreting and
applying legal provisions relating to disruptive technology may mean that founders lack
sufficient information to make adequate compliance decisions. This could mean that
technology-driven business models are more likely to be non-compliant compared to
traditional business models.
We already noted in subsection 2.2.1 that technology is central to the startup ap-
plication domain. We also confirmed that the business model is usually unsettled and
always evolving i.e. agile. In response to the question of how they (intend to) make
money, participants said: “Business model appears with the market/solution fit. We’re
still looking for the perfect fit”, “ridesharing: commission between the rider and the
passenger - we gave up. Now, it’s based on customer/supplier relationship on a btob
market”, “Still ongoing with several iterations and test. We haven’t found a working
attractive business model yet”. The primary goal is scalability and all decisions seems
to be oriented towards optimizing the business model using technology in a manner lean
enough to scale to a wide market. This is essentially a startup’s competitive advantage
and all decisions are geared towards that. However, compliance decisions are not yet
seen this way. This is because, when asked what’s makes legal compliance challenging,
some of the responses given were: “Interpretation of the law. Looks vague at times”,
“Trust with the expert. Blurry responses. Need to have someone skilled enough in new
business model variations to be a proposal force”, “lack of examples”. This may sug-
gest that startup engineers may view compliance as obstructive if seeking legal advice
is unyielding and as we have seen, expensive.
For the participants that said they do not consider legal risks when designing or
changing their business model, the reasons included “Getting customers is more impor-
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tant than anything else.” and “I don’t care about them since my business model can
adapt, we have low scale then low risk, if we are disruptive enough we may expand to
other markets/having legislation adapting.” This highlights the pressure that timelines
impact on compliance decisions.
Finally, we sought the participants’ views on what was most important to facilitate
the compliance of their business models. It is telling that two participants equally
said “no idea”. More instructive responses included “to get the opinion of the public
authorities even if it’s only a trend.” and “researching on what compliance means for
my business and what is required to be compliant.” Theirs is also a genuine interest in
being compliant, for instance, “We have to be sure to be compliant with the law at the
beginning of the project.” and “Having all the documentation to back up your claims
and defend yourself against any claims.” However, there doesn’t seem to be enough
resources to do so.
4.4 Key findings
4.4.1 Insufficient information for managing legal risks
The foremost observation is that majority of the founders are not simply ignoring their
obligations to be compliant. Responses to question 7 in Figure 4.4 shows that majority
of participants attempt to seek legal advice. Moreover, that they rely on forums, friends
and family for legal advice when they cannot afford lawyers ought to be a testament of
their genuine desire to comply with the law. We have also seen that they struggle to
apply legal advice when they are able to procure it. Unfortunately, they do not have
enough time to decode this information as seen in responses to question 6 in Figure 4.4.
Without the necessary skills for legal interpretation, compliance decisions are likely to
become subservient to other modeling decisions as seen in responses to question 3 in
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Figure 4.4: Responses to the decision-making process.
Figure 4.4. This results in a situation where compliance decisions are based on other
more available albeit inferior sources of information as shown in responses to question 9
in Figure 4.4. Participants were generally not very confident of the quality of compliance
decisions they were making and thereby risking noncompliance.
4.4.2 Technology compounds the complexity of legal interpretation
The data confirms the assertion made in the literature that lawyers may understand
the legal requirements for compliance but lack the necessary tech-savvy to advice star-
tups. The participants’ attitude on this is summarized by question 1 and 2 of Fig-
ure 4.5. Where available, the advice given by lawyers is vague and difficult to apply as
shown in majority of responses to question 8 in Figure 4.5. Some participants there-
fore deemed it untrustworthy. This gets more complicated in a cross-jurisdictional or
multi-jurisdictional setting e.g. “Each jurisdiction in which we operate has a different
legal environment. We work with external counsel in each market to ensure we have
maximum expertise. Our chief legal and compliance officer manages these external
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Figure 4.5: Responses regarding legal certainty and interpretation.
counsels”. The most difficulty encountered was on how to implement variations of the
business models in order to be compliant. This provides a basis for further research
on whether business models driven by disruptive technologies are more likely to be
non-compliant.
4.4.3 Uncertainty regarding compliance decisions
In line with the foregoing two findings, participants are not confident in the nature of
compliance decisions that they are making. Some participants, did note that “inno-
vation can come from legal compliance”, which is particularly true from the Kenyan
startups that we interviewed who are more likely to get a head start from the lack
of a regulatory framework. However, this can also be counterproductive as the sub-
sequent development of regulations may vitiate successful business models thus: “We
have strict anti-money laundering policies and there is much time and expertise spent
on maintaining them. The legal risks are that a country in which we operate suddenly
changes their view on our business model (as we are often unregulated) or even bans
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Figure 4.6: Responses related to compliance decisions.
it.” They are always trying to improve these decisions using whichever resources are
available to them as reflected in the responses to question 4 in Figure 4.6. It is therefore
likely that such decisions may not be very productive in managing the legal risks that
a startup is facing. However, given that 40% of the participants were neutral on ques-
tion 5 in Figure 4.6, one could raise doubts on whether some startups are making any
compliance decisions at all. When they do have to consider them, compliance decisions
have a significant impact and they may require a remodeling of the business model as
seen in responses to question 10 in Figure 4.6.
4.4.4 Logical next step
The foregoing survey results presentation and analysis are instructive in suggesting
that:
1. Existing regulatory frameworks are insufficient for regulating emerging technolo-
gies particularly those driven by disruptive technologies. Resources are therefore
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necessary to help legislators to understand and legislate sufficiently for such tech-
nologies.
2. Additional resources are necessary to help startups identify and manage the legal
risks facing their business models.
3. Additional resources are necessary to help lawyers, compliance officers, regula-
tors and related stakeholders apply existing regulations to startups in a practical
manner.
4.5 Conclusion
The foregoing findings help to formulate the following requirements in relation to the
conceptual framework:
1. It is imperative to develop a compliance formulation method that is tailored for,
and equally agile to the rapidly evolving business models in the startup domain
and one that lawyers can understand.
2. The module on legal interpretation needs to deliver a prescription that is action-
able.
3. The module on legal analysis needs to identify the risk and deliver clear and
specific requirements tailored to manage it.




Our goal in this chapter is to describe the preprocessing that needs to occur in order for
the compliance pattern framework to be applied. The first goal is to model a business in
a manner that is sufficient to map the compliance patterns onto its business processes.
The second modeling involves the translation of interpretive canons into semi-formal
argument schemes, in which form they can be applied within the compliance pattern
framework.
5.2 Value modeling
We have followed the VDMBee methodology to describe the business and build the
business plan on its value management platform. This involves a three-tier methodology
from discovery, prototyping and adoption.
The discovery stage begins with unstructured then structured discovery. Unstruc-
tured discovery involves web and other forms of research on general information about
the business in question. Structured discovery clarifies the business strategy and its
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ecosystem. It incorporates a number of business modeling tools from which one can
select depending on the modeling needs, expertise and experience. We retain e3value
to describe the business network as a value network. This is because of the experience
gained so far with the modeling tool coupled with its affinity to quickly visualize the
possible legal relationships in the network. We also adopt the strategy map to depict
how the strategy is implemented within the firm. The prototype stage involves creating
a plan on the value management platform. This involves creating a plan and the dif-
ferent phases of the plan e.g. from As-Is to To-Be. In our case, the As-Is version of the
plan will be the current business and the To-Be version will be the one reflecting an ap-
plication of the compliance pattern. The next module is the value network design which
first models the different modular networks involved in the overall business network,
the value propositions, and the exchange of value. The next module is value stream
design to model the value streams that create and deliver value. The fifth module is
competency design for the competencies that perform activities in the value streams.
The sixth module is value impact design and measurement which involves connecting
values and sub-areas of aggregation into a complete design of value impact and how to
measure that value impact. The seventh module involves how to prototype alternatives
and next phase(s) in the plan.
Finally, the adopt stage involves the presentation of prototyping results, how to
prepare for the best decision-making and how to use the prototyping results as a basis
for initiating change. We now illustrate this value modeling with Aereo as a running
example.
5.2.1 Business model canvas
Figure 5.1 depicts Aereo’s business model canvas. It helps us appreciate the general
nature of the business i.e. the different customer segments served, the service delivered,
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the types of customer relationships and the profit model used by the business. These go
towards defining our main objects of interest in the canvas i.e. the value propositions,
the key activities and partners. This is where we begin to understand the competencies
enabled by the disruptive technology the firm uses to generate value.2 Robert Muthuri






























n x feen x right tobroadcast
Fig. 1. (a). Aereo’s initial value model. (b). Aereo’s adapted business model
2 An Exploratory Case Study
We use a recent court case involving a startup in media technology to relay
the conceptual framework. Aereo, was a startup based in New York city with
technology that enabled subscribers to view live and time-shifted streams of
over-the-air television on Internet-connected devices. Aereo was sued in a US
Supreme Court case American Broadcasting Companies v. Aero1. The Supreme
Court rejected the Appeal decision 6-3, to hold that Aereo’s retransmission of
television broadcasts was a public performance of a network’s copyrighted work.
We first used e3value[4] to develop Aereo’s value model (VM) as in figure 1(a).
The value viewpoint helps to identify the actors, value activities and exchanges
needed to satisfy the top-level consumer need in Aereo.
2.1 Conceptual framework
The framework involves three facets: legal risks analysis, legal argumentation,
and compliance patterns.
1 573 U.S. (2014)
Figure 5.2: (a) Aereo’s initial value model. (b). Aereo’s adapted business model.
5.2.2 Val e network
The value network shows Aereo in its ecosystem i.e. the interactions with key partners
that enable it to create and deliver value. viewers, advertisers, the public broadcast
channels. Figure 5.2 ill strates how e3-value models the court scenario. This type of
modeling was very intuitive for the author, a lawyer, who was quickly able to spot
a copyright issue arising in 5.2 (a). We then modeled the remedy as shown in 5.2
(b).


























































































Figure 5.3: TVC’s strategy map.
Figure 5.3 shows TVC’s strategy map. Later on, we apply our compliance frame-
work to develop some compliance patterns for the firm. Our current solution to manage
legal risks has been to extend the strategy map with an additional ‘legal risk manage-
ment perspective’ directly below the internal processes perspective as in Figure 5.3. We
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place the patterns in the legal risk management perspective so we can map them onto
their respective value streams. We then link those to the revenue-at-risk e.g. a fine or
bankruptcy. This gives us a placeholder for the compliance patterns and from which
we can see the corresponding actions taken at the internal processes perspective of the
strategy map. We tie the legal risk to the revenue-at-risk because it could negatively
affect revenue partly (a fine) or fully (bankruptcy). On the right of the Strategy Map
is an alignment of the map’s perspectives to their corresponding role in the compliance
pattern.
5.2.4 Value model
Besides linking compliance patterns to the strategy map, we also need to quantify them
in the VDMBee business plan. This helps the business executives to understand the
consequences and the future viability of the business model. Given the CJEU ruling
and UK’s decision to terminate the section 73 exception, the total revenue is at risk
and TVC will have to factor the cost of acquiring copyright in order to access both the
UK and EU markets. We implemented the TVC case on VDMBee and details about
the example implementation can be found at TVC business model.
5.3 Modeling canons
Chapter 3 has shown that there are many canons operating within the arguments in the
Aereo and TVC cases. However, we do not have a structure for interacting with these
canons. Here, we consider argument schemes from informal logic as a tool to represent
the canons introduced in section 2.4. The following terms are abbreviated: VM - Value
Model, CR - Constitutive Rule, PR - prescriptive rule, PC - prescriptive condition,
T-term, Cs - Case, Pr - purpose, SR - substantive reason, I - Interpretation.
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5.3.1 Linguistic arguments
Linguistic arguments are made from an express reading of the text of the law and they
are the initial arguments to be made. For instance, in both running examples, one party
argued the term ‘cable’ means wire (ordinary meaning) while the defendants argued
for fibre-optic (technical meaning).
5.3.1.1 Argument from ordinary /technical meaning
These arguments are best represented using Walton’s argument from verbal classifica-
tion particularly the argument from definition to verbal classification [Walton et al.,
2008, p. 319]. We formalize it as an argument from ordinary/technical meaning as
follows:
1. Definition premise: VMx fulfills the prescriptive condition PC(T) because its technolog-
ical competence fits definition t ;
2. Classification premise: For all x, if x fits definition t, then x ought to be ascribed either:
(a) the standard ordinary meaning of an ordinary term It;
(b) the standard technical meaning of an ordinary legal/non-legal term It
(c) the standard technical meaning of a technical legal/non-legal term It.
3. Conclusion: VMx fulfills the prescriptive condition PC(T) interpreted as It.
4. Critical questions:
(a) What evidence is there that t is an adequate definition in light of other possible
definitions that might exclude T being in It?
(b) Is the legal classification in the classification premise based merely on stipulative or
biased definition that is subject to doubt?
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5.3.2 Systemic arguments
5.3.2.1 Argument from established contextual rule
The argument from contextual harmonization involves categorization with topographic
and conceptual sub-classifications. For instance, in the TVC, Justice Arden argued
that the provisions describing access to cable in the EU directive did not make a direct
reference to copyright and should therefore not be interpreted as primarily dealing with
defenses to copyright infringement but with access to infrastructure. To represent this
argument we appropriate Walton’s argument from established rule [Walton et al., 2008,
p. 343] as follows.
1. Major premise: The definition [T] is topographically arranged and conceptually related
to the definition [Y] in [the referenced Act].
2. Established rule premise: Interpreting [T] according to a) the topographic arrangement
with related provisions of statutes or b) its conceptual structure, is the established rule
for PR.
3. Minor premise: the referenced Act defines [Y] as/to include It
4. Conclusion: The Court/expert must consider definition [Y] while interpreting the term
[T].
5. Critical questions:
(a) Does T require contextual harmonization as described?
(b) Are there other established rules that might conflict or override with this one?
(c) Is this case an exceptional one, that is, could there be extenuating circumstances
or an excuse for noncompliance?
5.3.2.2 Argument from precedent
This argument refers to a previous decision made by the same court or a court of higher
ranking which could be binding or persuasive on subsequent cases of a similar nature.
In TVC for example, in order to apply the EU Directive to UK law, the CJEU had to
follow the rule that in a harmonizing directive, a member state option may have to be
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narrowly construed, a precedent laid down in C-435/12 ACI Adam BV and others v
Stichting de Thuiskopie and another at [22]. Walton already has an argument scheme
from precedent at [Walton et al., 2008, p. 344]. Generally, the argument has to be
constructed as follows:
1. Major Premise: Generally, courts have interpreted [T] as/to entail that IT.
2. Minor Premise: VMX has been subjected to [T]
3. Conclusion: In conformity with other courts, the following interpretation ought to be
applied to VMX: IT.
In case reference needs to made to a particular case, the argument can be made as
follows:
1. Previous case premise: Cs1 is a previously cited case where rule PR was applied.
2. Previous ruling premise: In Cs1, PR(T) was interpreted as IT.
3. New case premise: Cs2 is a new case that has not yet been decided.
4. Similarity premise: Rule PR also applies to Cs2.
5. Conclusion: Generally, PR(T) in Cs2 ought to be given an interpretation IT.
6. Critical questions:
(a) Are there respects in which Cs1 and Cs2 are different that would tend to undermine
the force of the similarity cited?
(b) Is IT the right interpretation to be drawn in Cs1?
(c) Is there some other case Cs3 that is also similar to Cs1, but in which some conclusion
other than IT should be drawn?
5.3.2.3 Argument from analogy
The argument from analogy is a subset of the argument from classification. When a
case has similar facts as a previous one, the interpretation of terms in the new case
should align with those of it’s previous counterpart. For instance, it was argued in TVC
that since in Football association vs QC leisure,1 exceptions to copyright infringement
were retained to their fullest extent, the same should be done in the present case.
1No. 3 [2012] EWCA civ 708 [2013], FSR 20 at paragraph [52])
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We customize the argument as follows using Walton’s argument from analogy [Walton
et al., 2008, p. 315]:
1. Similarity premise: Generally case Cs1 is similar to Cs2.
2. Base premise: PR(T) is interpreted as IT in Cs1.
3. Conclusion: PR(T) ought to be interpreted as IT in Cs2.
4. Critical questions:
(a) Are there differences between Cs1 and Cs2 that would tend to undermine the force
of the similarity cited?
(b) Is PR(T) interpreted as IT in Cs1?
(c) Is there some other case Cs3 that is also similar to Cs1, but in which PR(T) is not
interpreted as IT?
It may also be necessary to use an analogy based on classification from Walton [2010]
as follows:
1. Premise 1 : Generally case(s) [X] has features a, b, c.
2. Premise 2 : VMy has features a, b, c.
3. Conclusion 1 : Legally, Case X and VMy should be classified in the same way with respect
to the above features.
4. Premise 3 : It is by virtue of the above features that [X] is properly classified as a [Z].
5. Conclusion 2 : Because they are substantially similar, VMy ought to be classified as [Z].
6. Critical questions:
(a) What evidence is there that [X] is definitely a [Z] as opposed to evidence indicating
room for doubt whether it should be so classified?
(b) Is the legal classification in the classification premise based merely on assumption
about word usage that is subject to doubt?
(c) Are there differences between [X] and VMy that would tend to undermine the force
of the similarity cited?
(d) Is there some other case [U] that is also similar to [X] but in which features a,b,
and c are false?
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5.3.2.4 Argument from established legal concept
A Contract is a good example of a common legal concept. Everyone has a basic
understanding of what it means. Similarly, other legal concepts ought to maintain
their meanings whenever they are interpreted. Here we again use the argument from
established rule [Walton et al., 2008, p. 343]. We could also use the argument from
commitment but we retain the former for consistency. The customized argument is as
follows:
1. Major premise: The term [T] has a uniform and precise statutory/historical definition in
the legal system in question.
2. Established rule premise: Interpreting T with terminological consistency is the estab-
lished rule for PR.
3. Conclusion: [T] is interpreted as/to include It.
4. Critical questions:
(a) What is the evidence that the established rule is to interpret T with terminological
consistency /historically?
(b) Are there other established rules that might conflict with or override with this one?
(c) Is this case an exceptional one, that is, could there be extenuating circumstances
or an excuse for noncompliance?
This argument can be rebutted by claiming special circumstances which means applying
the argument from exceptional case. We could also rebut with argument from inconsis-
tent commitment [Walton et al., 2008, p. 337], the warrant being that Parliament does
not intend an absurdity as it cannot commit to two positions contemporaneously.
5.3.2.5 Argument from legal principle
A good example here is conforming interpretation i.e. the principles of interpretation
which the court applies to make domestic legislation conform to EU legislation and
often referred to as the marleasing principle. The principle states that the court can
abandon the principle of statutory interpretation that expressions used in legislation
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bear the same meaning throughout that legislation where it is necessary to give effect
to EU law. This would in effect undercut the foregoing argument from legal-concept
above. To expresses this canon we customize Walton’s argument from values: positive
value [Walton et al., 2008, p. 321] as follows:
1. Premise 1 : P is a principle of the legal system which affects the interpretation and
therefore the evaluation of [T].
2. Premise 2 : Interpreting T as IT is necessary to ensure commitment to principle P.
3. Conclusion: T ought to be interpreted as IT.
4. Critical questions:
(a) What is the evidence that the established principle P applies to [T]?
(b) Are there other principles that might conflict with or override this one?
(c) Is this case an exceptional one, that is, could there be extenuating circumstances
or an excuse for noncompliance?
Sometimes, principles may be conflicting and we present them with the following
scheme:
1. Premise 1 : It is principle [Px], not [Py] that is applicable to the interpretation of, and
therefore the evaluation of [T].
2. Warrant : If [T] is interpreted using [Py], then VMx should satisfy [the prescribed test
under Py].
3. Premise 2 : VMx does not fulfill the prescribed test.
4. Conclusion: [T] ought to be interpreted using principle [Px] as IT.
5.3.2.6 Argument from constitutive legal history
In both running cases, the argument was made that whereas the law as enacted had
referred to traditional cable lines, the same text had now come to include modern fibre-
optic cable and it should be interpreted according to this historically evolved meaning.
Here, we use Walton’s argument from constitutive rule claims - physical world premise
version 2 [Walton et al., 2008, p. 342] customized as follows:
1. Premise: IT counts as PR(T).
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2. Warrant : When the meaning of a statute(s) historically evolves into something rather
different from what a) its language facially represents, or b) it’s original design indicates,
the provisions ought to be interpreted in line with the evolved meaning on a) the point
and purpose of the statute or b) the new conception of rightness it embodies.
3. Conclusion: IT counts as PR(T).
4. Rebuttal factor : The warrant backing applies unless IT has further been revoked, over-
turned, or statute amended.
5. Critical questions:
(a) What is the evidence that IT counts as PR[T]?
(b) Are there other historical interpretations that might conflict with or override with
this one?
(c) Is this case an exceptional one, that is, could there be extenuating circumstances
or an excuse for noncompliance?
5.3.3 Teleological arguments
If the arguments proceed to the the third level, one can either deploy a) an argument
from purpose or b) an argument from practical reasoning.
5.3.3.1 Argument from purpose
An example of an argument from purpose was seen in Aereo where the majority judges
cited a legislative committee report to show that the current law being applied was
enacted to outlaw the very activities that Aereo was being accused of conducting. We
use Walton’s argument from practical reasoning: Necessary condition schema [Walton
et al., 2008, p. 323] customized as follows:
1. Goal premise: The legislature’s purpose in promulgating (enacting/amending/repealing)
PR(T) was [Pr].
2. Alternative premise: Therefore, it is necessary that at least one of the following interpre-
tations of the term [T] ought to fulfill this purpose [I1, I2, ... In].
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3. Selection premise: Interpretation Ii has been selected as the most compatible to fulfill
Pr.
4. Practicality premise: No legislative intention prevents the application of Ii, as far as is
known.
5. Side effects premise: Realizing Pr is more acceptable to the legislature than not applying
Ii.
6. Conclusion: Therefore, Ii is the most compatible interpretation with the legislature’s
purpose [Pr].
7. Critical questions:
(a) Alternative means question: Are there alternative means of realizing Pr, other than
Ii?
(b) Acceptable/Best option question: is Ii an acceptable interpretation, is it the best
alternative?
(c) Possibility question: Is there a legislative intention or other rule that prevents the
application of the chosen interpretation?
(d) Negative side effects question: Are there negative side effects of applying Ii that
ought to be considered?
(e) Conflicting goals question: Does the legislature have purposes other than Pr, which
have the potential to conflict with applying Pr?
5.3.3.2 Argument from substantive reason
A substantive reason used to rule against Aereo was that congress had enacted a com-
plex licensing regime setting out the conditions, including the payment of compulsory
fees under which cable systems may retransmit broadcasts to the public. We choose
Walton’s abductive - backward argumentation scheme [Walton et al., 2008, p. 329]
as it allows us to list, compare and choose between the foregoing arguments at the
systemic level of interpretation.
1. Substantive premise: [SR] is a particular/general substantive reason of a moral / political
/ economic / social nature in the legal order informing the content of/relevant to the
immediate interpretation of [T].
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2. Alternative premise: Each of the interpretations [I1, I2, ..., In] of [T] should seek to
achieve this substantive reason.
3. Selection premise: Ii is the interpretation that achieves SR most successfully.
4. Conclusion: Therefore Ii is the most plausible interpretation compatible with the sub-
stantive reason to [SR].
5. Critical questions:
(a) How satisfactory is Ii itself as a substantive reason, apart from the alternative
reasons available so far in the dialogue?
(b) How much better a representation of the substantive reason is Ii than the alternative
interpretations so far in the dialogue?
(c) How thorough has the search been in the investigation of the case? Would it be
better to continue the dialogue further, instead of drawing a conclusion at this
point?
5.3.4 Trans-categorical arguments
5.3.4.1 Argument from intention
Here we use Walton’s abductive scheme for argument from character to action [Walton
et al., 2008, p. 329] customized as follows:
1. Premise 1 : Parliament promulgated (enacted/amended/repealed) a given Act/provision
in relation to [T].
2. Premise 2 : This ought to be interpreted as fitting the intention Ix over Iy in regard to
VMx.
3. Conclusion: Therefore, the legislature intended Ix for VMx when it promulgated with
regards to [T].
4. Critical questions:
(a) How was the intention defined (statute preamble / doctrine / case law)?
i. enacted/amended/repealed an Act/statutory provision;
ii. interpreted evidence; or
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iii. stated in travaux pre´paratoires.
(b) Does the description of the interpretation in question actually fit the definition of
the intention?
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter has illustrated value modeling section 5.2 and the modeling of canons sec-
tion 5.3. The value modeling illustrated Aereo’s business model mainly showing the
structured discovery using a business model canvas, a value network, and a strategy
map. The modeling of canons involved semi-formalization using Walton’s argumenta-








This chapter consolidates insights from the foregoing chapters to develop patterns
that firms can apply to gauge their compliance. We will be working towards a semi-
automated framework that: 1. takes a business model as input; 2. outputs that model’s
main activities through a value model; 3. facilitates a legal-knowledge engineer to find
and interpret the relevant legal provisions and 4. apply the argumentation framework
to reconcile the resulting prescriptions in order to 5. formulate applicable compliance
patterns for the business model.
The objective is to design compliance that is focused on a firm’s innovative business
model. As seen in Figure 6.1, the appropriate design should incorporate business model-
ing, legal knowledge management and legal risk analysis tools and techniques to develop
patterns of compliance that describe the business context, the potential problems and
the possible solutions applicable to a business model. The framework is divided into
three parts a) legal risk analysis b) legal interpretation and c) compliance patterns.
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The Compliance Patterns Conceptual Framework 
Figure 6.1: The conceptual framework.
6.1 Legal risk analysis
Value modeling: The first step is to establish what the business context is. We deploy
value modeling as discussed in section 5.2 to represent the flow that a startup creates.
This is shown in a value model that gives us the activities and capabilities driven
by a startup’s disruptive technology. It is these activities and the general interaction
between the stakeholders in the value model that give hints on what legal domain
governs the model. It is from this domain that the rules that determine compliance are
derived.
Traditionally, once a lawyer determines the legal domain involved, they will select
the relevant provisions and then narrow down to the most pertinent provision applicable
to the case. Equally, Eunomos may recommend a number of rules related to one of it’s
ontological concepts. It is the prescriptive conditions in the rule that relay the nature
of compliant behavior expected of a firm. However, sometimes the operative facts in
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the condition Hohfeld [1913] lend themselves to more than one interpretation. They
need to be interpreted to determine the behavior required.
Legal interpretation: This part helps us explore the space of legal interpretation
that is possible for a given operative fact. We apply canons from legal theory to work
out the possible interpretations. This may generate conflicting or even complementary
interpretations and we need a way to resolve which interpretation prevails in the former
case, or which take precedence in the latter. For this we use a model from MacCormick
and Summers [1991] . The prescriptive rule is then updated by rephrasing it with the
interpreted version of the prescriptive condition.
Compliance pattern: This last part ties the interpreted rule to the business model
in a pattern. The pattern summarizes the business context, the potential risks, the
possible solutions and the relevant penalties that the startup could face. This then
allows the firm, in consultation with other stakeholders, to determine possible ways of
altering the value model to achieve compliance.
6.2 The compliance pattern framework
We could view the above framework as the transitions of a regulatory conversation.
As such, it could take the form of a dialogue. In fact, Walton et al. [2008] discuss the
use of a dialectical model to represent legal reasoning. We adopt this approach with
the following steps which we structure using argument schemes as summarized in the
Figure 6.2 below.
We use a dialectical approach following Walton in order to indicate how legal ar-
guments are developed in a legal dispute. Accordingly, the argumentation is divided
into five stages of a dialogue namely, domain classification, confrontation, opening, ar-
gumentation and closing stages Walton et al. [2008]. This helps to justify the winning
argument, hence the winning interpretation. These stages will also serve to structure
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Compliance pattern framework Walton’s argumentation scheme Adapted scheme
Legal risk analysis
Positioning a value model in the 
legal framework 
• Argument from verbal classification 
• Argument from analogy based on 
classification
Argument from legal domain 
classification
Rule identification Forward argument scheme from 
abductive inference
Forward argument for abductive
rule identification
Legal claim Regulative-rule premise obligation claim Argument from legal claim
Legal action Argument from established rules Argument from legal action





Legal interpretation generation - -
Legal argumentation   Forward argument scheme for abductive 
inference 
Forward argument for abductive
legal interpretation inference 
Compliance pattern 
Compliance pattern generation Argument from practical reasoning –
necessary condition schema 
-
Figure 6.2: The framework argument schemes.
the rest of the framework.
6.2.1 Domain classification stage
This stage facilitates the classification of a value model within an appropriate domain
in the legal framework from which the legal rules will be derived. It has two stages:
value modeling then legal domain identification.
6.2.1.1 Value modeling
We apply the VDMBee value management methodology to describe the business; build
a business model canvas, a business network, a strategy map and eventually the busi-
ness plan on the VDMBee value management platform. This helps determine the
competencies and activities driven by a startup’s disruptive technology.
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6.2.1.2 Legal domain identification
The resulting competencies and activities serve as evidential facts (EF) Hohfeld [1913]
to determine which legal domain governs the value model. It is here that lawyers,
in-house counsel or compliance officers would traditionally be engaged, although the
growing number of legal knowledge engineers will increasingly be playing this role. We
apply Walton’s argument from classification to identify the legal domain for the value
model as below:
Argument from legal domain classification
1. Individual premise: VM has competence/activity EF.
2. Legal classification premise: for all x if x has competence/activity EF, then x ought to
be regulated by legal domain D.
3. Conclusion: VM is regulated by legal domain D.
4. The critical questions:
(a) Does VM definitely have competence/activity EF, or is there room for doubt?
(b) Can the legal domain classification be said to hold strongly, or is it subject to doubt?
6.2.2 Confrontation stage
This is where the conflict of opinion or problem is stated in a dialogue setting. We use
this stage to characterize the legal research phase that lawyers conduct before a case is
adjudicated. Walton applies abductive arguments for forward argument invention. We
adopt this application to generate the prescriptive rules that define legal behavior and
thereby help parties make their legal claim.
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6.2.2.1 Prescriptive rule generation
We use Walton’s forward argument scheme [Walton et al., 2008, p. 329] to derive the
prescriptive rules.
Forward argument for abductive rule identification
1. Domain Premise: EF is an competence/activity in VM.
2. Rule premise: There’s a set of legal rules PR1, PR2, ..., PRn that regulate EF.
3. Plausibility premise: PRi is the most plausible rule regulating EF.
4. Conclusion: Therefore EF should be compliant with PRi.
5. Critical questions:
(a) How satisfactory is PRi itself as a rule regulating EF, apart from the alternative
rules available in the dialogue?
(b) How much better a rule is PRi than the alternative rules so far in the dialogue?
(c) How far has the dialogue progressed? If the dialogue is an inquiry, how thorough
has the search been in the investigation of the case?
6.2.3 Opening stage
Participants try to resolve the conflict or solve the problem using rational argument.
In the legal domain this may involve proponents stating their case and respondents
responding, which opens the way for further argumentation. The proponents are nor-
mally expected to state the rule, generalization or in legal theory terms, a normative
conditional Sartor and Pattaro [2005] for the case they allege has been violated. Here,
legal claims are restated more precisely in terms of the prescriptive conditions identified
from the foregoing stage.
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6.2.3.1 Legal claim
We use one of Walton’s argument schemes from rules [Walton et al., 2008, p. 343] as
follows:
Argument from legal claim
1. General rule premise: [Activity a] is restricted by a right belonging to X under [section].
2. Performance premise: To perform the [Activity a], an entity Y must:
(a) own the right; or
(b) be assigned to perform
(c) be licensed to perform
3. Warrant : Y violates/infringes the right of X if it performs activity without authorization.
4. Conclusion: Therefore, Y must own or obtain the right to perform the activity.
5. Else: Y violates/infringes the right of X.
6.2.3.2 Legal action
The legal action invokes additional prescriptive rules to enforce the claim. For this we
deploy Walton’s argument scheme from established rule [Walton et al., 2008, p. 343]
as follows:
Argument from legal action
1. Established rule premise: Where a valid legal claim under [section] exists, X has a right
to sue Y under [section].
2. Remedies premise: Y is potentially liable under [section] to X for: [damages, injunctions,
account of profits, impounding and disposition of infringing articles, costs and attorney’s
fees or criminal offenses].
3. Violation premise: Y violates X’s right under [section].
4. Conclusion: Therefore: Y is potentially liable to X for remedies.
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6.2.3.3 Exceptional case generation
A party can now confront the other side in order to force them to negotiate a fair
settlement amicably or risk being sued. This places a burden of proof on the respondent
who may then respond by either rebutting the foregoing conclusion or attacking one
of its premises using a suitable rule. We use Walton’s argument from exceptional case
[Walton et al., 2008, p. 344] to simulate how they can go about making their case.
Argument from exceptional case
1. Exception premise: If the case of [Ex] is an exception to the established rule under
[section], the rule can be waived in that case.
2. Minor premise: The case cited is an exception.
3. Conclusion: Therefore, X is exempted from violation of Y’s right under the established
rule.
4. Critical questions:
(a) Is the case of [Ex] a recognized type of exception?
(b) If it is not a recognized case, can evidence that the established rule does not apply
to it be given?
(c) If it is a borderline case, can comparable cases be cited?
6.2.4 Legal interpretation
Participants may try further attempts to resolve the conflict. In law, this may involve
out of court settlement, mediation, arbitration or a full-fledged legal suit. Whichever
the case, the rules determined by the foregoing arguments need further examination so
each party can determine the strength of its position.
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MacCormick’s interpretive argument Walton’s argumentation scheme
Linguistic arguments 
Argument from ordinary meaning 
Argument from technical meaning
Argument from classification: definition 
to verbal classification 
Systemic Arguments
Argument from contextual harmonization Argument from established rule
Argument from precedent Argument from precedent 
Argument from analogy   Argument from analogy
Argument from a legal concept Argument from established legal concept 
Argument from general principles Argument from values
Argument from history Argument from constitutive-rule claims: 
Physical-world premise version 2 
Teleological-evaluative arguments
Argument from purpose Argument from practical reasoning: 
Necessary condition schema 
Argument from substantive reasons Abductive argument scheme: Backward 
argumentation scheme 
Trans-categorical arguments
Arguments from intention Abductive scheme for argument from 
action to character 
Figure 6.3: Interpretive arguments and their corresponding argument schemes.
6.2.4.1 Legal issue identification
Stating the prescriptive conditions helps determine the terms (T) to be interpreted and
the legal issues arising thereof. The prescriptive rule will have a number of elements
which legal theory refers to as operative facts (OF). These are abstracted from actual
legal scenarios and case law to characterize compliant behavior. An operative fact
may also be defined by a constitutive rule in the interpretation section of a statute.
Even then, such meaning may at times be defeasible or open textured. This is not
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always unintended as the law is sometimes designed to capture multifaceted scenarios.
Conventionally, a legal issue will be raised regarding the identified term. This takes the
form of a question (Q), the answer to which helps determine the appropriate compliance
behavior. The framing of Q sets off the interpretive process.
Once a term has been brought to issue, it will form the subject of adverse inter-
pretation between the parties Hohfeld [1913]. The term could be a word, phrase, or
sentence. Parties will use different interpretive arguments to ensure that the term fits
their case. As modeled in section 5.3, we use interpretive arguments represented using
Walton’s argument schemes as shown in the table in Figure 6.3.
6.2.5 Argumentation stage
The identified term is interpreted in accordance with the legal question using a number
of interpretive arguments.
6.2.5.1 Legal argument generation
We apply Walton’s forward abductive scheme [Walton et al., 2008, p. 329] to generate
the different arguments that could be made in favor of, or against a given interpretation
while interpreting a given term. The argumentation model is incorporated within this
argument to reconcile the resulting interpretations.
Forward argument for abductive legal interpretation inference
1. Legal issue premise: PR(T) is open-textured/defeasible term, that requires interpretation
to determine compliance of [VM]/whether it meets the PC in the legal claim.
2. Interpretive argument premise:
(a) PR(T) may be interpreted by a set of canons [CLinguistic, CSystemic, CTeleological-evaluative,
CTrans-categorical] supplemented by plausible conditionals and other statements that
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function as missing parts of enthymemes.
(b) which lead to respective interpretations [ILinguistic, ISystemic, ITeleological-evaluative,
ITrans-categorical].
3. Interpretive model premise: Unless there is a strong indication of a CTrans-categorical ar-
gument, then:
(a) the most plausible/strongest canon Ci is represented:
i. in the first instance by a CLinguistic argument unless a CSystemic argument;
ii. in the second instance by a CSystemic argument unless a CTeleological-evaluative
argument;
iii. in the third instance a CTeleological-evaluative argument;
(b) Else:
i. the most plausible/strongest argument is represented by a CLinguistic argument
supported by any CTrans-categorical argument.
4. Conclusion: Then, the most plausible/strongest interpretation is:
(a) a ILinguistic interpretation supported by a ITrans-categorical interpretation
(b) Else:
i. a ILinguistic interpretation applies in the first instance;
ii. a ISystemic interpretation applies in the second instance;
iii. a ITeleological-evaluative argument applies in the third instance.
6.2.6 Closing stage
Here, we determine the actual compliant behavior by applying the final interpretation to
the prescriptive rule. This allows us to rewrite the rule in order to derive a prescription.
The prescription should include all the accepted interpretations to reflect the possible
options for compliance. We then apply the EARS framework to generate clear and
unambiguous requirements for compliance.
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6.2.6.1 Compliance pattern generation
We are now ready to fill out the context - problem - solution structure to derive a
compliance pattern. The context is stated using the value model’s competencies and
activities, the problem is a restatement of the legal risk, and the solution is described
in the system requirements clarifying the compliant behavior expected.
6.2.6.2 Legal risk management
The legal risk is managed by applying the compliance patterns to the value model. The
strategy map goals represent desired changes to the current state of the business. These
changes correspond to an evolution of the business that can be modeled by using two
phases of the business model, one for the As-Is version (before legal risk analysis) and
another for the To-Be version (compliant to the generated patterns). In order explain
the necessary conditions for compliance in a way that is much more intelligible to
requirements engineers, business executives, business analysts and other stakeholders,
we also modify the strategy map and the value model as explained in section 5.2.
6.3 Instantiating framework with Aereo case
We now apply the foregoing framework to Aereo’s case to test it.
6.3.1 Aereo’s legal risk analysis
6.3.1.1 Positioning Aereo in a legal domain
1. Business premise: [VMAereo] has the technological competence to [digitize and stream
terrestrial channels] to enable [subscribers to watch television programs over the internet
about the same time as the programs are broadcast over the air].
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2. Legal classification premise: For all x, if x has capability [digitize and stream terrestrial
channels], then x ought to be governed by legal domain [Broadcast copyright].
3. Conclusion: The [digital broadcast copyright] domain governs [VMaereo].
4. Critical questions:
(a) What evidence is there that VMAereo has the capability to [digitize and stream ter-
restrial channels], as opposed to evidence indicating room for doubt about whether
it should be so classified?
• Evidenced by the facts in evidence in court; and
• Evidenced by the activities in VMAereo.
(b) Is the domain classification in the classification premise based merely on an as-
sumption about word usage that is subject to doubt? The classification is based
on:
• The performance clause; and
• The transmission clause of the US Copyright Act 1976.
6.3.1.2 Aereo’s rule identification
1. Domain premise: [VMAereo] is governed by the [digital broadcast copyright] domain.
2. Rule premise: There is a set of digital broadcast copyright rules [PR§106(1), PR§106(2),
PR§106(3), PR§106(4), PR§106(5), PR§106(6), PR§111 and PR§501] that regulate the
digitization and streaming of terrestrial channels in VMAereo].
3. Plausibility premise: The most plausible rule regulating VMAereo is PR§106(4) - the owner
of copyright in audiovisual works has the exclusive rights to perform and to authorize
performance of the copyrighted work publicly.
4. Conclusion: Therefore, VMAereo should be compliant with PR§106(4).
5. Critical questions:
(a) How satisfactory is PR§106(4) itself as a rule regulating VMAereo, apart from the
alternative rules available in the dialogue? PR§106(4) comprehensively explains
who owns and has the right to deal in the copyright for audio-visual works in TV
programs that [VMAereo] retransmits.
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(b) How much better a rule is PR§106(4) than the alternative rules so far in the dia-
logue?
• The other rules from PR§106 only describe copyright for other types of works.
• PR§111 defines the limits of broadcast rights but only after they have been
established.
• PR§501 defines infringement and explains the remedies thereof. It comes into
operation after copyright ownership has been established.
(c) How far has the dialogue progressed? If the dialogue is an inquiry, how thorough
has the search been in the investigation of the case? The inquiry is still preliminary;
PR§106(4) only helps us explain the scope of ownership. It is a basis for a claim.
(d) Would it be better to continue the dialogue further, instead of drawing a conclusion
at this point? This argument establishes the rule to be complied with. Further
steps needs to be taken to assess actual compliance of the activity/capability.
6.3.1.3 Broadcaster’s legal claim
1. General rule premise: To perform the copyright in an audio-visual work publicly under
PR§106(4), VMAereo must:
(a) own the copyright; or
(b) be licensed to perform
2. Warrant : EFAereo infringes the copyright pursuant to CR§501(a) if it performs the copy-
right in an audio-visual work and:
(a) does not own the copyright; or
(b) is not licensed to perform.
3. Conclusion: Therefore, VMAereo must:
(a) obtain ownership of the copyright (purchase, assignment, transfer); or
(b) acquire a license to perform the copyright.
4. Else: VMAereo infringes the copyright pursuant to CR§501(a).
5. Rebuttal Factor : Aereo has an adequate excuse, or an overriding duty.
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• E.g. One of the limitations of exclusive rights §107-122.
6.3.1.4 Broadcaster’s legal action
1. Established rule premise: If [VMAereo] infringes [Broadcasters]’s copyright under CR§501(a),
then:
(a) [Broadcasters] has a right to sue [VMAereo] under CR§501(b);
(b) [VMAereo] is liable to [Broadcasters] for infringement remedies including: injunc-
tions, impounding and disposition of infringing articles, damages and profit, costs
and attorney’s fees [and criminal offenses].
2. Minor premise: VMAereo infringes on the copyright of [Broadcasters] pursuant to CR§501(a).
3. Conclusion: Therefore:
(a) [Broadcasters] has a right to sue VMAereo under CR§501(b);
(b) VMAereo is liable to [Broadcasters] for infringement remedies including: injunctions,
impounding and disposition of infringing articles, damages and profit, costs and
attorney’s fees [and criminal offenses].
6.3.1.5 Aereo’s exceptional case generation
1. Exception premise: If the case of [VMAereo merely supplies equipment to enable others
to perform [Broadcaster]’s audio-visual work under CR §113(3)] is an exception, then the
copyright infringement rule can be waived in that case.
2. Minor premise: VMAereo merely supplies equipment to enable others to perform [Broad-
casters]’s audio-visual work under CR §111(3).
3. Conclusion: Therefore VMAereo is exempted from the copyright infringement rule.
4. Critical questions:
(a) Is the case of [X merely supplies equipment to enable others to perform Y’s audio-
visual work under CR §113(3)] a recognized type of exception? Yes, under the cited
provision of the law.
(b) If it is not a recognized case, can evidence that the established rule does not apply
to it be given? N/A.
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(c) If it is a borderline case, can comparable cases be cited? N/A.
6.3.2 Interpretive element identification
The two main contentions from the foregoing is whether Aereo performs, and if it
performs, whether it does so publicly.
6.3.3 Argument generation
Exploring the first issue will be sufficient for this running example. Using the operative
term perform, we develop the following arguments.
6.3.3.1 Linguistics arguments
The majority opinion first argues that Aereo’s system, fits the statutory definition
of ‘perform’. We characterize this with a linguistic argument that incorporates the
technological competence and the resulting activities of VMAereo.
Argument from technical meaning
1. Definition premise: VMAereo performs because its technological competence fits the defi-
nition of perform i.e. - in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show
its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible [section 101
(definitions) The U.S. Copyright Act].
2. Interpretation premise: For all x, if its technological competence fits the definition in
[section 101], then x ought to be ascribed the standard technical meaning of the ordinary
term in that section.
3. Conclusion: VMAereo performs where, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual
work, it shows its images in any sequence or makes the sounds accompanying it audible.
4. Critical questions:
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(a) What evidence is there that [section 101(definitions)] is an adequate definition, in
light of other possible alternative definitions that might exclude VMAereo being
ascribed with this standard technical meaning? The definition is not adequate.
The court seems to perceive it as a ambiguous and therefore goes ahead to support
it with other arguments.
(b) Is the legal classification in the classification premise based merely on stipulative or
biased definition that is subject to doubt? No, the definition is based on a statutory
definition in the relevant Act.
6.3.3.2 Systemic arguments
To further contextualize the term perform, the majority opinion proceeds to associate it
with a related term i.e. to perform or display a work ‘publicly’. This takes an argument
from contextual harmonization.
Argument from contextual harmonization
1. Major premise: The definition [To perform] is topographically arranged and conceptually
related to the definition [To perform or display a work publicly] in the US Copyright Act.
2. Rule premise: Interpreting perform according to a) the topographic arrangement with
related provisions of statutes or b) its conceptual structure, is the established rule for the
prescriptive rule.
3. Minor premise: The Copyright Act defines to perform or display a work publicly to
include [To transmit or otherwise communicate a performance ... of the copyrighted
work...to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the
public capable of receiving the performance...receive it in the same place or in separate
places and at the same time or at different times.
4. Conclusion: In interpreting the term perform, the Court must consider the definition to
transmit or otherwise communicate a performance of the copyrighted work to the public.
5. Critical questions:
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(a) Does the term require contextual harmonization as described? This is the approach
taken in the opening statement of the majority opinion.
(b) Are there other established rules that might conflict or override with this one? The
argument from principle raised by the dissenting opinion.
(c) Is this case an exceptional one, that is, could there be extenuating circumstances
or an excuse for noncompliance? No. The dissenting opinion criticizes the majority
ruling stating that, with their approach, proving that one has performed necessarily
proves that such performance was public.
The dissenting opinion does not have a linguistic argument to counter the statutory
definition. It therefore proceeds to the systemic level to attack the broadcasters’ lin-
guistic argument. It uses an argument from principle to show that, assessed under the
correct rules, it does not itself perform.
Argument from principle (liability rules)
1. Premise 1 : VMAereo does not perform because it is secondary-culpability not direct-
culpability rules which affect the interpretation, and therefore the evaluation of whether
Aereo performs.
2. Warrant: If perform is interpreted using direct-culpability, then it should satisfy the voli-
tional conduct test to direct infringement in order to ensure commitment to the principle
that [A defendant may be held directly liable only if it has engaged in volitional conduct
that violates the Act [see W. Patry, Copyright s9:5.50 (2013)]].
3. Premise 2 : Aereo’s operation of its automated system is a volitional act and a but-for
cause of the resulting performances, that degree of involvement is not enough for direct
liability. [Groster, 545 U.S., at 960].
4. Conclusion: VMAereo does not perform because it cannot be held directly liable for
infringing the broadcaster’s public performance right.
The foregoing argument is further supported with an argument drawn from analogy
to show that, in fact, automated systems do not fulfill the volitional conduct test
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when they respond to user input. The analogy is with an Internet Service Provider
(ISP).
Argument from analogy (ISPs)
1. Similarity premise: Generally VMISP is similar to VMAereo.
2. Base premise: The volitional conduct test is false when the technological competence in
VMISP facilitates automatic transfer of data between its users.
3. Conclusion: The volitional conduct test is false when the technological competence in
VMAereo facilitates automatic transfer of broadcasts to its users.
4. Critical questions:
(a) Are there differences between VMISP and VMAereo that would tend to undermine
the force of the similarity cited? None have been presented by the opposing side
i.e. the majority opinion in the case.
(b) Is the volitional conduct test false in VMISP? Yes, The Judges support this con-
tention by quoting the case of CoStar, 373 F. 3d, at 550-1.
(c) Is there some other case VMz that is also similar to VMISP, but in which direct
liability is true? None have been highlighted by the case.
Even after demonstrating that the volitional conduct test does not apply, the dissenting
opinion draws again on analogy to show why this is the case, this time with a comparison
to a copy shop that issues its members with a library card.
Argument from analogy (copy shop)
1. Similarity premise: Generally VMCopy shop is similar to VMAereo.
2. Base premise: Direct liability of a VMCopy shop is false when a customer uses its photo-
copier to make an infringing copy, because it plays no role in selecting the content.
3. Conclusion: Direct liability of VMAereo is false when a subscriber selects a program and
uses Aereo to relay it, because it plays no role in selecting the content.
4. Critical questions:
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(a) Are there differences between VMCopy shop and VMAereo that would tend to under-
mine the force of the similarity cited? None have been presented by the majority
opinion in the case.
(b) Is direct liability false in VMCopy shop? Yes, The Judges quote the case of CoStar,
373 F. 3d, at 550-1.
(c) Is there some other case VMz that is also similar to VMCopy shop, but in which direct
liability is true? Yes, the judges highlight the case of VMvideo-on-demand where direct
liability is true. While Video-one-demand services automatically respond to user
input like VMCopy Shops, they curate i.e. they choose the content.
The dissenting opinion further strengthens its position with a precedent to prove that
courts have already interpreted this issue and the precedent is binding in this in-
stance.
Argument from precedent
1. Major Premise: Generally, courts have interpreted a direct infringement claim against
defendant who operates an automated, user-controlled system to entail that [a producer
who permits unlawful copying does not himself engage in unlawful copying].
2. Minor Premise: VMAereo has been subjected to direct infringement claim for operating
an automated, user-controlled system.
3. Conclusion: In conformity with other courts, the following interpretation ought to be
applied to VMAereo: a producer who permits unlawful copying does not himself engage
in unlawful copying.
The majority opinion has its own argument from analogy to show that Aereo is similar
to previous cases that SCOTUS has dealt with in the past and so should be treated in
the same way i.e. as a Community Antenna Television (CATV) system.
Argument from analogy based on classification
1. Premise 1: The cases of Fortnightly and Teleprompter have the following features:
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(a) Sell a service that allows subscribers to watch TV programs, many of which are
copyrighted, virtually as they are being broadcast;
(b) Use their own equipment, housed in a centralized warehouse, outside of its users’
homes;
(c) Receives programs that have been released to the public and carries them by private
channels to additional viewers.
2. Premise 2: VMAereo has features:
(a) Sells a service that allows subscribers to watch TV programs, many of which are
copyrighted, virtually as they are being broadcast;
(b) Uses its own equipment, housed in a centralized warehouse, outside of its users’
homes;
(c) By means of its technology, Aereo’s system ‘receives programs that have been re-
leased to the public and carries them by private channels to additional viewers.’
3. Conclusion 1: [The cases of Fortnightly and Teleprompter] and VMAereo should be clas-
sified in the same way in respect to the above features;
4. Premise 3: It is by virtue of above features that [the cases of Fortnightly and Teleprompter]
are properly classified as a [CATV system].
5. Conclusion 2: Because VMAereo activities are substantially similar to those of CATV
companies that congress amended the Act to reach, VMAereo ought to be classified as a
[CATV system].
6. Critical questions:
(a) What evidence is there that [the cases of Fortnightly and Teleprompter] are defi-
nitely a [CATV system] as opposed to evidence indicating room for doubt about
whether it should be so classified? They were classified in the precedent cases
highlighted by the majority opinion.
(b) Is the legal classification in the classification premise based merely on an assumption
about word usage that is subject to doubt? No, it based on the similarity of the
operations of both entities.
(c) Are there differences between [the cases of Fortnightly and Teleprompter] and Aereo
that would tend to undermine the force of the similarity cited?
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• The dissenting opinion highlights that cable systems in the cases of Fortnightly
and Teleprompter transmitted constantly while in VMAereo, transmission is
upon request activated by the subscriber.
• The majority decision respond by stating that given the overwhelming like-
ness to CATV systems targeted by the legislative reform, this difference is not
critical.
(d) Is there some other case VMZ that is also similar to [the cases of Fortnightly and
Teleprompter] but in which the shared features are false? The dissenting opinion
also highlight that, “at the time of SCOTUS Teleprompter decision, cable compa-
nies ‘performed the same functions as ‘broadcasters’ by deliberately selecting and
importing distant signals, originating programs, and selling commercials,’ thereby
making them curators of content - more akin to video-on-demand services than copy
shops. So far the record reveal[ed], Aereo did none of those things.”
6.3.3.3 Teleological-evaluative arguments
Both court opinions have set out strong systemic arguments in support their favored lin-
guistic interpretations. We therefore need to ascend to the third level of interpretation
to determine the strongest line of argument. Remember, this level of argumentation
does not develop new arguments but decides between the ones already identified.
Argument from purpose
The majority opinion pursued an argument from purpose to illustrate why the current
law being interpreted was enacted.
1. Purpose premise: The [US congress] purpose in amending [the Copyright Act 1976] was
to [overturn the SCOTUS holdings that the activities of CATV providers fell outside the
Act’s scope].
2. Alternative premise: Therefore, it is necessary that at least one of the alternative inter-
pretations of the term [perform] ought to fulfill this purpose:
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(a) VMAereo performs where, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work,
it shows its images in any sequence or makes the sounds accompanying it audible
(linguistic argument from technical meaning).
(b) VMAereo does not perform because it cannot be held directly liable for infringing
the broadcaster’s public performance right (systemic argument from principle).
3. Selection premise: The majority opinion selected the linguistic interpretation, as the
most compatible (necessary/sufficient condition) to fulfill the purpose.
4. Practicality premise: No legislative intention prevents the application of the said inter-
pretation, as far as is known.
5. Side effects premise: Realizing the identified purpose is more acceptable than not apply-
ing the chosen interpretation.
6. Conclusion: Therefore, the linguistic interpretation is the most compatible interpreta-
tion with the US congress purpose to overturn the previous SCOTUS holding that the
activities of CATV providers fell outside the Act’s scope.
7. Critical questions:
(a) Alternative means question: Are there alternative means of realizing the identi-
fied purpose, other than the chosen interpretation? The dissenting opinion argue
that this purpose should be pursued by assessing Aereo’s secondary liability for
performance infringement. “Moreover, its primary and secondary liability for re-
production infringement has also not been determined. If that does not suffice and
there is a loophole in the law, it is for Congress to eliminate it through appropriate
legislation.”
(b) Acceptable/Best option question: Is the chosen interpretation an acceptable or the
best alternative? The dissenting opinion argue that “the consequence of hold-
ing that someone who implements this technology ‘performs’ under that provision
greatly disrupts settled jurisprudence which before today, applied the straightfor-
ward, bright-line test of volitional conduct directed at the copyrighted work...perhaps
the Court means to adopt (invent, really) a two-tier version of the Copyright Act,
one part of which applies to ‘cable companies and their equivalents’ while the other
governs everyone else.
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(c) Possibility question: Is there a legislative intention that prevents the application of
the chosen interpretation? None has been identified in the case.
(d) Negative side effects question: Are there negative side effects of applying the chosen
interpretation that ought to be considered? The dissenting opinion argues that the
majority decision does not provide a criteria for determining when its cable-TV
analogy applies. It even goes further to identify a number of scenarios that do not
suffice.
i. If the rule is applied to the watch function (live television), the record function
(time shifting) will not be covered.
ii. The rule cannot cover an automated service that captures and stores live tele-
vision broadcasts at a user’s direction as that is what remote storage digital
video recorders (RS-DVRs) do, see Cartoon Network, 536 F. 3d, at 124-5.
iii. The rule cannot apply to any entity that operates an integrated system, sub-
stantially dependent on physical equipment that is used in common with its
subscribers as this would capture ISPs and a host of other entities that quite
obviously do not perform.
(e) Conflicting purposes question: Are there other purposes which have the potential
to conflict with the one chosen? Aereo argued that the purpose of the Copyright
Act is, not to stifle, but to promote innovation in the industry.
Abductive argument from substantive reason
The majority opinion continues to argue that there is a substantive economic reason
why their interpretation should be preferred.
1. Premise 1 : [Creation of a complex licensing scheme under section 111] is a particular
substantive reason of an economic nature in the legal order relevant to the immediate
interpretation of the term [perform].
2. Premise 2 : Each of the interpretations of the term perform should seek to achieve this
substantive reason.
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(a) VMAereo performs where, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work,
it shows its images in any sequence or makes the sounds accompanying it audible
(linguistic argument from technical meaning).
(b) VMAereo does not perform because it cannot be held directly liable for infringing
the broadcaster’s public performance right (systemic argument from principle).
3. Premise 3 : The linguistic argument from technical meaning is the interpretation that
achieves the substantive reason most successfully.
4. Conclusion: Therefore, this linguistic interpretation is the most plausible interpretation
compatible with the substantive reason to create a complex licensing regime scheme under
section 111.
5. Critical questions:
(a) How satisfactory is the linguistic interpretation itself as a substantive reason, apart
from the alternative reasons available so far in the dialogue? The majority opinion
uses the licensing scheme to underpin the values of the legal system in support of
the amendments made in the argument from purpose.
(b) How much better a representation of the substantive reason is the chosen interpre-
tation than the alternative interpretations so far in the dialogue? The alternative
interpretation denies performance hence does not promote the substantive reason
in question.
(c) How thorough has the search been in the investigation of the case? Would it be
better to continue the analysis to the trans-categorical level, instead of drawing a
conclusion at this point? The search has been quite advanced but the majority
decision goes further to make a trans-categorical argument from intention.
6.3.3.4 Trans-categorical arguments
According to the dissenting opinion, the majority decision goes to the extent of making
a trans-categorical argument because they perceive the statutory definition in the lin-
guistic argument to be ambiguous. They therefore need strong indication of legislative
intention at this level to support their position.
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Argument from intention
We already underscored that an argument from intention can be used to depart from
the foregoing hierarchical order of linguistic - systemic - teleological arguments. This
in fact, is what the majority opinion seems to do as we can construct with the following
argument. Remember the argument from intention can use any other argument in the
hierarchy to make its case. This will be evident as follows:
1. Premise 1: Congress amended the Copyright Act 1976 to:
(a) Overturn two previous SCOTUS holdings and clarify the term ‘perform’ as, to show
images in any sequence or make sounds accompanying it audible.
(b) Enact a ‘transmit’ clause which specifies that an entity ‘performs’ when it transmits
a ‘performance’ to the public; and
(c) Create a complex licensing scheme that sets out conditions, including the payment
of compulsory fees under which cable systems may transmit broadcasts to the public
(section 111);
2. Premise 2: This ought to be interpreted as fitting the intention that VMAereo performs,
as opposed to VMAereo merely supplies equipment that allows others to perform.
3. Conclusion: Therefore, Congress intended that VMAereo performs when it amended the
Copyright Act 1976 to:
(a) Overturn two previous SCOTUS holdings and clarify the term ‘perform:’ as, to
show images in any sequence or make sounds accompanying it audible.
(b) Enact a ‘transmit’ clause which specifies that an entity ‘performs’ when it transmits
a ‘performance’ to the public; and
(c) Create a complex licensing scheme that sets out conditions, including the payment
of compulsory fees under which cable systems may transmit broadcasts to the public
(section 111);
4. Critical questions:
• How is the intention defined? The majority opinion rely on a parliamentary report
used to illustrate the legislative history.
• Does the description of the promulgation in question actually fit the definition of
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the interpretation? The dissenting opinion questions the interpretive methodology
used given that the parliamentary report is not authoritative. It is a single report
issued by a committee whose members make up a small fraction of one of the two
houses of Congress [See Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. (2014)].
6.3.4 Aereo’s legal argumentation
We now have to resolve all the arguments made using the argumentation model identi-
fied in subsection 2.4.6. First we detail the arguments for each side according to their
hierarchical order after which we will apply the interpretive model.
1. Legal issue premise: ‘Perform’ is an open textured/defeasible term that requires inter-
pretation to determine compliance of VMAereo.
2. Interpretive argument premise: ‘Perform’ may be interpreted by a set of canons supple-
mented by plausible conditionals and other statements that function as missing parts of
enthymemes:
(a) Broadcasters: VMAereo performs where, in the case of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, it shows its images in any sequence or makes the sounds accom-
panying it audible (linguistic argument from technical meaning).
i. Because VMAereo activities are substantially similar to those of CATV compa-
nies that congress amended the Act to reach, VMAereo ought to be classified
as a CATV system (argument from analogy).
ii. This meaning of perform is the most compatible interpretation with the US
congress purpose to overturn the previous SCOTUS holding that the activ-
ities of community antenna television providers fell outside the Act’s scope
(argument from purpose).
iii. This is the most plausible interpretation compatible with the substantive rea-
son for [creation of a complex licensing regime scheme under section 111.]
(argument from substantive economic reason).
iv. Congress intended that VMAereo performs when it amended the Copyright Act
1976 to:
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A. Overturn two previous SCOTUS holdings and clarify the term ‘perform’ as,
to show images in any sequence or make sounds accompanying it audible.
B. Enact a ‘transmit’ clause which specifies that an entity ‘performs’ when it
transmits a ‘performance’ to the public; and
C. Create a complex licensing scheme that sets out conditions, including
the payment of compulsory fees under which cable systems may transmit
broadcasts to the public (section 111).
(b) Aereo: VMAereo does not perform because it cannot be held directly liable for in-
fringing the broadcaster’s public performance right (systemic argument from prin-
ciple).
i. The volitional conduct test is false when the technological competence in
VMAereo facilitates automatic transfer of broadcasts to its users (argument
from analogy (ISP))
ii. Direct liability of VMAereo is false when a subscriber selects a program and uses
Aereo to relay it, because it plays no role in selecting the content (argument
from analogy (copy shop)).
iii. The following interpretation ought to be applied to VMAereo: a producer who
permits unlawful copying does not himself engage in unlawful copying (argu-
ment from precedent).
3. Interpretive model premise: Unless there is a strong indication of a CTrans-categorical ar-
gument, then:
(a) the most plausible/strongest canon Ci is represented:
i. in the first instance by a CLinguistic argument unless a CSystemic argument ap-
plies;
ii. in the second instance by a CSystemic argument unless a CTeleological-evaluative
argument applies;
iii. in the third instance a CTeleological-evaluative argument;
(b) Else:
i. the most plausible/strongest argument is represented by a CLinguistic argument
supported by any CTrans-categorical argument.
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4. Conclusion: Therefore, the strongest interpretation is a trans-categorical argument con-
stituting a linguistic argument supported by an argument from intention:
(a) VMAereo performs where, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work,
it shows its images in any sequence or makes the sounds accompanying it audible
(linguistic argument from technical meaning).
i. This meaning of perform is the most compatible interpretation with the US
congress purpose to overturn the previous SCOTUS holding that the activ-
ities of community antenna television providers fell outside the Act’s scope
(argument from purpose).
ii. Congress intended that VMAereo performs when it amended the Copyright Act
1976 to:
A. Overturn two previous SCOTUS holdings and clarify the term ‘perform’ as,
to show images in any sequence or make sounds accompanying it audible
(argument from intention);
B. Enact a ‘transmit’ clause which specifies that an entity ‘performs’ when
it transmits a ‘performance’ to the public (argument from contextual har-
monization); and
C. Create a complex licensing scheme that sets out conditions, including
the payment of compulsory fees under which cable systems may transmit
broadcasts to the public (argument from substantive reason).
iii. Because VMAereo activities are substantially similar to those of CATV compa-
nies that congress amended the Act to reach, VMAereo ought to be classified
as a CATV system (argument from analogy).
5. Critical questions:
(a) How satisfactory is CTrans-categorical itself in interpreting T, apart from the alter-
native arguments available so far in the dialogue? It is the winning argument as
endorsed by the majority opinion at the SCOTUS.
(b) How much better an interpretive argument is CTrans-categorical than the alternative
arguments so far in the dialogue?
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• It is able to explain the term; and
• trace the legislative history motivating this interpretation.
(c) How far has the dialogue progressed? If the dialogue is an inquiry, how thorough
has the search been in the investigation of the case? This the first part of the
dialogue which determines whether the respondent performs. The next step is to
determine if such performance was public. The investigation is exhaustive for the
first part.
(d) Would it be better to continue the dialogue further, instead of drawing a conclusion
at this point? The dialogue needs to proceed in order to determine whether Aereo’s
performance is public or not.
6.3.5 Compliance pattern generation
The conclusion in the legal argumentation designates the winning argument. It is there
that we extract the possible valid interpretations as follows: The technological compe-
tence in [VMAereo] to digitize and stream terrestrial channels, performs when:
1. It shows the images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work in any sequence or
makes the sounds accompanying it audible.
2. It transmits or otherwise communicates a performance of the copyrighted work to the
public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of
receiving the performance receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the
same time or at different times.
3. Its activities are substantially similar to CATV systems:
• Sells a service that allows subscribers to watch TV programs, many of which are
copyrighted, virtually as they are being broadcast;
• Uses its own equipment, housed in a centralized warehouse, outside of its users’
homes;
• By means of its technology, Aereo’s system receives programs that have been re-
leased to the public and carries them by private channels to additional viewers.
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6.3.5.1 EARS Schema
This interpretations capture the competencies and activities of VMAereo as it can no
longer claim it merely facilitates the subscriber to perform. Recalling the legal claim,
this value model must either own copyright, or be licensed to undertake such perfor-
mance. We therefore apply the EARS schema discussed in subsection 2.4.7 to generalize
the interpretations as follows:
Ubiquitous requirements
For Aereo, there’s only one single requirement: The system shall verify that the chan-
nels being re-transmitted to subscribers over the internet are licensed channels. For
comparison, we derived a similar requirement for TVC in the EU scenario Muthuri
et al. [2017]. However for the UK scenario, the following requirements apply:
1. The system shall verify that the channels being re-transmitted to subscribers over
the internet are either:
• Public broadcast channels - BBC, ITV, Channel 4, Channel 5, or S4C; or
• Licensed channels.
2. The system shall prevent retransmission to mobile devices via any mobile tele-
phone network.
State-driven requirements
WHILE transmitting channels, the system shall restrict retransmission to the geograph-
ical region of the original broadcast.
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6.3.5.2 Aereo’s compliance pattern
Using, the context-problem-solution structure and the foregoing analysis, we derive a
compliance pattern as follows:
• Context: Aereo technological resource has the capability to digitize and stream
terrestrial channels to subscribers over the internet.
• Problem: The retransmission capability may infringe broadcasters right to broad-
cast and film copyright.
• Solution: Ubiquitous requirement : The system shall verify that the channels
being re-transmitted to subscribers over the internet are licensed channels.
6.3.6 Aereo’s legal risk management
We apply the developed pattern to Aereo by adding an activity to the legal risk man-
agement perspective of the strategy map for channel verification as shown in Figure 6.4.
This helps to map the ubiquitous requirement in the legal risk management perspective
to the business processes in the value stream perspective. Additionally, the activity is
added to the compliant phase of the value model which mitigates the negative valuation
of the legal risk value in the model and hence the value-at-risk at the business plan
level.
6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have represented the legal risk analysis process by semi-formalizing
the individual steps using argumentation schemes in steps comparable to Walton’s
dialectical model. To facilitate this process, we have co-opted value modeling into the
framework in place of the facts that would ordinarily be rendered in a court case. This
facilitates the legal risk analysis and which involves interpretation and reconciliation
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of any legal issues using argumentation. The final prescriptions are used to derive
unambiguous system requirements that can then be applied to formulate a compliance
pattern using earlier defined context and problem statements. An illustration of the
framework using Aereo as a running example has been conducted to show that the
method works and is applicable to the target audience. However, we still need to
evaluate the framework in the real world which follows in the subsequent chapter.


























































We conduct two case studies to test the compliance pattern framework developed in
chapter 6 above. The studies are of startups BitPesa and FirstLife headquartered in
Nairobi and Turin respectively. Data for the case study was collected by means of
interviews and a documentary review of publicly available documents. We also use
original legal sources so the reasoning can be traced.
7.1.1 Case study protocol
We synthesize the VDMBee methodology with our own compliance pattern framework
to create the following method for conducting the two case studies as summarized in
Figure 7.1. This is encased within the context - problem - solution pattern structure
for an integral view of the numerous interdisciplinary aspects incorporated thus far.
The context: The context is made up of two stages. The domain classification stage
develops a value model of the startup from which the relevant legal domain is identified.
The confrontation stage is next, it helps to determine the dispute at hand.
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Value modelling VDMBee: Discovery: 
• Unstructured discovery
• Structured discovery 
VDMBee: Prototype  
Legal domain identification Argument from legal domain 
classification. 
Confrontation stage Prescriptive rule specification? Forward argument for abductive rule 
identification. 
Legal claim Argument from legal claim 
Legal action Argument from legal action
Exceptional case Argument from exceptional case
PROBLEM
Opening stage Legal issue identification Operative facts
• Term to be interpreted 
Legal question
Interpretation stage Legal argument generation Forward argument for abductive 
inference 
Argumentation stage Legal argumentation 
SOLUTION
Closing stage Prescription generation Interpretation + prescriptive rule 
• Prescription 
Requirements specification Requirement type(s)
Compliance pattern generation 
Legal risk management Legal risk management perspective of 
the SM
Adoption stage VDMBee: adopt
Figure 7.1: The case study protocol.
The problem: This phase has three stages. The opening stage which determines the
issue to be interpreted. The interpretation stage generates the possible interpretations
to the issue and the argumentation stage determines the prevailing interpretation.
The solution: phase consists of the closing and adoption stages. The closing stage
involves the generation of a prescription from the prevailing interpretation which helps
to specify an appropriate requirement(s) for the system. This allows us to generate a
compliance pattern which is applied to manage the legal risk in the value model. Finally,




BitPesa is a universal payment and trading platform for Africa headquartered in Nairobi,
with offices and staff in Lagos, London and San Francisco. It provides an online plat-
form to convert digital currency such as bitcoin into local African currencies. Founded
in 2013 by Elizabeth Rossiello and Duncan Goldie-Scot, the goal of BitPesa is to allow
individuals and businesses to send payments to and from Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, and
Tanzania.
7.2.1 The BitPesa context
The unstructured discovery for BitPesa is conducted via online research from its own
website and other articles written about its revolutionary product. This gives us enough
information to begin the structured discovery using a business model canvas, a value
network and a strategy map.
7.2.1.1 Value modeling
The business model canvas
The business model canvas in Figure 7.2 helps to summarize the main aspects of the
business. The goal is to deliver cheaper international money transfers to African coun-
tries using digital currency as opposed to Society for Worldwide Interbank Telecommu-
nication (SWIFT) or other traditional money transfer systems. This delivers a number
of customer segments: a) family and friends remitting money from abroad, b) businesses
receiving payment from foreigners (expatriates and tourists) c) individuals and SMEs
receiving business loans from donors and recently, d) businesses purchasing goods and
services from China. The money is delivered via BitPesa’s web platform which operates
a forex exchange service in the background.








































































The entire service is automated and one has to register an account on www.bitpesa.co,
give an id, name, and address. When these are verified, you are allowed onto the plat-
form. We’re able to identify the following value propositions: bitcoin exchange, bitcoin
settlement, and mobile money remittance. The key activities are: payment order ex-
ecution, bitcoin settlement, and mobile money remittance. The key resources are: a
blockchain-driven forex platform, and AML and KYC policies. Key partners are: Lip-
isha, a startup operating a payment gateway and Safaricom, a telecommunications
company that also operates M-PESA, the award winning mobile money platform that
delivers mobile money services to 10 million Kenyans.


































(KYC & AML regulations)
Compliance
Bitcoin exchange
Figure 7.3: BitPesa’s value network.
134 CHAPTER 7. CASE STUDIES
The value network
The value network captured in Figure 7.3 depicts the flow of value between BitPesa and
it’s partners to create value. It shows three participant networks at work for: forex,
settlement and remittance. Clients wishing to trade or remit foreign currency place an
order on the site and BitPesa exchanges this for local currency via the forex platform.































































Figure 7.4: BitPesa strategy map
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The strategy map
The strategy map in Figure 7.4 traces how BitPesa’s high level goals are implemented
in the firm’s business processes. Its goal is to focus on adaptive, web technologies to
connect with a strong, international network to ease the flow of funds. For the business,
this involves the development of robust platforms for forex trading and cross-border
money transfers to deliver good profit for the business. Remitters are also able to
enjoy low-cost transfers while recipients enjoy prompt and convenient access to their
money. Forex traders can also avail the Bitcoin platform. The internal processes driving
these values include bitcoin exchange, settlement and mobile money remittance. The
exchange is conducted on BitPesa’s web platform which leverages blockchain technology
and the forex trading platform. The settlement involves compliance checking using
AML & KYC policies.
7.2.2 The confrontation stage
The confrontation between BitPesa and its partner Safaricom was the subject of a
court case Lipisha Consortium ltd & BitPesa ltd vs. Safaricom ltd Petition 512 of
2015. On 12 November 2015, Safaricom suspended its services to Lipisha and by
extension its counter-services to third parties including BitPesa. Safaricom required
Lipisha to provide regulatory approval or a license from The Central Bank of Kenya
(CBK) allowing it to transact or make bitcoin settlements. Safaricom reinstated Lipisha
on 17th November 2015 on condition that it delinked BitPesa from its services. Lipisha
and BitPesa sued Safaricom for conservatory orders to reinstate BitPesa pending the
full hearing.
In the ruling delivered on 14th December 2015, Safaricom’s main claim was that
BitPesa was dealing in Bitcoin without a license from CBK contrary to the Money
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Remittances Regulations and Section 12 of the National Payment Systems Act.1 It
asked BitPesa to obtain formal approval of its business from CBK pursuant to Sec-
tion 13 of the National Payment Systems Act and the Money Remittances Regulations
2013. As BitPesa was conducting bitcoin business through Safaricom’s systems, Safari-
com contended that it had the right to protect its own business by terminating such
illegality.
On its side, BitPesa reported that it has implemented AML and KYC policies that
comply with Kenyan legal and regulatory requirements. They claimed to have freely
submitted them to CBK, as well as regulators in other jurisdictions in which they
operate stating that they hold themselves to the highest standards when it comes to
AML and KYC compliance.
The court noted that BitPesa had approached Safaricom to access its payment
gateway directly but it requested BitPesa to get CBK approval first given that it had
revealed it dealt in bitcoin. However, CBK responded that as long as BitPesa dealt
in bitcoin, it could not use the words ‘money remittance’ or ‘money transfer’. It also
stated that it does not regulate virtual currencies. Lipisha and BitPesa agreed with
this view but Safaricom did not.
The court noted that the controversy as to whether approval and regulation by
CBK is necessary in the circumstances of BitPesa is certainly a substantive point which
requires a deeper interrogative approach at the petition hearing. Nevertheless, it gave
a preliminary view with which we could start the legal analysis.
The court observed that because BitPesa was engaged in the business of accepting
bitcoin from various countries of the world and exchanging it for African currencies
including the Kenya shilling, then it engaged in the money remittance business. It
referenced regulation 2 of the Money Remittance Regulations 2013 which define money
1No. 39 of 2011
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remittance business to mean a service for the transmission of money or any represen-
tation of monetary value without any payment accounts being created in the name of
the payer or payee. In that regard, bitcoin represents monetary value and it is the only
reason why it can be exchanged by BitPesa for the Kenya shilling. The court therefore
claimed, that BitPesa and and Lipisha were not in particularly good stead when they
stated that dealing in bitcoin is not part of money remittance business. Safaricom was
therefore justified in crying foul that BitPesa had not obtained any approval from CBK
which put its own license at risk.
Lipisha and BitPesa lost the hearing for conservatory orders and the petition did
not proceed to full hearing. However, it is a good example of how a party, in this
case Safaricom, can manage a regulatory conversation. Safaricom did not wait to be
approached by its regulator CBK to be deemed non-compliant, but it took active steps
to manage a pending legal risk. Given the court’s preliminary observation that BitPesa
is engaged in money remittance business, we have to assess its compliance under the
relevant legislation. We will try to manage BitPesa’s regulatory conversation in the
manner that it would have been argued had the matter proceeded to full hearing.
7.2.2.1 Legal domain identification
Following the foregoing suit, CBK issued the public notice in Appendix A.2 emphasizing
repeatedly that bitcoin and similar virtual currencies are not legal tender and they are
not regulated in Kenya. This appears to conflict with the preliminary court finding
above that BitPesa is engaged in money remittance business, an activity regulated by
CBK. In June 2016, the bank’s Governor Patrick Njoroge remarked that Kenya and its
officials were not prepared to work with virtual currencies like Bitcoin because Kenya
doesn’t quite have the technical means to handle cryptocurrencies. He said CBK was
yet to come up with regulatory policies and discussions of blockchain technology was
a point of contention for the bank. This sentiment may have since evolved given the
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recent announcement of a trial to issue bonds using blockchain courtesy of the World
Bank.
It is imperative to note that the public notice statement was carefully worded.
It stopped short of saying BitPesa’s activities are illegal. It emphasizes that virtual
currencies are unregulated in Kenya. However, the court indicated that BitPesa is
governed by the Money Remittance Domain whose regulator is CBK. This results in a
legislative gap as the CBK is mandated to protect BitPesa’s clients in its jurisdiction.
The legal risk here is that CBK could be prevailed upon to enforce the relevant penalties
on BitPesa for operating foreign exchange dealings without a license. This entails a
fine not exceeding five hundred thousand Kenya shillings, or imprisonment for a term
not exceeding three years, or both.
We do not have to apply the argument for legal domain classification as we can
already conclude from the foregoing that BitPesa’s competence, it’s blockchain-driven
forex platform for international money transfers is governed by the foreign exchange
domain under the CBK Act and more specifically, the Money Remittance Regulations
2013 promulgated under that Act.
7.2.2.2 Prescriptive rule identification
We trace the prescriptive rule from within the CBK Act and the Money Remittance
Regulations 2013 with the following argument for rule identification:
1. Domain Premise: VMBitPesa blockchain-driven forex platform for international money
transfers is governed by the money remittance domain.
2. Rule premise: There’s a set of rules that regulate international money transfers:
• Central Bank Act of Kenya, Cap 491
– Section 33A. Authorized dealers
(a) Subject to subsection (3), no person shall, in Kenya, transact foreign ex-
change business except an authorized dealer.
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(b) A person who contravenes the provisions of subsection (1) commits an
offense and shall, on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding five hun-
dred thousand shillings, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three
years, or to both.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1), the Bank may permit
such person or class of persons as it may specify, to transact foreign ex-
change business without a license, subject to such conditions as it may
impose.
– Section 33B. Licensing of authorized dealers
(a) A person proposing to transact foreign exchange business shall, before
commencing such business, apply to the Bank for a license.
• Money Remittance Regulations 2013.
– Regulation 4 - Licensing: A person shall not provide money remittance
services unless such person:
(a) is incorporated as a limited liability company under the Companies Act;
(b) has obtained the approval of the Bank for the proposed business name be-
fore incorporation and has the words ‘money remittance’ or ‘money trans-
fer’ as a brand name; and
(c) is licensed to provide money remittance services under these regulations.
3. Plausibility premise: Regulation 4 is the most plausible rule in this case.
4. Conclusion: Therefore VMBitPesa blockchain-driven, forex platform for international
money transfers, should be compliant with Regulation 4.
5. Critical questions:
(a) How satisfactory is Regulation 4 itself as a rule regulating blockchain-driven forex
platforms for international money transfers apart from the alternative rules available
in the dialogue?
Regulation 4 defines the conditions under which an entity can be licensed to provide
money remittance services.
(b) How much better a rule is Regulation 4 than the alternative rules so far in the
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dialogue?
It is a subsidiary provision on the issue, hence more specific.
(c) How far has the dialogue progressed? If the dialogue is an inquiry, how thorough
has the search been in the investigation of the case?
We have established the relevant rule, we now need to determine the possible claims
under that rule.
7.2.2.3 Legal claim generation
The legal claim is stated with the help of the argument from legal claim as follows:
1. General rule premise: Money remittance is an activity licensed by the CBK under regu-
lation 4 of the Money Remittance Regulations 2013, laws of Kenya.
2. Performance premise: To perform international money transfers, VMBitPesa must be
licensed by the CBK as an authorized money remittance provider.
3. Warrant: VMBitPesa violates regulation 4 if it facilitates money remittance services with-
out authorization.
4. Conclusion: Therefore, BitPesa must obtain a license to become an authorized money
remittance provider under regulation 4 of the 2013 regulations.
5. Else: It violates the cited regulation.
7.2.2.4 Legal action generation
The legal action is given with the following argument from legal action:
1. Established rule premise: If An entity X is not an authorized money remittance provider
under section 33A of the Central Bank Act, then it commits an offense when it transacts
foreign exchange business.
2. Penalty premise: X is liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding 500,000 shillings or
imprisonment for three years, or both under section 33A(2) of the Central Bank Act.
3. Violation premise: VMBitPesa facilitates international money transfers but it is not li-
censed as an authorized money remittance provider.
4. Conclusion: Therefore: BitPesa is is potentially liable for the stated penalties.
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7.2.2.5 Exceptional case generation
BitPesa argues an exception with the following argument from exception:
1. Exception premise: IF the following cases read together amount to an exemption to the
licensing rule, THEN the rule can be waived in that case.
• Section 33A(3): Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1), the bank may
permit such person or class of persons as it may specify, to transact foreign exchange
business without a license, subject to such conditions as it may impose.
• CBK issued a public notice in December 2015 clarifying that virtual currencies are
unregulated in Kenya.
• CBK has not moved to enforce any penalties against VMBitPesa.
2. Minor premise: That (a) CBK has not enforced penalties against BitPesa; and (b) it
has issued a notice that virtual currencies are unregulated in Kenya, ought to imply
a permission by the CBK under section 33A(3) for VMBitPesa to continue transacting
foreign exchange in the form of money remittance without a license.
3. Conclusion: Therefore, VMBitPesa is exempted from authorization [licensed as an autho-
rized money remittance provider] under section 33A of the Central Bank Act.
4. Critical questions:
(a) Are the two cases recognized types of exception?
Section 33A(3) is a provision of the law and therefore recognized. The public notice
is not a formal exemption.
(b) If it is not a recognized case, can evidence that the established rule does not apply
to it be given?
The CBK did not claim that bitcoin was illegal, but the lesser - that bitcoin and
similar products are not legal tender neither are they regulated in Kenya.
(c) If it is a border line case, can comparable cases be cited?
Other countries has legislated against Bitcoin to regulate money remittances using
bitcoin.
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7.2.3 BitPesa’s problem
So the main problem is that CBK has declined to recognize let alone authorize BitPesa
as a payment service provider which could potentially vitiate the startup’s business
model in Kenya. However, they have not moved to enforce any penalties against the
startup and there is a likelihood that an exemption applies as above. However, is it
sufficient?
7.2.3.1 Legal issue identification
The legal issue is whether the identified exception is adequate to protect the startup
from further enforcement proceedings by CBK in the future. The operative fact is
permit in section 33A - the bank may permit such person or class of persons as it
may specify, to transact foreign exchange business without a license, subject to such
conditions as it may impose.
7.2.3.2 Legal interpretations generation
There is no linguistic definition of the term permit in the Central Bank Act. We
therefore move to systemic arguments.
Systemic arguments
The foregoing inferred permission is likely to be rebutted by an argument from principle
as follows:
Argument from principle (volitional conduct)
1. Premise 1 : [Volitional conduct is required to activate a legal provision which is expressed
in active affirmative terms], is a principle of the legal system which affects the interpreta-
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tion and therefore the evaluation of the term [Permit in section 33A of the Central Bank
Act].
2. Premise 2 : Interpreting permit as requiring volitional conduct of the CBK is necessary
to ensure commitment to the stated principle.
3. Conclusion: Permit in section 33A ought to be interpreted as requiring volitional conduct
of the CBK.
4. Critical questions:
(a) What is the evidence that the established principle applies to the term permit in
section 33A of the Central Bank Act?
The section implies that active consideration by the CBK is necessary in exercising
discretion to decide whether to authorize an entity to transact without a license and
impose any conditions it deems necessary in that regard.
(b) Are there other principles that might conflict with or override this one?
None have been identified.
(c) Is this case an exceptional one, that is, could there be extenuating circumstances
or an excuse for noncompliance?
There is no indication of circumstances that warrant an exception of the section
from the principle.
Equally, BitPesa may respond with an argument from principle to argue that CBK has
no regulatory power over them as there is no definition of virtual currency in Kenyan
law.
Argument from principle (Nulla poena sine lege stricta)
1. Premise 1 : [There is to be no penalty without strict law] is a principle of the legal system
which affects the interpretation and therefore the evaluation of [whether the Central Bank
can regulate VMBitPesa with regard to virtual currencies.]
2. Premise 2 : The following interpretation is necessary to ensure commitment to the stated
principle [CBK has no power to regulate VMBitPesa where no specific laws on virtual
currencies have been promulgated].
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3. Conclusion: Section 33A of the Central Bank Act ought to be interpreted as meaning
CBK has no power to regulate VMBitPesa where no specific laws on virtual currencies
have been promulgated.
4. Critical questions:
(a) What is the evidence that the established principle applies to the Central Bank?
The Bank is empowered to levy a criminal penalties under section 33A. This princi-
ple ensures that there is no penalty without strict law. It prohibits the application
of statutory laws by analogy in criminal law.
(b) Are there other principles that might conflict with or override this one? Yes, the
forthcoming argument on legal tender.
(c) Is this case an exceptional one, that is, could there be extenuating circumstances
or an excuse for noncompliance? No.
The bank could respond with an argument from intention that since there is no defini-
tion of legal tender, the term could therefore be extended to virtual currencies.
Argument from intention (legal tender)
1. Premise 1 : Parliament did not define ‘legal tender’ despite numerous uses of the term
when it promulgated the Central Bank Act.
2. Premise 2 : This ought to be interpreted as Parliament’s intention that the term should
have an ambulatory or movable meaning [with regard to use of virtual currencies in
VMBitPesa].
3. Conclusion: Therefore, the term ‘legal tender’ ought to be extended to cover virtual
currencies in VMBitPesa.
4. Critical questions:
(a) How was the intention defined? Via a presumption of legislative intention employed
in the legislative process when drafting the Act.
(b) Does the description of the interpretation in question actually fit the definition of
the intention? Yes.
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The Bank could come back with the argument that other jurisdictions have outlawed
bitcoin for its association with money laundering. This takes an argument from con-
textual harmonization as follows:
Argument from contextual harmonization (AML)
1. Established rule premise: VMBitPesa as a potential a money remittance operator under
the Central Bank Act is required to comply with The Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money
Laundering Act No. 9 of 2009.
2. Minor premise: VMBitPesa transactions in virtual currencies such as bitcoin are largely
untraceable and anonymous making them susceptible to abuse by criminals in money
laundering and financing terrorism.
3. Conclusion: Therefore, in transacting with virtual currencies, VMBitPesa is potentially in
violation of the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act No. 9 of 2009.
4. Critical questions:
(a) Is contextual harmonization described required? Yes, the referenced Act forms part
of the regulatory framework for the financial sector.
(b) Are there other established rules that might conflict or override this one? None
have been identified at this stage.
(c) Is this case an exceptional one, that is, could there be extenuating circumstances
or an excuse for noncompliance? BitPesa claims that it has implemented AML and
KYC policies in compliance with Kenyan regulations and has freely submitted these
to the Central Bank.
Argument from analogy (restriction)
The Bank could buttress this with an analogy showing jurisdictions that have outlawed
bitcoin to counter its use for money laundering and financing terrorism.
1. Similarity premise: Generally the regulatory framework for fiat currencies in Kenya is
similar to those of other countries.
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2. Base premise: Many jurisdictions have banned, restricted, or warned against the use of
virtual currencies.
3. Conclusion: Therefore, virtual currencies ought to be restricted in Kenya in line with
other jurisdictions.
4. Critical questions:
(a) Are there differences between Kenya and other countries that would tend to under-
mine the force of the similarity cited? None have been identified at this stage.
(b) Have the regulatory frameworks in other jurisdictions banned, restricted or warned
against virtual currencies? Actually, many jurisdictions have shied from strict reg-
ulation and the legal status of virtual currencies varies substantially and changes
frequently.
(c) Is there some other countries which have not banned, restricted or warned against
the use of virtual currencies? Yes, e.g. Sweden, Luxembourg and the US. Australia
also officially confirmed it would treat bitcoin ‘just like money’ as from as from 1st
July 2017 and it will no longer be subject to double taxation.
Argument from analogy (Bitlicense)
BitPesa could counter this argument drawing on analogy with the jurisdictions that
have implemented legislation to regulate bitcoin as follows:
1. Similarity premise: Generally VMBitPesa is similar to firms in other jurisdictions trading
in virtual currencies.
2. Base premise: In addition to AML legislation, these firms are regulated in their respective
jurisdictions with the following features: a license usually referred to as a bitlicense,
capital requirements, custody and protection of consumer assets, reporting and financial
disclosures, a cyber-security program.
3. Conclusion: Therefore, CBK ought to regulate VMBitPesa in the following terms: a
license usually referred to as a bitlicense, capital requirements, custody and protection of
consumer assets, reporting and financial disclosures, an anti-money laundering program,
and a cyber-security program.
4. Critical questions:
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(a) Are there differences between Kenya and other countries that would tend to under-
mine the force of the similarity cited? The CBK Governor has claimed that Kenya
lacks the technical capacity to handle virtual currencies and the related blockchain
technology.
(b) Are firms in other jurisdictions regulated in the terms stated above? Yes e.g. the
New York State Title 23 Chapter 1 Part 200 - Regulations of the superintendent of
financial services on virtual currencies.
(c) Is there some other cases where firms transacting in virtual currencies are not
regulated with the above features? Yes, Many jurisdictions seem to have adopted a
wait and see approach, not regulating nor entirely outlawing virtual currencies as
they will prosecute fraud and money laundering offenses related to bitcoin.
Argument from analogy by classification (M-Pesa)
BitPesa could draw an analogy of itself and previous innovations that were supported
in a pseudo-sandbox fashion in order to allow them to come to term.
1. Premise 1 : Generally VMM-Pesa had the following features when it was launched:
• M-Pesa was highly disruptive in financial services in Kenya;
• Safaricom, a telecom operator, was acting as a credit provider which required a
banking license.
2. Premise 2 : VMBitPesa has the following features:
• BitPesa is potentially highly disruptive in financial services in Kenya
• VMBitPesa offers mobile money remittance which requires a CBK license to become
an authorized money remittance provider.
3. Conclusion 1 : Legally, VMM-Pesa and VMBitPesa should be classified in the same way
with respect to the above features.
4. Premise 3 : It is by virtue of the above features that CBK allowed VMM-Pesa to operate
without a banking license despite political opposition and lobbying by banks.
5. Conclusion 2 : Because VMM-Pesa and VMBitPesa are substantially similar, VMBitPesa also
ought to be allowed to be trialed without a license in this initial phases of its business
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model despite the opposition by Safaricom.
6. Critical questions:
(a) What evidence is there that VMM-Pesa is definitely operating without a license as
opposed to evidence indicating room for doubt whether it should be so classified?
The unstructured discovery part of the value modeling and the case exposition from
the confrontation stage.
(b) Is the legal classification in the classification premise based merely on assumption
about word usage that is subject to doubt? No. It may appear so from the term
‘Pesa” but the classification is based on the features of both entities.
(c) Are there differences between VMM-Pesa and VMBitPesa that would tend to under-
mine the force of the similarity cited? None have been identified.
(d) Is there some other case that is also similar to VMM-Pesa but in which the identified
features are false? None has been identified.
Teleological - evaluative arguments
We now need to apply the arguments at this stage to choose between the foregoing
interpretations that we have already developed.
Argument from purpose
The first argument against the implied permission is the founding purpose of the CBK
Act and related legislation.
1. Goal premise: The Kenyan legislature’s purpose in enacting section 33A of the Central
Bank Act was to license and supervise authorized dealers in order to protect depositors.
2. Alternative premise: Therefore, it is necessary that at least one of the following interpre-
tations of the term permit ought to fulfill this purpose:
(a) VMBitPesa is potentially liable to penalties because permit in section 33A ought to
be interpreted as requiring volitional conduct of the CBK to permit VMBitPesa to
transact in virtual currencies.
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(b) VMBitPesa is not potentially liable to penalties because Section 33A of the Cen-
tral Bank Act ought to be interpreted as meaning CBK has no power to regulate
VMBitPesa where no specific laws on virtual currencies have been promulgated.
3. Selection premise: Interpretation 2(a) is the most compatible to fulfill the identified
purpose.
4. Practicality premise: No legislative intention prevents the application of the identified
interpretation, as far as is known.
5. Side effects premise: Realizing the identified purpose is more acceptable to the legislature
than not applying the chosen interpretation.
6. Conclusion: Therefore, interpretation 2(a) is the most compatible interpretation with
the legislature’s purpose to license and supervise authorized dealers in order to protect
depositors.
7. Critical questions:
(a) Alternative means question: Are there alternative means of realizing the identified
purpose, other than the chosen interpretation? The government could develop
regulations to license and monitor entities transacting in virtual currencies.
(b) Acceptable/Best option question: is the chosen interpretation an acceptable inter-
pretation, is it the best alternative? While an acceptable interpretation, it is not
the best alternative as it has been said to have a chilling effect around the market
on investors, startups and developers experimenting in fintech solutions.
(c) Possibility question: Is there a legislative intention or other rule that prevents the
application of the chosen interpretation? None has been identified.
(d) Negative side effects question: Are there negative side effects of applying the cho-
sen interpretation that ought to be considered? The chilling effect could hinder
innovation in the budding fintech market and other areas that have potential for
blockchain technology in Kenya e.g. lands, transport and immigration.
(e) Conflicting goals question: Does the legislature have other purposes which could
potentially conflict with the chosen one? Yes, the legislature needs to harmonize
the current regulatory framework with National ICT Policies for innovation, and
technology convergence.
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Argument from substantive reasons (National ICT policy)
The other evaluative argument is for substantive socio-economic reasons as follows:
1. Substantive premise: The following National ICT policies are particular substantive socio-
economic reasons in the legal order relevant to the immediate interpretation of the term
permit.
(a) Encourage innovation, attract investment and promote ease of doing business for a
positive socio-economic impact through ICT.
(b) Promote technology convergence which ought to include blockchain-enabled conver-
gence of artificial intelligence (AI), Internet of Things (IoT), autonomous robotics,
and virtual reality.
(c) Support emerging ecosystems which ought to include, shared ledger systems and
thereby to issue the relevant guidance and adaptive regulation to the financial sector.
2. Alternative premise: Each of the following interpretations of the term should seek to
achieve this substantive reason.
(a) VMBitPesa is potentially liable to penalties because permit in section 33A ought to
be interpreted as requiring volitional conduct of the CBK to permit VMBitPesa to
transact in virtual currencies.
(b) VMBitPesa is not potentially liable to penalties because Section 33A of the Cen-
tral Bank Act ought to be interpreted as meaning CBK has no power to regulate
VMBitPesa where no specific laws on virtual currencies have been promulgated.
3. Selection premise: Interpretation 2(b) is the interpretation that achieves SR most suc-
cessfully.
4. Conclusion: Therefore 2(b) is the most plausible interpretation compatible with the
stated substantive reasons.
5. Critical questions:
(a) How satisfactory is the chosen interpretation itself as a substantive reason, apart
from the alternative interpretations available so far in the dialogue? The chosen
interpretation is not ideal but it gives a much needed lifeline for investments in
business models such as VMBitPesa to mature.
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(b) How much better a representation of the substantive reason is the chosen interpreta-
tion than the alternative interpretations so far in the dialogue? This interpretation
highlights the need for a delicate balance and a flexible regulatory regime to support
emerging ecosystems where new innovations are encouraged.
(c) How thorough has the search been in the investigation of the case? Would it be
better to continue the dialogue further, instead of drawing a conclusion at this
point? The investigation has been extensive and can be concluded at this point as
there is no strong indication of a trans-categorical argument.
7.2.3.3 BitPesa’s legal argumentation
We now have to resolve all the arguments made using the argumentation model identi-
fied in subsection 2.4.6. First we detail the arguments for each side according to their
hierarchical order after which we will apply the interpretive model.
1. Legal issue premise: ‘Permit’ is an open textured/defeasible term that requires interpre-
tation to determine compliance of VMBitPesa.
2. Interpretive argument premise: ‘Permit’ may be interpreted by a set of canons supple-
mented by plausible conditionals and other statements that function as missing parts of
enthymemes:
(a) CBK: VMBitPesa is potentially liable to penalties because permit in section 33A
ought to be interpreted as requiring volitional conduct of the CBK to permit
VMBitPesa to transact in virtual currencies (clarifying interpretation from princi-
ple).
i. The term ‘legal tender’ ought to be extended to cover virtual currencies in
VMBitPesa (argument from intention).
ii. In transacting with virtual currencies, VMBitPesa is potentially in violation
of the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act No. 9 of 2009
(argument from contextual harmonization).
iii. Virtual currencies ought to be restricted in Kenya in line with other jurisdic-
tions (argument from analogy (restriction)).
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iv. This is the most compatible interpretation with the legislature’s purpose to
license and supervise authorized dealers in order to protect depositors. (argu-
ment from purpose).
(b) BitPesa: VMBitPesa is not potentially liable to penalties because Section 33A of
the Central Bank Act ought to be interpreted as meaning CBK has no power to reg-
ulate VMBitPesa where no specific laws on virtual currencies have been promulgated
(clarifying interpretation from principle).
i. CBK ought to regulate VMBitPesa in the following terms: a license usually
referred to as a bitlicense, capital requirements, custody and protection of
consumer assets, reporting and financial disclosures, an anti-money laundering
program, and a cyber-security program (argument from analogy (Bitlicense)).
ii. Because VMM-Pesa and VMBitPesa are substantially similar, VMBitPesa also
ought to be allowed to be trialed without a license in this initial phases of
its business model despite the opposition by Safaricom (argument from anal-
ogy by classification (M-Pesa)).
iii. This interpretation is the most plausible interpretation compatible with the
stated substantive reasons:
A. Encourage innovation, attract investment and promote ease of doing busi-
ness for a positive socio-economic impact through ICT.
B. Promote technology convergence which ought to include blockchain-enabled
convergence of artificial intelligence (AI), Internet of Things (IoT), au-
tonomous robotics, and virtual reality.
C. Support emerging ecosystems which ought to include, shared ledger sys-
tems and thereby to issue the relevant guidance and adaptive regulation
to the financial sector.
(Argument from substantive reasons (National ICT Policy).
3. Interpretive model premise: Unless there is a strong indication of a CTrans-categorical ar-
gument, then:
(a) the most plausible/strongest canon Ci is represented:
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i. in the first instance by a CLinguistic argument unless a CSystemic argument ap-
plies;
ii. in the second instance by a CSystemic argument unless a CTeleological-evaluative
argument applies;
iii. in the third instance a CTeleological-evaluative argument;
(b) Else:
i. the most plausible/strongest argument is represented by a CLinguistic argument
supported by any CTrans-categorical argument.
4. Conclusion: Therefore, the strongest interpretation is the clarifying interpretation from
principle 2(b) by BitPesa: VMBitPesa is not potentially liable to penalties because Section
33A of the Central Bank Act ought to be interpreted as meaning CBK has no power to
regulate VMBitPesa where no specific laws on virtual currencies have been promulgated
(clarifying interpretation from principle).
(a) CBK ought to regulate VMBitPesa in the following terms: a license usually referred
to as a bitlicense, capital requirements, custody and protection of consumer assets,
reporting and financial disclosures, an anti-money laundering program, and a cyber-
security program (argument from analogy (Bitlicense)).
(b) Because VMM-Pesa and VMBitPesa are substantially similar, VMBitPesa also ought
to be allowed to be trialed without a license in this initial phases of its business
model despite the opposition by Safaricom (argument from analogy by classification
(M-Pesa)).
(c) This interpretation is the most plausible interpretation compatible with the stated
substantive reasons:
i. Encourage innovation, attract investment and promote ease of doing business
for a positive socio-economic impact through ICT.
ii. Promote technology convergence which ought to include blockchain-enabled
convergence of artificial intelligence (AI), Internet of Things (IoT), autonomous
robotics, and virtual reality.
iii. Support emerging ecosystems which ought to include, shared ledger systems
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and thereby to issue the relevant guidance and adaptive regulation to the fi-
nancial sector.
(Argument from substantive reasons (National ICT Policy).
5. Critical questions:
(a) How satisfactory is the chosen clarifying argument itself in interpreting the term per-
mit, apart from the alternative arguments available so far in the dialogue? Though
not entirely accurate, this argument is the most reflective of the current circum-
stances where VMBitPesa has been allowed to continue operating through other
mobile money providers.
(b) How much better an interpretive argument is the chosen argument than the alter-
native arguments so far in the dialogue? Compared to the other argument, this
argument gives a more flexible solution to the stalemate.
(c) How far has the dialogue progressed? How thorough has the search been in the
investigation of the case? The dialogue has progressed through the three levels of
argumentation and is exhaustive for the first part.
(d) Would it be better to continue the dialogue further, instead of drawing a conclusion
at this point? No.
7.2.4 The BitPesa solution
7.2.4.1 Prescription generation
The prescriptive rule in this case is section 33A(3) of the Central Bank Act:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1), the Bank may permit such
person or class of persons as it may specify, to transact foreign exchange
business without a license, subject to such conditions as it may impose.
We now recast this rule with the interpretations developed in order to derive ap-
propriate prescriptions that will define the compliance behavior. The interpretations
are extracted from the conclusion of the legal argumentation and the final prescrip-
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tion is as follows: The Bank may permit such person or class of person’s as it may
specify, to transact foreign exchange business without a license, subject to the fol-
lowing conditions: an anti-money laundering program, capital requirements, custody
and protection of consumer assets, reporting and financial disclosures, a cyber-security
program.
7.2.4.2 Requirements specification
1. Ubiquitous requirements: The system shall establish protocols to authenticate
each transaction with regard to:
(a) An anti-money laundering program
(b) Capital requirements
(c) Custody and protection of consumer assets
(d) Reporting and financial disclosures
(e) A cyber-security program
2. Optional features: as a show of prudence and good faith, the system may imple-
ment automated software for end-to-end user identification.
7.2.4.3 Compliance pattern generation
There are five ubiquitous requirements and 1 optional requirement.
Context: BitPesa has a competence i.e. blockchain-driven forex platform that enables
international money transfers.
Problem: The CBK has refused to authorize or recognize BitPesa as a payment service
provider or an authorized money remittance provider, which could potentially vitiate
it’s business model in Kenya.
Solution: To mitigate the risk, BitPesa ought to implement the following:
• 5 ubiquitous requirements for an anti-money-laundering program, capital require-





















































































Figure 7.5: BitPesa strategy map with risk management
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ments, custody and protection of consumer assets, reporting and financial disclo-
sures, and a cyber-security program.
• 1 optional feature for automated software for end-to-end user identification.
7.2.4.4 Legal risk management
The solutions are first introduced as activities to the VMBitPesa strategy map as shown
in Figure 7.5 and then onto the VDMbee platform prototype as activities that manage
the legal risk, and thereby mitigating the value-at-risk for the firm. We implemented
the As-Is and To-Be phases of BitPesa’s value model and the details about the imple-
mentation can be found at BitPesa Value Model.
7.3 FirstLife
FirstLife is a new social network in Turin, a platform for social innovation activities;
based on an interactive map it allows citizens to share information on the map, to
create groups, to co-produce services, all the while using a smartphone. The startup
has challenges managing data to understand the obligations related to the possible
scenarios in evolution of the business model. What type of data should they collect, how
long can they keep it, in what type of context, how should they ask for it, how do they
alter the MoU, in what scenarios should they communicate to the relevant authority?
They recently received a cease and desist letter for data they had collected from what
they deemed a public entity. The said entity, a museum, had posted the information
onto its Google Maps portal. We therefore explore a regulatory conversation that will
help us manage this issue.





















The unstructured discovery for Firstlife is conducted via interviews and online research
from its own website. This gives us enough information to begin the structured discov-
ery using a business model canvas, a value network and a strategy map.
FirstLife’s business model canvas
Figure 7.6 shows how FirstLife serves local council administrations and organizations.
They do so through their geo-referenced web platform, and conferences to build ca-
pacity with their stakeholders. Their research efforts facilitate relations with relevant
companies and local institutions. EU and local projects avail relations with companies
while the University arm pursues relations with local institutions. Their main value
propositions include (a) coordination with external actors at a local level and (b) local
and time-based view of local activities on the web platform. Activities in that regard
include (a) collecting local data, and (b) tailoring the platform and developing use
patterns for local actors. The main resources for these are geographical data sources,
established initiatives and business networks. The key partners are the local munici-
palities, local institutions that render services on behalf of those municipalities. Their
main costs involve maintaining their relationships and developing technological solu-
tions. The revenue streams come from services rendered on the platform and support
functions.
FirstLife’s value network
The value network captured in Figure 7.7 depicts the flow of value between FirstLife
and its key partners. It features three participant networks at work for: collaboration,
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Figure 7.7: FirstLife value network
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data aggregation and outsourcing. Local councils outsource their service mandates to
FirstLife who in turn coordinate the local institutions to delivers services to the public.
To do so, FirstLife needs to collect and aggregate data regarding public institutions in
order to run the services on their web platform, which may result in potential copyright
infringement.
FirstLife’s strategy map
The strategy map in Figure 7.8 traces how FirstLife’s strategy gets actualized in its
internal processes. The goal, to build a civic social network for supporting urban
networks and institutions in daily activities. It aims to improve cooperation through
a participatory and evolutionary design process, research and forecasting. This creates
value for the local council and the organizations it works with to provide services
to the public. The internal processes supporting this include: data collection and
integration, geo-tagging and mapping, real-time data communication, and designing use
patterns. The main resource applied is a web platform which enables visualization of
urban knowledge and indexing of temporal and spatial features. With this information,
we proceed to build the value model on the VDMBee platform which can be viewed
here.
7.3.1.2 Legal domain identification
From the foregoing we have established that FirstLife’s competence is a geo-referenced
web platform technology that enables it to re-use Public Sector Information (PSI)
for commercial purposes to coordinate urban institutions. We classify this technology
under the Re-use of Public Sector Information (RPSI) domain as follows:
1. Individual premise: VMFirstLife has a geo-referenced web platform that re-uses open data
to coordinate activities of urban institutions.










































































Figure 7.8: FirstLife strategy map.
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2. Legal classification premise: for all x if x has this competence, then x ought to be regulated
by the RPSI domain.
3. Conclusion: VMFirstLife is governed by the RPSI domain.
4. Critical questions:
(a) Does VMFirstLife definitely have the said activity, or is there room for doubt? This
has been ascertained from the discovery and the interview with the project and
technical manager.
(b) Can the legal domain classification be said to hold strongly, or is it subject to doubt?
The PSI directive allows for access to all content under national access and re-use
beyond the initial purpose for commercial and non-commercial purposes.
7.3.1.3 Prescriptive rule identification
We trace the prescriptive rule from within PSI law with the following argument for rule
identification:
1. Domain Premise: Re-use of PSI is an activity in VMFirstLife.
2. Rule premise: The following set of rules govern this activity:
(a) Article 3(2) RPSI Directive 2003/98/EC - General principle: For documents in
which libraries, including university libraries, museums and archives hold intellec-
tual property rights, Member States shall ensure that, where the re-use of such
documents is allowed, these documents shall be re-usable for commercial or non-
commercial purposes in accordance with the conditions set out in Chapters III and
IV.
(b) Article 1(2) of the Italian legislative Decree No 36 of 24 January 2006 - Subject
matter and scope: Public sector bodies and bodies governed by public law shall
ensure that documents to which this Legislative Decree applies shall be re-usable for
commercial or non-commercial purposes in accordance with the conditions set out
in this Decree, including documents in which libraries, including university libraries,
museums and archives hold intellectual property rights, where the re-use of such
documents is allowed in accordance with provisions in Part II, Title II, Chapter III
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of Legislative Decree No 42 of 22 January 2004, and those in Part II, Title VII,
Chapter II of Legislative Decree No 196 of 30 June 2003.
3. Plausibility premise: Rule 2(b) is the most plausible rule in this case.
4. Conclusion: Therefore VMFirstLife should comply with the identified rule.
5. Critical questions:
(a) How satisfactory is rule 2(b) itself as a rule regulating RPSI apart from the alterna-
tive rules available in the dialogue? It defines the scope of re-use and incorporates
content from libraries, museums and archives.
(b) How much better a rule is 2(b) than the alternative rules so far in the dialogue?
The rule shows the Italian domestication of the EU directive and is therefore more
specific and directly applicable to VMFirstLife which is a an Italian startup.
(c) How far has the dialogue progressed? If the dialogue is an inquiry, how thorough
has the search been in the investigation of the case? The search is not advanced,
there may be need to further examine Italian law.
7.3.1.4 Legal claim generation
The legal claim is stated with the help of the argument from legal claim as follows:
1. General rule premise: VMFirstLife must obtain a license to re-use information from a
private museum.
2. Warrant : VMFirstLife infringes copyright if it re-uses information from a private entity
without authorization.
3. Conclusion: Therefore, VMFirstLife must obtain a license.
4. Else: It infringes the museum’s copyright.
7.3.1.5 Legal action generation
The legal action is given with the following argument from legal action:
1. Established rule premise: If VMFirstLife is not authorized to re-use PSI information under
Art. 1(2), it infringes copyright when it re-uses the information of a private museum.
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(a) The private museum has a right to sue VMFirstLife under the Law for the Protection
of Copyright and Neighboring Rights No. 633 of April 22 1941 Part III Chapter
III.
(b) VMFirstLife is liable to the private museum for infringement remedies including: in-
junctions, impounding and disposition of infringing articles, damages and accounts
for profit, costs and attorney’s fees and penal offenses.
2. Infringement premise: VMFirstLife has not sought authorization from the museum for
re-use of particular information harvested online.
3. Conclusion: Therefore: FirstLife is potentially liable for the stated penalties.
7.3.1.6 Exceptional case generation
VMFirstLife pursued the following exception.
1. Exception premise: IF data collected from an online platform is governed by its Terms
of Use, THEN the copyright infringement rule can be waived in that case.
2. Minor premise: VMFirstLife collected data of the museum’s location from its Google Maps
entry.
3. Conclusion: Therefore, VMFirstLife is exempted from violation of the museum’s right
under the established rule.
4. Critical questions:
(a) Is the case given a recognized type of exception? Not from a legal perspective.
(b) If it is not a recognized case, can evidence that the established rule does not apply
to VMFirstLife be given? There is not enough evidence because Google’s Terms
of Service provide that the museum retains ownership of any intellectual property
rights that it holds in any content that it uploads, submits, stores, sends or receives.
(c) If it is a border line case, can comparable cases be cited? None have been identified.
The exception thus fails since critical question 4(b) shows that Google’s terms of service
do not rescind the museum’s copyright. We will therefore not proceed with the con-
frontation stage but will seek to define the problem in order to manage the risk.
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7.3.2 FirstLife’s problem
The main problem from the foregoing is that FirstLife has data collection algorithms
that can re-use restricted information without requesting for such re-use thereby in-
fringing copyright. In this particular instance, the cease and desist letter was from
a private museum. We therefore need to define the scope of institutions from which
FirstLife can collect data without the risk of infringing copyright.
7.3.2.1 Legal issue identification
The legal issue is how VMFirstLife can properly delineate entities from which it can
collect re-use data in order to avoid copyright infringement. This raises a number of
legal questions with regard to the definitions in the identified rules:
1. What is the meaning of a public sector body?
2. What is the meaning of a body governed by public law?
3. Are these institutions presumed to include libraries, museums and archives?
7.3.2.2 Legal interpretation generation
We will apply the necessary interpretive arguments in order to clarify the meaning of
the identified definitions.
7.3.2.3 Linguistic arguments
Linguistic argument from ordinary meaning (public sector body)
We use a linguistic argument to define the first two terms as follows:
1. Definition premise: The terms public sector body and a body governed by public law are
defined in Article 2(1)(a) and (b) respectively of Legislative Decree No 36 of 24 January
2006 implementing Directive 2003/98/EC on the RPSI.
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2. Classification premise: For all x, if x fits the definition in the identified Article, then x
ought to be ascribed the standard ordinary meaning of that term.
3. Conclusion: The standard ordinary meaning of the terms are:
(a) Public sector body : an administrative body of the State, the regions, the autonomous
provinces of Trento and Bolzano, the local authorities and their unions, consortia
or associations and other non-economic public entities.
(b) Bodies governed by public law : bodies with a legal personality established for spe-
cific purposes of meeting needs in the general interest, not having an industrial or
commercial character, whose activity is financed for the most part by the State,
regional or local authorities, other public bodies or organizations governed by pub-
lic law, and subject to their management supervision, or having an administrative,
managerial or supervisory board, more than half of whose members are appointed
by those public entities. This excludes public undertakings as defined in Article
2(1)(b) of Legislative Decree No 333 of 11 November 2003.
4. Critical questions:
(a) What evidence is there that the interpretation given is an adequate definition in
light of other possible definitions that might exclude the term being in the inter-
pretation given? No other possible definitions have been identified. Moreover, the
interpretations are defined in the law and are inclusive and extensive.
(b) Is the legal classification in the classification premise based merely on a stipulative
or biased definition that is subject to doubt? No, the provenance of these interpre-
tations can be guaranteed given that they are based on statutory definitions.
Linguistic argument from ordinary meaning (museum)
The Italian Legislative Decree on RPSI does not define libraries, museums or archives
and it is not clear whether the definitions in question include libraries, museums and
archives. Even so, these terms are more specifically defined as follows:
1. Definition premise: The terms library, museum and archive are defined in Legislative
Decree No 42 of 22 January 2004 Code of the Cultural and Landscape Heritage Second
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Part Title II Chapter I Section I Article 101 (2) which defines institutions and places of
culture.
2. Classification premise: For all x, if x fits the definition in the identified Article, then x
ought to be ascribed the standard ordinary meaning of that term.
3. Conclusion: The standard ordinary meaning of the terms are:
(a) Museum: shall mean a permanent facility which acquires, conserves, arranges and
exhibits cultural property for the purposes of education and study;
(b) Library : shall mean a permanent facility which gathers and conserves an organized
collection of books, materials and information, written or published on any kind of
support, and ensures consultation for the purposes of promoting reading and study;
(c) Archive: shall mean a permanent facility which collects, inventories, and conserves
original documents of historical interest and ensures consultation for purposes of
study and research.
4. Critical questions:
(a) What evidence is there that the interpretation given is an adequate definition in light
of other possible definitions that might exclude the term being in the interpretation
given? The interpretations are given in the law and they are inclusive and extensive.
(b) Is the legal classification in the classification premise based merely on stipulative or
biased definition that is subject to doubt? The provenance of these interpretations
can be guaranteed given that they are based on statutory definitions.
Argument from technical meaning (public undertaking)
It is further important to understand the nature of the public undertakings excluded
from the definition of bodies governed by public law in the foregoing Article 2(1)(b)
of Legislative Decree No 333 of 11 November 2003. This Decree implements Directive
2000/52/EC. For brevity, we refer directly to the Directive to define a public under-
taking as follows:
1. Definition premise: The term public undertaking is defined in Article 2(1)(b) of the
Directive 2000/52/EC [amending Directive 80/723/EEC] on the transparency of financial
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relations between Member States and public undertakings.
2. Classification premise: For all x, if x fits the definition in the identified Article, then x
ought to be ascribed the standard technical meaning of the legal term.
3. Conclusion: The standard technical meaning of the legal term is: A public undertaking
means any undertaking over which the public authorities may exercise directly or indi-
rectly a dominant influence by virtue of their ownership of it, their financial participation
therein, or the rules which govern it.
4. Critical questions:
(a) What evidence is there that the interpretation given is an adequate definition in light
of other possible definitions that might exclude the term being in the interpretation
given? The interpretation is inadequate particularly given that a relatively similar
phraseology has been used i.e. public institutions where public authorities have
influence on an organization, has already been included in the definition of a body
governed by public law.
(b) Is the legal classification in the classification premise based merely on a stipulative
or biased definition that is subject to doubt? The provenance of this interpretation
can be guaranteed given that it is grounded in statute.
7.3.2.4 Systemic arguments
Argument from contextual harmonization
With an argument from contextual harmonization, we learn of an implication that these
institutions are limited to those owned by the government thus:
1. Major premise: The definitions of museum, library, and archives in Article 101(2) Title
II Chapter I Section I of Legislative Decree No 42 of 22 January 2004 Code of Cultural
and Landscape Heritage are topographically arranged and conceptually related to Article
101(3) in same section of the code.
2. Established rule premise: Interpreting the stated definitions according to a) the topo-
graphic arrangement with related provisions of other statutes or b) its conceptual struc-
ture, is the established rule for the prescriptive rule.
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3. Minor premise: The referenced Article 101(3) provides: The institutions and places
indicated in paragraph 1 which belong to government bodies are designated for public
enjoyment and offer a public service.
4. Conclusion: The expert must consider Article 101(3) while interpreting the identified
definitions.
5. Critical questions:
(a) Do the definitions require contextual harmonization as described? Yes, given the
two provisions are topographically arranged in the same section and Article 101(3)
limits the conceptual definition by showing that the institutions defined are limited
to those owned by the government.
(b) Are there other established rules that might conflict or override this one? None
have been identified.
(c) Is this case an exceptional one, that is, could there be extenuating circumstances or
an excuse for noncompliance? No, this case falls within the established rule premise
for interpreting the Articles in question.
7.3.2.5 Trans-categorical arguments
Argument from intention
We use a trans-categorical argument to clarify the meaning of a public undertaking
given that the linguistic meaning is still not clear.
1. Intention Premise: The European Commission enacted Directive 2000/52/EC with the
following purposes with regard to public undertakings and the Treaty establishing the
European Community:
• Recital 2 : Various sectors of the economy which were characterized in the past
by the existence of national, regional or local monopolies have been or are being
opened partly or fully to the competition in the application of the Treaty or by rules
adopted by the Member States and the Community. This process has highlighted
the importance of ensuring that the rules of competition contained in the Treaty
are fairly and effectively applied in these sectors, in particular that there is no abuse
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of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 82 of the Treaty unless it is
compatible with the common market, without prejudice to the possible application
of Article 86(2) of the Treaty.
• Recital 3 : In such sectors Member States grant special or exclusive rights to partic-
ular undertakings, or make payments or give some other kind of compensation to
particular undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic
interest. These undertakings are often also in competition with other undertakings.
2. Minor premise: Article 2(1)(b) of Legislative Decree No 36 of 24 January 2006 defines
bodies governed by public law as bodies with a legal personality established for specific
purposes of meeting needs in the general interest, not having an industrial or commercial
character, whose activity is financed for the most part by the State, regional or local
authorities, other public bodies or organizations governed by public law, and subject to
their management supervision, or having an administrative, managerial or supervisory
board, more than half of whose members are appointed by those public entities. This
excludes public undertakings as defined in Article 2(1)(b) of Legislative Decree No 333
of 11 November 2003.
3. Intention premise: In light of the identified purposes, the exclusion of public undertakings
in Article 2(1)(b) of Legislative Decree No 36 of 24 January 2006 ought to be interpreted
as excluding bodies with a legal personality entrusted with the operation of services of
general economic interest of an industrial or commercial character.
4. Conclusion: Therefore, public undertakings are bodies with a legal personality entrusted
with the operation of services of general economic interest of an industrial or commercial
character.
5. Critical questions:
(a) How was the intention defined? The intention is defined in the recitals of Direc-
tive 2000/52/EC which makes provisions on the transparency of financial relations
between Member States and public undertakings.
(b) Does the description of the interpretation in question actually fit the definition of
the intention? Yes, because the definition of bodies governed by public law aims to
exclude entities of a commercial or industrial nature from its definition which this
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interpretation achieves satisfactorily.
7.3.3 The FirstLife solution
We can now conclude that the institutions in the following prescription qualify for RPSI
in order for FirstLife to avoid potential copyright infringement.
7.3.3.1 Prescription generation
The following prescription is developed from the foregoing interpretations:
1. The following entities shall ensure that their documents shall be re-usable for
commercial or non-commercial purposes.
(a) Public sector body: an administrative body of the State, the regions, the
autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano, the local authorities and their
unions, consortia or associations and other non-economic public entities.
(b) Bodies governed by public law: bodies with a legal personality established
for specific purposes of meeting needs in the general interest, not having
an industrial or commercial character, whose activity is financed for the
most part by the State, regional or local authorities, other public bodies
or organizations governed by public law, and subject to their management
supervision, or having an administrative, managerial or supervisory board,
more than half of whose members are appointed by those public entities.
2. If owned by government, and if allowed by the law, the following institutions shall
ensure that their documents shall be re-usable for commercial or non-commercial
purposes: museum, library, archive, archaeological area, archaeological park, and
monumental park.
3. Public undertakings are excluded from RPSI obligations to make their documents
re-usable for commercial or non-commercial purposes.
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7.3.3.2 Requirements specification
We apply the EARS framework to the foregoing prescription in order to implement a
policy with which VMFirstLife can identify the institutions from which it can harvest
data without infringing copyright.
1. Ubiquitous requirement: The system shall verify that the type of institution
from which data is being harvested is:
(a) An administrative body of the State in Italy
(b) An administrative body of a region of Italy
(c) An administrative body of the autonomous province of Trento and Bolzano
(d) A local authority in Italy
(e) A union of a local authority in Italy
(f) A consortium of a local authority in Italy
(g) A non-economic entity of a local authority in Italy
(h) A non-profit organization financed by the State or region or local authority
in Italy
(i) An non-profit organization governed by public law
(j) An non-profit organization managed or supervised by an administrative body
of the State, region or local authority in Italy
(k) An organization with more than half of the members of its administrative,
managerial or supervisory board appointed by an administrative body of the
State or region or local authority in Italy
(l) A museum
(m) A library, including university library
(n) An archive
(o) An archaeological area, an archeological park or a monumental park.
2. Unwanted behavior: IF the type of institution is as follows, THEN the system
174 CHAPTER 7. CASE STUDIES
shall request for a license to re-use the information in question:
• An organization entrusted with the operation of services of general economic
interest of an industrial or commercial character i.e. a public undertaking;
• A museum, library or archive, where re-use is not for historical purposes;
3. Optional Feature: WHERE the system is required to apply for a license for
RPSI, the system shall request re-use using the form in Figure 7.9.
Request to re-use information produced or held by








Indicate what information you wish to re-use 
(provide as much detail as possible)
Please indicate how you wish to re-use the 
information (for example, on an intranet site, 
to copy for in-house training papers, for 
commercial publication)
If you are planning to publish the 
information, please provide details such as 
publication title, website address, name of 
publisher. 
Figure 7.9: The PSI request form (Courtesy of The National Archives, UK).
7.3.3.3 Compliance pattern generation
Context: Firstlife has a competence i.e. geo-referenced web platform technology that
enables it to re-use PSI for commercial purposes to coordinate urban institutions.
Problem: FirstLife has data collection algorithms that can re-use restricted informa-




1. An ubiquitous requirement : delineating 15 types of institutions from which VMFirstLife
can harvest data without a license.
2. An unwanted behaviors requirement : identifying two instances where VMFirstLife
is obliged to apply for a license to re-use the subject information; and
3. An optional feature: a standardized form that VMFirstLife can use where it is
required to apply for a re-use license.
7.3.3.4 Legal risk management
We manage FirstLife’s risks by adding further activities to the strategy map as depicted
in Figure 7.10. These are activities to verify the type of institution and request for RPSI
licenses where necessary. Corresponding activities and competencies have been added
to the value model on the VDMBee platform and the implementation can be examined
at FirstLife Value Model.
7.4 Conclusion
This chapter set to evaluate the CPF by exploring the regulatory conversation of two
startups. We first set out a case study protocol as a foundation for the case studies.
The first startup BitPesa presented a gap-filling scenario envisioned in the literature
review in subsection 2.4.5. This required going beyond legal interpretation to fill the
extrinsic gap in the legislation. The second startup, FirstLIfe presented a scenario for
data management that required an interpretation of the legal institutions from which
its system could collect data. The legal argumentation was less about confrontation
and more about defining the scope of institutions from which data could be collected
without risking copyright infringement. This will prove invaluable in an age where
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governments are under pressure to tighten their data protection regimes and copyright






























































































Figure 7.10: FirstLife’s strategy map with risk management.
178 CHAPTER 7. CASE STUDIES
Chapter 8
Conclusions
This thesis investigates how to make the law more accessible for legal risk manage-
ment in order to help firms manage their regulatory conversations. This chapter sum-
marizes the contributions in this regard in section 8.1 and considers future work in
section 8.2.
8.1 Contributions
This thesis introduces a compliance patterns framework CPF to help firms manage the
complexity involved in interpreting legal provisions. The framework endeavors to reduce
the complexity involved in interpreting legal provisions. Steps have been outlined on
how to model the business context, isolate the legal risk and formulate an appropriate
solution. Once the business context is modeled, using value modeling, abstract argu-
mentation schemes are used to ensure (1) the relevant legal rules are identified (2) any
ambiguities are resolved, and (3) the resulting outcome is applied. The result can be
summarized in a compliance pattern, following a context-problem-solution format. The
Compliance Patterns Framework covers the following sub-contributions:
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1. a meta-model formalizing concepts of the framework;
2. implementation of the meta-model to derive compliance patterns;
3. definition of a methodology for legal risk analysis using value models;
4. mapping multiple interpretations to business processes; and
5. extension of Eunomos with a module for interpretation.
In particular response to the research questions in section 1.4.1:
1. RQ1: To minimize legal costs for startups, chapter 2 reviews the relevant litera-
ture and proposes a comprehensive approach that applies interdisciplinary aspects
from business modeling, legal interpretation, informal logic and RE. We have de-
termined value modeling to be a suitable method for exploring a startup’s legal
risks by focusing on a value model’s competencies and activities. To develop busi-
ness models that achieve their value while minimizing legal risks, we were able to
remodel legal risk as value-at-risk using VDMBee, thereby expressing its impact
on the business model in monetary terms.
2. RQ2: In order to understand the uncertainty that startups face, we first conducted
preliminary case studies in chapter 3 of two court cases litigated at SCOTUS and
CJEU. Here, we were able to extract the steps for a legal risk analysis based
on the steps followed by the courts in discussing the cases. We also observed
the active role that canons from section 2.4 had in determining the outcomes
of the cases, even though they were not explicitly declared. To determine legal
requirements for disruptive technology, the survey in chapter 4 showed that we
need to develop an agile compliance formulation method that delivers action-
able prescriptions and specific requirements. We therefore began by applying the
VDMBee methodology in chapter 5 to discover and prototype business models
for the Aereo and TVC cases. Consequently, we applied argument schemes in sec-
tion 5.3 to develop templates of the canons in order to apply them in the risk
analysis process. Similarly, we apply argument schemes to characterize the legal
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risk analysis process in chapter 6. This helps to position the value model in the
relevant legal domain where the relevant issues are determined and interpreted.
A model for legal argumentation is incorporated in this process to reconcile and
determine the prevailing interpretations. Suitable prescriptions are then derived
and clarified using the EARS framework to derive compliance patterns applicable
to the value model.
3. RQ3: We redesign the strategy map by introducing a legal risk management
perspective that helps us to map the compliance patterns onto their respective
business processes. To transition from high-risk to low-risk models, we model two
phases of the value model on the VDMBee platform showing the As-Is (current)
phase, and the To-Be (compliant) phase. The activities managing the legal risk
are added to the To-Be phase of the model. This also helps to mitigate the
value-at-risk accordingly.
The compliance patterns are designed to clarify the necessary conditions for com-
pliance in a way that is accessible to system engineers, business executives, business
analysts and other stakeholders. This aims to help them make informed decisions about
the way to deal with legal risks. Should they revise the business model in accordance
with the compliance pattern to mitigate the legal risk, or should they accept the risk
and absorb the costs of non-compliance?
We test the CPF with two case studies in chapter 7 involving two startups BitPesa
and Firstlife. The case of BitPesa showed the need for a flexible approach to fill gaps
in scenarios where the regulatory framework was non-existent and uncertain. We were
able to develop a compliance pattern based on other jurisdictions that are already
regulating virtual currencies. The case of FirstLife highlighted the need for an agile
approach to manage their data collection algorithms. A further study is illustrated in
our paper Muthuri et al. [2017] where the TVC legal dispute in the area of copyright
law is illustrated. These cases show that the CPF is expressive enough to capture the
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essence of the legal debate, and yet can be summarized in a compliance pattern. In
particular the choice of using value modeling (VDML) to represent a business model, in
order to represent the legal context and problem of a dispute, turns out to be fruitful.
Value modeling can be linked to the Business Model Canvas, which is accessible and
usable by the target audience of entrepreneurs. It is precise enough to capture legal
choices, while avoiding the operational details of a business process model in a notation
like BPMN. From an RE perspective, this work improves on the requirements elicitation
process by elaborating on what may be entailed in the interpretive process.
8.1.1 Upgrading Eunomos
Compliance patterns could further enhance search capabilities in Eunomos to help
executives explore the legislation given a business model. In case of changes in the
law, compliance officers can find and update prescriptions affecting business models.
Diagnosis will also improve as executives will be enabled to find potential legal risks
and assess their relative impact using a value management platform such as VDMBee.
Most importantly, the compliance patterns distill legal advice into unambiguous system
requirements to help manage outstanding risks. In some cases, the patterns will have
alternatives for stakeholders to choose from.
8.2 Future work
A successful representation of the ontological and conceptual modelling of the intepre-
tive process sets the stage for formalization. Governatori [2005] applies ruleML, defea-
sible and deontic logics to transform a contract from an implicit to an explicit form so
that a rule engine can monitor its performance at run time. Similarly, our approach can
be incorporated as a module to derive possible interpretations in developing frameworks
for a) legal reasoning e.g. Rotolo et al. [2015], b) the management of legal knowledge
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e.g. Eunomos Boella et al. [2016] or c) for the acquisition and specification of legal
requirements in RE e.g. Nomos 3 Ingolfo et al. [2014], Legal-URN Ghanavati et al.
[2014] and FBRAM Breaux [2009].
Future work will focus on the formalization and streamlining of the argument
schemes and the compliance pattern generation process. Additionally, more work is
needed on a general method for quantification of legal risk, possibly in conjunction with
either statistical or rule-based NLP methods (cf. Boella et al. [2013a] and Robaldo et al.
[2011]). So far we have only explored one model of reconciling interpretive arguments.
How this model can interface with alternative models such as Araszkiewicz [2013] needs
to be investigated.
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CAUTION TO THE PUBLIC ON VIRTUAL CURRENCIES SUCH AS 
BITCOIN 
 
The attention of the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) has been drawn to media reports 
on the use, holding and trading of virtual currencies such as Bitcoin in Kenya. 
Bitcoin is a form of un-regulated digital currency that is not issued or guaranteed by 
any government or central bank. Domestic and international money transfer 
services in Kenya are regulated by the Central Bank of Kenya Act and other 
legislation.  In this regard, no entity is currently licensed to offer money remittance 
services and products in Kenya using virtual currency such as Bitcoin. 
 
This is to inform the public that virtual currencies such as Bitcoin are not legal 
tender in Kenya and therefore no protection exists in the event that the platform that 
exchanges or holds the virtual currency fails or goes out of business.  Some of the 
risks associated with buying, holding or trading virtual currencies include the 
following:  
 
x Transactions in virtual currencies such as bitcoin are largely untraceable and 
anonymous making them susceptible to abuse by criminals in money laundering 
and financing of terrorism.  
x Virtual currencies are traded in exchange platforms that tend to be unregulated 
all over the world. Consumers may therefore lose their money without having 
any legal redress in the event these exchanges collapse or close business.   
x There is no underlying or backing of assets and the value of virtual currencies is 
speculative in nature. This may result in high volatility in value of virtual 
currencies thus exposing users to potential losses. 
 
CBK reiterates that Bitcoin and similar products are not legal tender nor are they 
regulated in Kenya. The public should therefore desist from transacting in Bitcoin 
and similar products.  
 
CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA 
DECEMBER 2015 
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